(Korean War History) Post #39. The Division of Korea, 1945-1948

Prof. Kathryn Weathersby

Earlier posts examined how US concerns about Soviet pressure on Iran, Turkey, and Greece in 1945/46 strengthened American determination to resist Moscow’s expansion in Korea. By the fall of 1947 the situation in the Near East had stabilized, since American pressure had persuaded the Soviets to withdraw. However, the US was now alarmed about Eastern Europe. The Soviets had established a puppet government in Poland as soon as the Red Army moved into this strategically vital area. In the other countries the Soviets occupied, however, Moscow had allowed the creation of coalition governments. By September 1947 it was clear that the Soviet Union intended to establish communist rule throughout Eastern Europe.

Bulgaria abolished its monarchy in September 1946 after rigged elections and Romania followed suit in 1947. In Hungary, free elections in November 1945 had brought the non-communist Smallholders’ Party to power. But in August 1947, after months of Soviet subversion, rigged elections brought an exclusively communist government to power.

In Czechoslovakia the Soviets initially allowed a coalition government of communists and non-communists. In fair elections in 1946 the genuinely popular communist party won 38% of the votes, while the posts of president and foreign minister were held by prominent non-communists. An economic crisis that began in the summer of 1947 raised concerns in Washington that active pro-communist agitation would succeed in bringing Prague under Soviet control as well.

In Western Europe, the severe economic distress caused by the war so strengthened communist parties in France and Italy that there was a real chance these key countries could fall into the Soviet camp through fair elections. To head off this danger, in June 1947 the US announced a program of massive economic aid called the Marshall Plan. Since the assistance was offered to all European countries, Moscow sent a 100-person delegation to the international conference convened in France to discuss how to respond. However, when the US refused to back down on its insistence that that countries must apply as a group and must open their budgets to American inspection, the Soviet delegation withdrew.

Czechoslovakia, still occupied by the Red Army, was enthusiastic about joining the Marshall Plan. Since Stalin understood that the plan was a means to create an anti-Soviet bloc in Europe, he summoned the non-communist foreign minister, Jan Masaryk to Moscow, where he demanded that Prague refuse to participate. The Marshall Plan then hardened the division of Europe as Stalin responded by establishing firmer control over the occupied countries. In August 1947 the Soviets began liquidating independent political forces in the areas it controlled.

It was these Soviet actions in Eastern Europe that prompted the State Department’s Francis Stevens to argue in September 1947, as we discussed in the last post, that if the US allowed Korea to fall into the Soviet orbit, “the world will feel we have lost another round in our match with the Soviet Union.” This would be very dangerous because the Marshall Plan would only succeed in preventing a communist takeover of Western Europe if the beleaguered people there were confident that the US would hold firm in its support for them.

Events in Europe thus pushed Washington towards staying the course in Korea. However, as we will discuss in the next post, there was also an opposite trend. By September 1947, the American military leadership increasingly believed that its occupation forces in Korea were more needed elsewhere.