EOS Resource Renting VS EOS Force Voting Dividends

eosunion (41)in #eos • 6 years ago

Part1. EOS Resource Renting & Rent Distribution

Last week, We published an article "After RAM, Here Comes the Time of CPU? "Which discusses the necessity and possibility of the birth of the CPU rental market. In recent days, BM (Daniel Larimer) issued a proposal on "Proposal for EOS Resource Renting & Rent Distribution" on Medium, and proposed to solve EOS resource problems through REX and SEOS (staked EOS). The original English text can be found at: https://medium.com/@bytemaster/proposal-for-eos-resource-renting-rent-distribution-9afe8fb3883a

This proposal lists a number of creative suggestions and analyses, the main points are the following three:

REX: It is a token in the EOS system that will only be generated after lending EOS resources. EOS holders lend their EOS resources to the resource exchange to obtain the current book value of the REX token, and REX obtains a certain rental fee (ie rent) by lending EOS, then the value of the REX token can be used in this way. The formula to represent, ie: REX = staked EOS + earned rent, so holding REX is value-added.

SEOS: It is another token in the EOS system. Each mortgage of an EOS will generate a SEOS, which can be converted into a delegated CPU and net resources for users to purchase. However, because SEOS is set to inflate at a certain rate during the lease period, holding SEOS is depreciating.

Voting requirements: In order to purchase REX, the account must set up and maintain a voting agent or at least vote for 21 BPs. They can change their voting rights when they hold REX but they have to vote. When the account sells all REXs, they can vote for less than 21 BPs.

The EOS Resource Renting & Rent Distribution proposed by BM will not only reduce the cost of using EOS network, but also increase the voting enthusiasm of EOS token holders and the participation of community governance. The user's generally low voting enthusiasm has been criticized most frequently after the EOS mainnet released, whereas this is exactly the other mainnet - EOS Force main network's promotional selling point.

So today we mainly discuss the fundamental difference between Renting & Rent Distribution proposed by BM, and the voting dividend mechanism of EOS Force Mainnet.

Part2. rental dividends vs voting dividends

The EOS Force Mainnet is another main network launched by the EOS Force team that is different from the current EMLG main network. It adopts a voting dividend mechanism to solve the problem of community voting enthusiasm. Judging from the data we have learned so far, this voting dividend strategy does have a significant effect. The voting coins has reached more than 30 million now, whileas only a few million since the start of the EOS Force main network on June 22. It has developed more than 10 times a month.

Then why didn’t the BM and EMLG mainnet sponsoring teams adopt the strategy of voting dividends at the beginning, but instead use the current strategy of renting dividends? Tracing back to the source is actually caused by cultural differences between China and the United States.

The EMLG main network is greatly influenced by the American culture. For example, the US team thinks it is bribery, so they proposed that EOS governance should not allow to vote for dividends. In the discussion of bribery, there was an incident that made the EOS community members very impressed - the "bribery election" of the EMLG mainnet BP campaign.

At that time, Laomao said that “50% of the distributable income will be distributed to the top 50 users who have been verified, for other EOS project support”, i.e., the retail investors will vote for a BP candidate with the EOS in their hands. If the BP candidate won, the "reward" promised by the candidate can be obtained.

However, shortly after this strategy was announced, it was labeled as a bribe by EOS New York. In the end, New York Branch of EOS.IO wrote a stern letter stating that such bribery runs counter to the charter proposed by EOS.IO.

BM recently proposed to rent dividends by encouraging users to purchase REX, but the mandatory voting involved in purchasing REX is not linked to the voting node reward, so it does not involve “bribery election”. BM bypassed the taboo of “bribery election” and positively increased community members voteing enthusiasm and improved the role of community governance.

Compared with EOS Force's mainnet which publicly commit to the “reward” canvassing, the effect achieved by the two may be basically the same, but EOS force allows voting dividends, considering the interests of human nature more, which is obviously more competitive in the Chinese market. (Because the EOS Force mainnet BP has a large part of the domestic BP), it can motivate users to participate in BP voting.

Part3. Conclusion

By comparison, the EOS Resource Renting & Rent Distribution proposed by BM and the voting dividends adopted by EOS Force are taking a completely different governance structure and operation mode, but they all have a strong market base. Being is reasonable, we can't predict the future development value of these two kinds of dividend mechanism, and we can't assert which mechanism is more vital. Time will give us the answer.