RE: Revisiting Curation Reward: Hot Coffee, Cold Coffee, and Lukewarm Coffee
Investor's rewards are only given to accounts whose voting power is not used in a period. So it can be called as "inactiveness reward". The distribution is proportional to Steem Power.
So basically, you want to pay money to the people who contribute nothing (except their inactivity) but for the people who actually expend effort, you want the effort itself to be its own reward.
Why not go a step further. many people write because they enjoy writing and because they find the proccess of communicating with others to be rewarding. Why don't we pay people who want to make a money profit an investors incentive for not posting, and for the people who want to post, their remuneration can be the psychological reward of having written something good and shared it with the community.
Edit to add -- upvoted and resteemed for discussion though. Clayop is one of the good guys, and even though i don't agree with all of his ideas, i agree with the motivations behind them
I think you just solved Steemit's problems. They can eliminate incentives to do anything at all. They can create the coins through inflation, nobody can do any work, and magically, investors will show up and buy all the coins, making everybody rich!
Post HF17 steemit. Join the movement indeed.
It's revolutionary!
It's got electrolytes?
Very sad when you put it that way. Not much left to justify hanging around here if curation rewards walk the plank.
That's absolutely true, if you're a non-blogger. Basically, those who argue against curation rewards are saying that people who want to invest their money and simply upvote content provide no real value to the platform. They obviously miss the point that the people buying STEEM, powering up, and voting on posts are actually the ones providing the "money" that others are able to quickly cash out and realize as profits.
It says a lot about a user or a platform that is willing to shaft the actual investors and reward those who have no incentive or need to invest. These suggestions/proposals are reckless, in my opinion. The platform is based on incentives for both creating and evaluating content. To advocate the elimination of rewards for either one - but especially on the investment side - demonstrates a fundamental lack of understanding economics, the purpose of the platform's incentives, and how the platform actually functions...not to mention that they miss the actual causes of the problems that they presumably want to address.
And to make matters worse - these suggestions are being pushed by witnesses. This will certainly influence my witness voting, as will other issues, such as the willingness to accept hard fork proposals that I believe will be harmful for the platform.
Well said.
I couldn't agree more.
@ats-david for Governor of Steemit
@craig-grant
I'm not a tyrant, Craig!
Add advertisements to increase even further the investors incentives and you just invented Facebook!
Think reversely. Actually, the purpose is incentivising inactivity but charging opportunity costs for doing votes (exchanging with "psychic income"). And from other point of view, inactive users still hold Steem Power.
That's how the many other content systems work, so practically possible, and some authors already doing by declining rewards. But the difference is they are more likely to "create" contents while curators basically consume contents.
You may say finding good contents is also a hard work. Then, in the current system, does majority of voters put meaningful efforts to find good contents? Some may do but at least voting bots pursuing curation rewards don't.
Actually, no. Voters provide tiny fragments of information that are all gathered up and used in the curation process. If we discourage voting, we'll be left with passive readers who provide even less value than voters (if we're lucky).
Please tell us another example from economics where quality is improved by eliminating incentives or creating disincentives.
Voters should not be expected to work hard. Small rewards == small work. Maybe one voter is a stickler for grammar. Maybe another wants to support a particular category. Maybe another likes the color blue and the number 17. It's the aggregate of all those diverse and incomplete voting decisions that becomes the curated product. For better decisions, we need more voter diversity, not less.
Please tell us another example from technology, business, or social sciences where unassisted humans provide better quality than humans with tools.
This is yes and no, which is my point. Voters who don't read post, don't get any satisfactions, but just upvote provide any information about content itself. Their sign is mainly about payouts, e.g. if an author obtain high payouts repeatedly this type of voters are highly possible to upvote. I basically agree it has less financial incentives for other human voters. However, I expect their dissatisfaction from voting bots (e.g. concentration of votes on same authors) will be reduced and the overall they have more benefit.
My point is differentiating incentives into financial and psychic. However, if there's any way to enforce people to read posts to vote, I rather support it. Unfortunately, this is impossible on blockchain.
If you want to more understand my statement, please look at the number of votes and number of views on this post.
Imagine that I'm a fiction writer, and I want steemit to be a more welcoming place for other fiction writers, so I write a bot to upvote every post in the fiction category, whether I read it or not. Maybe I put in some basic checks for grammar and image files and length of article. Over time, I begin refining my bot to become more sophisticated about the content that it votes for. Even though I didn't read those articles, I still derive satisfaction from those votes. I'm also representing the views of some other group of non-voters, who would be attracted to the platform (if my votes prevail). It's the curation rewards that tell me (and steemit) how much of the community shares my interest (leaving aside the [n2] distortion). It's also the curation rewards that enable the whales (major longer-term stakeholders) to shape the platform content. Anyway, even if curation rewards didn't provide those services, shouldn't I get rewarded for my acts of representation?
And there is the crux of it. You don't like the way people are voting, so you want to force them to vote differently or stop voting. Even though, as @sigmajin already pointed out, the bandwagon voters don't actually influence rewards distribution anyway. And what are you going to do when you take away curation rewards and people continue to vote in ways that you don't like?
Those votes don't count. They're just here for the profit. ; -)
Edit: To put it simply, using this framework, your proposal might decrease Type-I voting errors, but it would do it at the cost of a huge increase in Type-II voting errors. IMO, that trade-off is contrary to the health of the platform.
Your framework borrowed from statistics is interesting, and thanks for your example. But please take my point: the issue is mixture of motivation. If you want to upvote every post in fiction tag, that's not because you want to maximize your curation reward but because you have some satisfaction from doing that.
@sigmajin's post is interesting too. But if no curation reward exist, the $160 might go to other posts by for-content curators. So they already meaningfully influence reward distribution, as well as voting counts.
The problems I perceive are, our filtration system for good contents are distorted by hybrid motivation. At least 500 bots (clues from votes on @steemvoter's posts. Maybe less but still hundreds I think) are round and casting votes for "profit", not for "quality of contents".
Yes, i understand it works both ways. Youre trying to get people to pay to vote. Now why would someone pay to vote?
One potential reason, as you pointed out, is the psychological reward. The warm peach fuzzy feeling that comes from supporting quality content.
Another potential reason (one which will, IMO, attract far more steem power) is that the money you can make by misusing your vote is greater than the money you are giving up through opportunity cost. Either because of kickbacks or because youre paying your guild payroll or whatever.
And i will point out once again that most of the whales voting for the worst content on steemit are, in fact, paying a non-trivial opportunity cost to do so. Disregarding this type of voter, and his maginified effect on the system after the honest voters are converted to investors, is just another canopener youre assuming.
Yes mostly the first point.
Second and third point seem remain with curation reward too. The magnitude can be different but we cannot tell it will be greater or smaller.
You hope.
The magnitude might be the same, but the effect will be magnified because youre taking the honest (but profit motivated) voters out of the system. That is to say, the bad fish might be the same sized fish, but theyll b e swimming around in a far smaller pond.
One possibility is stakes of sockpuppet voters are much greater than curators. But I think abusing the system will bring more stakes from the inactive to curation, especially for moderation (downvote abusers) because abusing consequently shrinks the pie so some investor on the edge are willing to give up incentives to prevent abuse.