Making Steemit Better: A Proposal to Flatten the Rewards Curve

in #steem3 years ago (edited)

This is a joint post that is endorsed by each of the following people: @ats.david @clayop @donkeypong @gavvet @hanshotfirst @jesta @kevinwong @liberosist @sigmajin @smooth @snowflake @stellabelle @timcliff


Since Steemit began almost a year ago, there have been many complaints about the disparity in its voting power and rewards distribution. The main source of this discontent has been the n^2 system, which has concentrated voting power in the hands of large stakeholders, so called whales. In short, while there were good intentions behind this system and its lottery-style rewards, it has created an unfair game that only whales can play. The present system super-concentrates voting power for whales and leaves the masses with very little influence.

It is time to fix Steemit and settle on a better distribution of voting power and rewards. And that is why a large group of us (many of whom do not agree on much else!) have come together to support a more equal system. We are posting today to urge Steemit Inc. to adopt a near-linear rewards curve.

Criticisms of the Current n^2 System

“A handful of posts are draining the rewards pool”. “Whales vote for popular content, not the best content.” “Why do we need these large-scale curation guilds just to do the job of distributing whale rewards to authors?” “My votes count for so little”. If any of those criticisms sound familiar, the n^2 system is the heart of the problem.

There have been growing concerns that Steemit has become an uneven playing field because of this n^2 system (more technically, n^2 + 2*400*n, where n is MVESTS with 100% voting power). While this system discourages self-voting, it also makes the reward system more like a “handful of winners take almost all” lottery because higher value becomes much higher by being squared (e.g. 1:5 in raw scores will results in 1:25). More specifically, as more stakes are voted for a post, it gets much larger rewards as shown in a below figure as an upper blue line.

Image via @timcliff

While this system might be efficient to alleviate the self-voting issue, it also has side effects. There have been criticism complaining that Steemit is rigged in favor of larger stakeholders. For instance, roughly speaking, a user owning 100 shares may have 10,000 times greater power than those who has 1 share (in the real cases, it surely differ depending on voting dynamics). The nearly winner-takes-all system also pushes people and bots to vote for the most popular posts rather than selecting the best quality content. Moreover, the highly concentrated power has given to whales a considerable advantage, while many average users are left with little impact on distributing rewards. Consequently, Steem is being perceived as an unfair, whale-bot-oriented system rather than one that is human-oriented.

The community has been pushing for a change. Recent debates triggered by posts from @snowflake, @timcliff, @sigmajin and @ats.david provided some good suggestions to cope with these problems, but until yesterday, there was no consensus about which solution was most practical. Yesterday, after many hours of debate on, everyone signing this post agreed that Steemit must apply a flatten reward curve. Furthermore, we agreed to support the near-linear system outlined below.

Theoretically, purely linear rewards would be the fairest method (one has impacts either no more or no less than the degree to which one owns). However, there still remains the issue of self-voting that could potentially harm user participation. As suggested by @steemitblog today (post link), a newly committed reward distribution equation on the comment reward pool can catch two rabbits of fairness and anti-abusing, i.e. self-voting (be advised that this post only deals with reward distribution method, not dealing with the comment reward pool or removing curation reward). For convenience, we’ll call it modified n from now. The equation of modified n is n^2/(n+400)

Details of modified n

The below figure with two lines compares the n and modified n systems. The X axis represents MVESTS. As you can see, the modified n is linear-shaped with a small offset in the beginning. More specifically, where X is 10,000, the modified n has 9,615 (96.15%). This means that a post can utilize 96% of voting power if it gets 10,000 MVESTS amount (note that a top article with $130 had about 27,000 MVESTS).


Then how can it deal with self-voting? When we magnify the 0-1000 range (below), the graph seems more curved and has a significant difference from the purely linear n. That difference applies a discount in the beginning to discourage profits from self-voting. For instance, if I have 100 MVESTS (approximately $7,000) and vote for myself, my vote only has 20-MVEST equivalent power, which lost 80%. If I self-vote with 1,000 MVESTS, I still lose 28.5%. Therefore, one would need to get enough votes from many others to reduce the discount.


Example Case

How would this new rule change the landscape of reward distribution? As of yesterday, we simulated the new system with real data. Before reporting this, it should be noted that the existing votes are subject to the current rule, so real changes in the new system would vary somewhat from this simulation result. For example, “voting concentration” under the current rule will be less likely to happen in the new system since voting on highly-ranked content and lower-ranked content will return smaller difference in curation rewards.

Compared to the current rewards (blue line), the new reward distribution (orange line) shows a flattened curve with the range between $25 to $71, which is narrower than the current range between $19 to $132 (a dip in the graph is due to posts with high comment rewards). Out of 100 posts, 27 would have smaller rewards but the remaining 73 would have higher rewards.

In short, it would result in less clustering and a broader distribution of rewards.



We expect that the new system can bring about significant improvements in curation patterns and in users’ perception about Steemit, which we hope will fuel more demand for STEEM. We urge the developers to implement the new reward distribution method universally as soon as possible, and furthermore adjust a parameter (constant of 400 or 2E+12 in terms of rshares) in order to balance between two objectives: discouraging self voting and deflating the whale advantage. If more Steemians would like to register your agreement with this proposal to make the system fairer, please add your comments and votes to this post.


First things first, an enormous thank you to each of you: @ats.david @clayop @donkeypong @gavvet @hanshotfirst @jesta @kevinwong @liberosist @sigmajin @smooth @snowflake @stellabelle for spending what I can only guess to be a lot of hours and doing some serious soul-searching.
I will not pretend to understand the mathematics with which I think many of us are somewhat bamboozled. Any assistance in the levelling of the playing field has to be welcomed and I thoroughly hope you get the support of your peers.
I understood the breadth of posts affected in terms of reward range. It looks like a post with few votes becomes a more attractive curation exercise and one with many votes is less attractive.
If a post has 100 votes and a value of $0.02 and another has 40 votes and $25.00 potential payout, would the 100 vote post become that much more attractive? I apologise if that sounds like a daft question - just trying to get to grips with it!
At the same time, could you make minimum vote %, say, 25% - there are many who do not understand that minnows voting at 5% is sort of useless. Under this scenario it could become more counter-productive.
Thank you all again. Your work and ability to find consensus is very much appreciated!
Posting this in Facebook support groups too.

If a post has 100 votes and a value of $0.02 and another has 40 votes and $25.00 potential payout, would the 100 vote post become that much more attractive?

This proposal will narrow the gap significantly. If people have SP, their votes will be more powerful. That will remain. What would not remain is the enormous amplification that the system adds on top of the already-large disparity in SP holdings.

If you look at the third graph in the post, the $25 post would be somewhere toward the left and its reward using the revised formula would be much smaller. The $0.02 post would be somewhere toward the right and its reward would be much larger.

Many thanks for that explanation @smooth - you guys are all doing an amazing thing by finding consensus amongst yourselves first and by being prepared to explain and rationalise the reasoning and the effects. Thank you.
Have a great time for the rest of your weekend.

One clarification, as i think @smooth may have missed part of what the question was looking for.

In @ebryan 's example, the gap between the 100 vote, $.02 post and the 40 vote, $25 post will be narrowed, but the narrowing will be based solely on the total SP voting for the post.

That is to say that fact that the first post has 100 votes and the second post has 40 votes is irrelevant. The narrowing of the gap between a 40 vote post with $.02 and a 40 vote post with $25 will be exactly the same.

In a perfect world, i don't think rewarding the 100 vote post for getting more votes is a bad idea. But i don't think there is a pratical way that can be done without making the system exploitable by sibyls.

I mostly agree. I deliberately did not address the 100 vote vs 40 vote issue because also agree with your comment that it can't be changed (my proposal has always been to stop prominently displaying the vote count because it is misleading and making it more visible is not only confusing but creates an incentive to deliberately manipulate it, as we saw in the case of the Hot ranking before that was changed).

However, I do think it helps, in narrowing the disparity. A 40 vote post may (and will) certainly earn more than a 100 vote post, but even when that does happen the disparity would often be much smaller, in practice. Maybe that reduces the degree to which it seems unfair, maybe not, but it certainly can't hurt.

great approach for all Steemians I think given I can judge this yet @smooth

The tech part is not my strong point, so maybe someone else can answer you there. As for curation rewards, there are still some different views in the community over how best to handle them. But I think voting on posts that are not doing well yet (or from content creators who are not yet well known) will prove to be the better choice.

Thank you @donkeypong, I really appreciate all your efforts. I have already posted this in both the steemit and our Aspiring Whales and Dolphins FB pages. Great job - you have no idea! I think that this will go a long way to getting vote distribution where it should be - not a cure-all - one step at a time. Have a great rest of your weekend. Namaste.


Whatever works, you can count me in. Obviously looking for a solution means there is a problem, experimentation will eventually get us there.

This is by and large the biggest issue Steem currently faces. Good work @clayop.

I stand behind this proposal. I see and know many people here who might benefit from a change as simple as this.

Agreed! I think about 99% of people would benefit... actually 100% if you have a long term view.

Well. We can't get anywhere if we don't look to see where we're going first. Always best to the look to the horizon and scan for problems on the way. Everyone seems to be doing that here.

Google Translate: I support it.

This is an outstanding post. The concrete examples and charts make it easier for the layman to understand. It would be amazing if this could be implemented!

I really do hope something like this can be implemented. As it stands I feel that Steemit is going to have a hard time really going anywhere at all. I would love to post content again on here but every time I think about sitting down and spending hours putting together a post and hope that a whale is going to upvote it just makes me cringe. So I just don't do it. It is a waste of time. Most others feel the same way. Getting upvotes here has nothing to do with quality. It is just this weird crap shoot. I just couldn't afford to spend my time here anymore and a lot of other people couldn't either. I could see myself being successful under this proposed model where as under the old model I won't be successful because I don't have any whale friends.

Here is the current Steemit model. The whales are the kings and everyone else is a jester trying to impress the kings.

Another thing to consider carefully: right now the shape of the curation reward curve is related to the author reward curve. Both are initially linear, and around the same point, the author rewards curve up and the curator rewards curve down. If the author reward curve becomes essentially linear, that will change the effect of additional votes on curation rewards. I haven't run the numbers, but I think it would make curation even less profitable for later voters.

So keep that in mind - making author rewards flatter without changing the curation curve will probably load curation rewards more towards early voters, which probably is a pro-bot change.

Great points. This is a first step and others probably will be needed. We were not able to find consensus yet on curation rewards, but hopefully that is something the community can discuss going forward.

Great idea and hats off to you guys who must have put in a lot of work before proposing this. I am no expert on these matters but am ready to support any incentive to balance the system. And by balance, I also means the psychological aspect because I have seen some "self appointing" themselves as "saviors" of the platform by misusing and abusing their wealth, making it a chore rather than fun, and a lower emphasis on wealth and its relation to rewards alone should go a long way in making it fun for posters as well!
Thanks guys, we have to keep experimenting till we get this right and I applaud your efforts!

Thanks. It needs to be fun for everyone, not just a few people.

Exactly! And I have knowledge of quite a few who have left the platform because they were hounded by these "self styled" saviors and had stopped having fun! This platform should be fun and we should find a way to ignore these pompous individuals with a large wallet who seem to be out to ruin things for everyone!

Agreed, Steem is too serious and negative of late... bring on the fun!!!! Let the little guy wield some decent voting power.

Thanks for this. I'm all in favour of modified n. It's good to see Steemit Inc is on the same page too. Of course, it's top level posts - not just comments - where this change is badly necessary.

The constant could be lower though. I'm seeing a lot of smaller accounts powering up to ~10-~50 MV of late. These are content creators and curators who may not risk-taking investors, but may want to power-up spare change for added influence. At 400, the curve is still too harsh on these voters. That said, 1 as proposed by Steemit Inc is perhaps too little to prevent abuse. I believe a compromise can be found in the middle, though I don't know what it is. Maybe look at the median MV of active users and target that as the point where the curve flattens out.

I stand behind this proposal. However, if possible, I'd like to see the 400 in the denominator lower than that.

Apologies @shenanigator, excuse my ignorance! What would that do in terms of the reward distribution?

With the 400 number in the equation n^2/(n+400), one would have to buy/earn a lot of Steem Power before they'd see their vote making a significant difference on a post with zero payout.

I want to increase the incentive to purchase lesser amounts of Steem Power because very few people can afford and will buy $50,000 worth. In order to do that, I think it's best to have a system whereby people see their vote making a difference with a much smaller stake.

If instead, we had something like n^2/(n+50), there'd be many more people on the platform whose vote meant something. They wouldn't have to purchase nearly as much Steem Power to make a meaningful difference.

I also agree with you. First of all, 400 may fit for the current system but we haven't found any good number for the modified n. And if the number is high, there are only few posts that become close-to-linearity while other posts are still suffering far below the n line. This will make more people and bots to choose few high-ranked posts and consequently current problem cannot resolved much.

If we lower the number in denominator (e.g. 400 to 50), posts with over 5000 MV votes already have approximately 99% of linearity so there's not much difference in piling effects between posts with 5000 MV and with 50000 MV.

Yes! That is a major psychological factor in whether or not new users will buy SP.

I just want my vote to be worth $0.01 !!!

(this is the voice of the masses)

I want to see and feel that I'm making a real difference in this big old world !!!

I'd even pay $100 to be like the rest of the people on this platform that are making a difference with their $0.01 vote !!!

Even if post payouts were displayed in STEEM to the 3rd decimal place. A minnow could see their vote was worth .002 STEEM and if they paid $20 bucks it would go up to .003 - that's the incentive for users to buy. People need to see that their investment makes a difference.

Golos (steemit spin off) has done it. :)

Wow... really? Did they just start with a more even distribution or how have they achieved this?

Perhaps because their low currency price. Hehe :D

Perhaps because their low currency price. Hehe :D

Ah, that would make sense. That's why I'm not too worried about STEEM long term... I figure the worst case scenario is that the price drops way way way down, which ironically is also maybe the best case scenario for fixing the distribution problem.

Exactly! I remember grinding and grinding just to try and get my vote worth .01. I just wanted to see the screen change when I voted something. I wanted the content creator to be able to see it too. I wanted to matter. .01 is logically very small... but is huge psychologically! Now imagine if you could move that decimal to .10 or 1.0! This proposal can do that.

Oh great, I didn't realize this proposal would make that much of a difference... now I'm really excited!

I should note that this proposal can eventually do that. I was just saying that it will give "regular" people more power. I apologize for using numbers here. I should have left that to the math people.

I just want my vote to be worth $0.01 !!!
(this is the voice of the masses)

You know, this is absolutely true, and a very big factor for many, and very often overlooked.

Thank you very much indeed, @shenanigator. This sounds like distribution would become much more fluid and quality content would be rewarded. I am very grateful for your very concise reply. Things are looking up!

I Agree

I want to increase the incentive to purchase lesser amounts of Steem Power because very few people can afford and will buy $50,000 worth. In order to do that, I think it's best to have a system whereby people see their vote making a difference with a much smaller stake.

If instead, we had something like n^2/(n+50), there'd be many more people on the platform whose vote meant something. They wouldn't have to purchase nearly as much Steem Power to make a meaningful difference.

I think this is a good direction to reduce the incentive for votes to cluster and is worth a try. If curating by voting patterns becomes harder/less profitable then naturally curators/bots should focus more on content and that could only be beneficial for the platform.

Go for it, the bots are out of control, especially this 1% vote group. I like Steemit (a lot) but as it stands I can't recommend it to many due to the lengthy explanations I would have to make about all its quirks.

I don't get the pile of 1% votes that I get.?? It is insulting actually. I was wishing that there was a rule that people have to give at least a 10% vote. Because if you don't think that my post is worth at least 10% than I would rather not have your vote at all.

Apparently they are bots and we sho
uld ignore them. Okay fine, but what happens to new users feelings when they have slaved over a blog to be greeted by that. It gets more ridiculous... I have a 0,1% voter....!!!!

I just did some research and found out they think that this is a good way to greet newcomers to steemit so that they don't feel ignored. It's called the Oprah Guild.

Seems to me that it is increasing bad feelings rather than lessoning them. At least now I know it is well intentioned. But I had to spend about 2 hours to figure it out. Plus now some members who would have normally given me a full or high vote are now only giving me 1%. Not that I'm only in this for $. But a vote above 10% makes it seem that my post has some value to them at least.

This place can be weird!!! Thanks for sharing your info, much appreciated 😀

This proposal won't eliminate the bots. For better or for worse, we need to learn to live with them. Most are annoying, but fairly harmless. Hopefully, this proposal will help make Steemit more fun for humans to use, too.

Cool and nice. Do it.

Thank you, Clayop. It's been a pleasure to work with this group on this proposal to make Steemit better.

great idea,
as discussed in kr community ... i agree with this idea... thanks...^^

I am so happy to read this. It is the NR1 issue on steem.

I believe Nr2. Is the curation reward system. Nr 3 is the fact that outside money needs to come in more directly.

Thank you for posting!

I agree with the need for change - the concept makes sense and because of the way you used charts more people can understand - well done on creating a clear post.

I like the way the curve applies a single mathematics formula to fixing the self-voting challenge. What this does is allow one to self-vote after the initial penalty has decayed.

fixing the self-voting challenge

This curve does not fix the self voting issue. It reduces payouts across the board. All payouts that earned very little already are reduced even more with this curve. It doesn't make the distinction between grandma's travel post or someone who would abuse the system.
It reminds me of the government wanting to ban encryption because a few terrorists use it ( as if it's going to discourage them) Here we have this curve trying to 'ban' everyone's post because a few self voters might abuse the system ( which I might add are going to self vote regardless of any curve).
You want to stop self voting content ? Downvote it. Simple.
Why only flatten shape of the curve? Just remove it altogether, it serves no purpose.

I'm wondering if you're missing the meaning of the curve. The curve shows how a post's reward is calculated as a function of how much stake is voting for it. It does not show an account's voting strength as a function of its stake.

What the linear curve would do is redistribute rewards from highly-voted posts to less-highly-voted posts. I don't think it would have much impact on low-voted posts (I could be wrong, I haven't run the numbers). It would just require a little more stake for a post to get off the ground, so to speak.

Define highly-voted posts please

Top 15 trending.

I know that it is stake weighted but how does this feature discourage self voting? Someone with a large stake will just upvote himself and even benefit from the curve since he has a lot of stake.

Sorry I'm late to answer this, and maybe someone else has already done so. The point is to discourage self-voting for garbage posts. If a post is worth something, of course it should be self-voted.

But if the post is garbage, the philosophy is to make sure that if the author is the only voter that he will have wasted his vote. Thus, you want the author reward curve to be steeper on the right than on the left. The way it's done in the current implementation is that at the far left (when the post hasn't received any votes yet), the curve is a straight upward-sloping line; after about 400 Mvests are voting for it, the curve starts to bend upwards.

The proposal in this post is to make the curve start out completely flat and gradually bend upwards until it's a straight line. Both discourage self-voting in the same way: they make sure that a post needs a little "oomph" to get off the ground, so to speak.

But if the post is garbage

A post with little weight on it doesn't make it garbage.

is the only voter that he will have wasted his vote when the post hasn't received any votes yet

The calculation is based on voting weight , it doesn't calculate how many vote were on a post, it calculates the weight.

Both discourage self-voting in the same way: they make sure that a post needs a little "oomph" to get off the ground, so to speak.

Someone who want to upvote himself is going to upvote regardless of any oomph. This feature doesn't discourage selfvoting at all, it actually encourages people to buy more steem power to self vote themselves.

I don't get it. If you're going to ignore my explanation why ask for it in the first place?

Your explanation of how the curve work is spot on, but this doesn't discourage self voting. It makes self voting less profitable for low SP account and more profitable for large SP account but doesn't discourage anyone .

It does not show an account's voting strength as a function of its stake.

It doesn't show it directly, but indirectly there is a similar effect because the most powerful accounts always "live" on the right side of the curve (they themselves can put a post there, so the only question becomes how far out to the right it goes) and the least powerful move between the right and left depending on the actions of the most powerful (in a sense this could be viewed as another way the most powerful have even more power).

Flattening the curve on posts flattens the power imbalance between accounts as one of its effects (or at least no longer amplifies it)

All payouts that earned very little already are reduced even more with this curve.

No theyre not. Vshares aren't porportional to payout except as a percentage of total vshares assigned.

as an example, imagine two posts. One post has 1MV of SP voting for it. The other, 100MV of SP lets assume that 1MV = 3 rshares, and and 100MV = 300 rshares.

Under the current system, the first post would get 3^2=9 vshares and the second post would get 300^2=90000 Vshares.. As a result, the second post would be paid 10000x more than the first post.

Now lets look at the modified system. Its dependent on the threshold, but lets take the n^2/n-1 idea that steemit, inc came up with (because i think its a better formula)

Under that system, yes, youre correct, the absolute number of vshares on the 3rshares post would be less. it would go from 9 to 5.5. But the second post, the one with 300 rshares would go down even more (from 90,000 to 909). As a result, the first post would get just under 1% of the reward pool, and the second post would get just over 99% (which is pretty close to linear, where it would be exactly 1% and 99%).

Note that, like others, i think this threshold is far too high. (though, tbh i like the one proposed by steemit inc)

It reduces payouts across the board. All payouts that earned very little already are reduced even more with this curve. It doesn't make the distinction between grandma's travel post or someone who would abuse the system.

Its not really possible to "reduce payout accross the board" (without changing the composition of the reward pool) because, regardless of the number of Vshares assigned, there is still the same amount of money being distributed.

The number of Vshares a post gets doesn't really matter. Its the percentage it gets of all vshares.

The entire rewards pool is awarded every day. So, there is no way, it reduces payouts across the board. It just might change who the winners are, or how much they win.

The curve gives voters with a large amount of steem power a disproportionate amount of voting power. When these users upvote content all content on the platform gets reduced. So it does effectively reduce payout across the board, except for a few lucky ones!

lol, I think you are describing what is happening now.

I don't understand all the math but I like what I do understand.

Haha this was me while reading through it.

I think that if something like ctayop's post has been pointed out as an unfair reward in steemit in the meantime, it can be improved a lot.

I fully support this post.
Thank you for your wonderful views.

And I this post resteemed

Crossing Fingers. Not holding breath.

good idea.. resteemed

Thank you too all of you who are working hard to address the current issues. A lot of this is over my head and I haven't been able to follow it closely. The community working together though is what will keep this place alive.

"The community working together though is what will keep this place alive."


The people on the list above have been spending a great deal of energy trying to figure out how to help steemit succeed. I'm just like you... a lot of this is over my head :) The reason I whole heartedly endorse their hard work is based on simple common sense. If you give the masses a greater sense of ownership in the platform, they will keep coming back and contributing. Everyone wants to feel like they "make a difference". This proposal would make that a reality.

A level field of play, it's just plain good sportsmanship! Incredibly interesting!

@steemvoter supports the improved curation model proposal.

TL;DR: I support this.

Long version:

First caveat: In this new scenario, there will be more posts getting a more balanced amount of rewards. Subsequently, as the rewards are getting evenly distributed, authors may start to post more content, to generate more income. In an ideal word, this would be quality content. We don't live in an ideal world. So the probability for spam increases under this model, since the incentive is bigger (until now, spam was "discouraged" because of low chances to get voted by whales). Maintaining the cap on the number of posts which can receive rewards, which is 4 now, AFAIK, should be enforced.

Second caveat: In this scenario, collusive voting behavior can generate more financial reward, so guilds may start to exert more power. I don't see this as either good or bad, just something that we should account for, one way or another.

If any of my two caveats is wrong or far fetched, please let me know how. We're in this together.

Thank you for the time spent in finding a new model, debating it and run the simulations.

I can only speak to my personal experience/opinion of being a Steem Guild member. The reason I whole-heartedly endorsed this proposal is because it will decrease the need for Steem Guild. Right now, Steem Guild members spend a lot of time and energy ensuring that hundreds of quality content creators earn some rewards for their contribution to the community. The goal is to retain as many creators as possible while encouraging them to continue to produce quality content. We currently help to reward approximately 400 content creators. If the rewards become less "top heavy", far more than 400 creators can earn significant rewards without the Guild's intervention. I have always said that I will throw a giant virtual party when the Guild is no longer needed. If this proposal is implemented, I think I will need to start figuring out how exactly to throw a virtual party.

If the rewards become less "top heavy", far more than 400 creators can earn significant rewards without the Guild's intervention.

But then another potential "Guild" can step in and aggregate another community of curators, which will redistribute the newly assigned rewards.

It only seems logical that, if more authors will receive more significant rewards, there will be more at stake. I didn't say "the guilds will increase in influence" with some sort of a judgement, like this will be either "bad" or "good". I just observed the possibility that new communities of curators can aggregate again, because there will be a more even surface of play. How this will tilt the balance, it's still something to be determined, IMHO.

Excellent point. Perhaps this will work like the entire system. Instead of a couple of large guilds, there will be many small ones. That would still help with the desired effect. Instead of rewarding 400 content creators, 4000 would be rewarded... or more. But you are correct, like everything here, we would have to wait and see the effect and then come up with another tweak if needed.

I agree. I think the role of Guild would be changed to "make posts beyond discount range". E.g. given 400 MVESTS discount, 3000 MVEST voting (about 1/3 of current Steem Guild voting) will make posts have about 90% linearity while it gives a post $7~8. If the discount is lowered under 100, 1000 MVEST voting would be enough to make posts attractive.

Second caveat: In this scenario, collusive voting behavior can generate more financial reward, so guilds may start to exert more power. I don't see this as either good or bad, just something that we should account for, one way or another.

this is incorrect. It would actually generate less. Additional users "piling on" would see diminishing (instead of exponentially increasing) returns. The curve becomes more linear as the support grows.

Incidentally, your first caveat is somewhat suppositious. You could make as compelling an argument that people would be inclined to spam low quality posts as a way of buying a "lottery ticket" at a chance for one exceptionally high paying post. The only system where there would not be a perceived incentive for posting more was one where there was no perception that the posts has any chance of getting rewarded at all.... which would obviously be a bad one.

I'd like to suggest that we make the shape of the reward curve adjustable by dynamic parameters that the witnesses can vote on. The "400" term in the denominator of the "modified linear" curve could easily be set by witnesses. If it turns out to be too high (which seems probable), the witnesses can change it.

Witnesses already don't do a very good job with the parameters that exist, and arguably in few cases (difficult to prove, so I'm not going to go and make accusations) have been influenced by witness self-interest.

IMO it is better to come up with solutions that don't rely on witness input any more than absolutely necessary.

Thanks for sharing your thoughts on this; always good to hear what you think!

Thank you for this! I've been suggesting the same thing lately.

And maybe as a first cut, keep n^x but let the witnesses vary x in the range 1 < x <= 2. I think this makes a change, but keeps it close to the original intent, so we can evaluate the change and then let the witness tweak it from there, without the need for further hard forks.

Thank you so very much for your dedication and hard work in relation to this. I have been following many discussion in partook to some of them. I really look forward to the end results, impact of this decision well awaited by so many of us.

All for one and one for all! Namaste :)

It is a good start for a fair change.

Seems worth a try; we are in Beta so we can experiment.

But why do we have to hard code the function?

If we go with modified n, does it make sense to allow the exponent and constant in the denominator to be parameters the witnesses can change by voing on them, like they currently vote to change the SBD interest rate?

Count we make an even simpler transition to n^x where x is currently 2 but can be any number that the witnesses vote for? n^1 is totally flat and n^2 is parabolic, but why not just keep the same equation and let the witnesses pick the exponent x so we don't need to wait for a Hard Fork if the reward function needs tweaked again the future?

Because n^1 has no anti-abusing mechanism. Modified n is basically the same as n if n goes to infinite.

Thanks for your reply!

Is it true that N^x does have anti-abusing mechanism where x > 1?

What about the idea of letting witnesses adjust whatever parameters are in whatever the reward function is?

For the existing simple n^2 equation, we could replace it with n^x where x = 1 + 1/y where y ranges from 1 to 10. The witnesses could simply vote for 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 or 10. So the equation's flatness could be varied in 10 steps between the flatest n^1.1 to the current n^2.

Or if we go with modified n, any thoughts on letting witnesses vote on the exponent and constant in the denominator?

Or if we go with modified n, any thoughts on letting witnesses vote on the exponent and constant in the denominator?

I'm time constrained, thank you for yours.
Let me just say that I would prefer to raise the bottom by a factor of at least 2, and preferably 3.
I don't like the idea of taking the n2 from the top, only raising the bottom to a level that can be shown to eventually add up to a cup of coffee.
Starbucks coffee.
I've been here since the end of august, I am in the top one hundred in posts, my efforts have been rewarded with 1000 sp by about 1470 users.
I don't have the skills to pull my total number of votes and contrast that to measure my 'popularity' against others.
I do have a running total of folks who have voted for me, they are who I follow.

That being said, I'd like some n2 when I got there, as well.
I don't wish to see anything taken from the whales if it can be avoided.
One of you math folks will have to tell me if that is possible.

I'm glad I'm not the only one who is actively trying to improve the content on Steemit. To that effect I created this campaign (please give me feedback, I just want to help):

I will upvote every constructive comment I get on Steemit with 5-10 cents in order to create a WIN-WIN-WIN.

You win by having me upvote and follow you, I win by having great comments and more followers and above all Steemit wins by getting better content.

Read about the rules and conditions here.

Please respond here or on my post with any feedback you have, thanks!

Everything started from new ideas. Cool beans!

What amazes and impresses me the most about Steemit is the people. Thank you all for working this out. I understand about 20% of what the hek is going on around here but one thing I am sure of, Steemit inc. better listen up and make some changes. Synereo, Akasha, and Yours are on the way.

I do not know much about algorithm for upvote, but this is good idea. Nice !

LOL I finally worked out how and where to make a comment. Wow what a great analysis this obviously means a lot to you Clayop. I see paralells in the slow but gradual death of Empire Avenue (now Empirire Kred) where we have after around 7 years a system that has not been flexible and now places all the power in the hands of whales merely because they have been there the longest. So much to study and learn and I am off to read all the other posts relating to this. Price of my STEEM down another 5% today obviously some action is necessary and your proposals seem fair and will promote the possibility of sustainable community

I think this is what Steemit needs to grow and be more fair, great work! your have my vote :)

Great idea! "If" it results in a fairer distribution and discourages self-voting, then it's a WIN WIN!

I fully support innovation on Steem, I got your back on this one guys. Voted!

My witness will upgrade to the hardfork that implements these changes for sure.

Great post @ clayop.good work.thank you very regards

Can you plot in sqrt(n), just for fun?

very good idea!

Thanks for great posting. I support it.

I mighthave missed this in the post but isnt the purpose of the current reward distribution model to keep value locked into the network to prevent the price of steem crashing. The theory being tbat newer user with less invested will sell their rewards and push the overall value of steem down quicker than the current model.

I was very supportive of flattening the rewards curve as well.. It's the removal of curation rewards that I find unacceptable.

Fantastic work to all involved here. Thank you. This is long overdue and I am enormously grateful for the time & work your group has clearly put into this proposal.

Is there some way in which the army of supporters which now stands behind you can offer our assistance?

Like by all putting our names to a further endorsement of this proposal?

Perhaps when enough of us stand behind this, there is no way it can be ignored?

Well done and clear proposal, I support it!

it is nice to see a post with almost half the number of votes in comments and a high number of views. I have feeling Steemit has been much harder on everyone the last couple of months, except the whales one might say. This is the reason I decided to power down, since there was really no advantages at holding the Steem Power I worked hard to cumulate. I am wondering what Steemit Inc. will think of this.

We are still in beta so I think the only way to know for sure is to try it. If we find there are massive problems we could readjust. Lets just try it already!

I still don't understand the whole voting stuff aka "rewarding system" and I am not interested anymore to investigate why some boring posts get more than others.
I just gave up thinking about it but then, the suggestion for 1% voting came along and this was a complete joke, feels like an epic fail, an insult for all motivated authors. I am sorry if I ever did this to you. Please don't do it to me.

Whatever works, is fair and keeps this fun community growing is good for me.

I thank all you technical masterminds.

@viva.witness will be supporting this if it comes to fruition.

I fully support this proposal!