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RE: A call to separation of powers in Steemit
The total amount of rewards are fixed. If some SP holders don't vote than every other vote is worth more.
The total amount of rewards are fixed. If some SP holders don't vote than every other vote is worth more.
Does it mean that if all whales will not vote, the vote value of dolphins, orcas and minnows will increase?
Yes it's exactly what it means.
I thought that vote value is based on a fix interest of the SP holder? Like .0001% of the author's SP.
It is relative to votes cast. Only SP that actually votes during the relevant reward period is what counts.
If only one person with a tiny 10 SP minnow account cast one vote, that vote would be "worth" the entire reward pool! Currently about 20 000 USD per day!
So that explains well, why rewards nowadays are getting smaller, its because lots of people are casting their votes.
What could possibly happen then if the steemit population reaches a million? Could it mean lesser and lesser rewards?
More a function of the market price of STEEM. Rewards are generated in STEEM, but then converted to SBD (and STEEM/SP). Lower price of STEEM is lower rewards. But, yes, more votes being spread out is a factor too.
Im learning here. How to possibly increase the STEEM price?
Only by being more attractive to investors. I can't give a simple answer there, as it depends on many factors such as adoption, utility, potential earnings/yield, prospects for future appreciation, etc.
About investor. Im in the process of convincing an investor but Im having hard times because Im not that familiar with the steemit economy. Any advice on how to make the proposal appealing would be an advantage.
So, it makes perfect sense to motivate big SP holders to keep most of SP in "non-voting form" by providing higher interest rate for that format, as it was suggested here ?
https://steemit.com/steemit/@l0k1/steem-preferred-stocks-benefits-of-a-type-of-steem-power-that-does-not-confer-voting-power
I considered a very similar idea a month or two ago and discussed it with Ned and with some of the other witnesses. The idea went cold when none of us could come up with a good way to make it attractive to larger stakeholders. Curation rewards are somewhat superlinear by stake holdings in practice, so a linear increase in SP (virtual) dividends would probably more more attractive to smaller stakeholders (an obvious example being those whose curation rewards are too small to pay out at all). What is worse, the degree to which curation rewards are superlinear is variable as it depends on voting behavior so there isn't a good way (that I could think of) to create a formula that offsets it. Finally actually investing effort in curation has more of a payoff if your curation rewards are larger.
So it seems a naive version of this would just tend to further concentrate voting power at the top, as smaller voters opt for the dividends and larger voters continue to prefer to earn more with curation.
The obviouse solution would be to make this option available for large SP holders only, but that's of course something people would see as a privilege and reject.