eosDAC's Position on the EOS Constitution
eosDAC's primary concern is securing the EOS chain which includes the value of the tokens used in Delegated Proof of Stake voting.
한글 번역본: EOS 헌법에 대한 eosDAC의 입장
eosDAC has always followed the interim Constitution and RegProducer Ricardian Contract to the best of our ability. Recently a claim was made in Telegram about eosDAC being the "most outspoken in claiming that BPs shouldn't behave as if they were bound by the Constitution" (source) and "champions of BPs ignoring all governing documents" (source) based on Telegram comments from a member of the DAC (when asked for a source, this conversation was given as a representative sample).
As stated previously, EOS chain stability should be the primary objective of governance. This statement does not represent the whole DAC, but was signed by the current block production team (Rob, Michael, and Luke) and Saro. The recent ECAF order failed approval receiving only 4 of the required 15 votes. The stated position regarding ECAF from the block production team seems to be in alignment with other block producers and the token holders who vote for them:
We call on ECAF to refrain from issuing any orders which require modifying accounts. We ask ECAF to exercise appropriate scope restraint by entertaining cases of arbitration of contractual disputes only (ie those which might otherwise be heard by the civil justice system) rather than criminal matters.
This position appears to be in alignment with Block One as well from their post about a 2.0 constitution proposal:
Therefore, Block.one suggests ending all protocol-level arbitration orders other than to render non-binding opinions on the intent of the code.
The "call" and "ask" are similar to Block One's "request." No demands were made and the post makes no mention of the Constitution, nor is there any call to action to other BPs regarding how they should view the current governing documents of EOS.
As a DAC, we're a group of uniquely organized individuals each having our own views and perspectives. Unlike more centralized block producers, we don't have a CEO or President who represents the entire DAC. Our members are free to express their strong opinions with this understanding in mind as no one person can represent all the individuals of the DAC.
Leadership involves sharing a clear vision and direction for a future outcome people want. We're doing that in multiple ways such as participating in the on-chain solutions for lost key recovery, demonstrating how EOS permissions systems work to secure property, and being vocal about the limitations and risks present in the current unratified Constitution and the scope of ECAF's authority mentioned in Article IX and the ECAF Rules of Dispute Resolution. Individuals pointing out concerns in Telegram does not mean eosDAC, as an organization, thinks all governing documents should be ignored. Article XIV makes it clear, even in the event that one part of the Constitution is not enforceable, the rest is still valid. That means, for example, even if Article VII is not currently being enforced because smart contracts which don’t have Ricardian Contracts and are not open source exist on EOS, then we don’t ignore the whole Constitution.
According to our lawyers:
"If the Constitution is seen as an agreement, and is binding, between each member of EOS, Article IX would require members to submit all disputes to the Rules of Resolution of ECAF for the purposes of determining such dispute (i.e. making a decision of which of the parties submitting the dispute to ECAF arbitration is wrong or right). In distinction to this effect, Article IX does not appear to or to be able to operate as a contract between ECAF and BPs that obligates or compels BPs to carry out the orders/directions/enforcement of ECAF.
In the absence therefore of any express contractual provision in the Constitution requiring BPs to carry out the orders/directions of ECAF, it is difficult to see any obligation on BPs to carry out such orders/directions."
As block producers, we take the responsibility of securing the EOS chain seriously. That includes securing the value of the tokens, without which, the chain itself would not be secure as anyone could easily, without much expense, buy up enough tokens to vote in block producers to attack the chain, create double spends, or do something worse. We've stated our position on ECAF, as it exists today, but that does not mean we are ignoring the Constitution or that we're suggesting other BPs ignore it. We are asking for more clarity on the role and responsibility of base-layer arbitration on EOS as supported by the token holders via a ratified Constitution obtained through referendum vote. It's our current opinion that an unelected ECAF creates a centralization risk and has the potential to weaken the decentralized intent of delegated proof of stake which could harm the token price. If the interpretation of Article IX is that all rulings from ECAF, regardless of the content, have to be followed by Block Producers because all rulings involve some aspect of the Constitution ("All disputes arising out of or in connection with this Constitution") then we see no limit to the extent of ECAF's influence on the EOS blockchain. The role of ECAF has been debated since the beginning of EOS, and eosDAC is not alone in its concerns and calls for clarity via referendum. It is our current view that approving all ECAF orders without question could potentially harm the value of the EOS token, which, like all blockchains, is ultimately secured via cryptographic proof and trusted immutability.
Again, from our lawyers:
"The most obvious document in which there could be a contractual arrangement between ECAF and BPs - that required BPs to carry out ECAF Orders - would seem to be the RegProducer ricardian “contract”. However it is clear that no such contractual provision appears in that RegProducer document."
Is EOS a governed blockchain and what does that mean to the community?
Currently, and as the last unapproved ECAF ruling demonstrates, EOS appears to be governed by the token-elected block producers via traditional delegated proof of stake. If we, as a community, intend to implement more governance, then ratifying the Constitution (or proposing a different one to be ratified) via referendum seems to be the next logical step forward as a community.
Let's work together to clarify what EOS is, what we want it to be, and how it relates to a governed blockchain to secure life, liberty, and property for all.
If you’d like to help us continue building tools for decentralized governance on EOS and you’d like a voice within this community-owned block producer, please consider registering as a member of eosDAC and voting for custodians. The eosDAC Constitution requires 15% voter engagement, and we’re currently at 10%. Please register and vote with your EOSDAC tokens today: https://members.eosdac.io/
This post was put together by Luke, Saro, Rob, and Michael and does not (and can not) represent the full position of eosDAC. Sorry for the clickbait title. :)
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Really excellent post, thorough and clear.
This project is one of the most critical for a global awakening. Thank you for your efforts for our species.
I just resteemed your post!
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