Let's Talk About Secure Messaging Apps

in security •  last year

This is a topic that comes up every now and then, and it's one I have a number of fairly carefully formed opinions on, but I've not taken the time to organize those opinions and write them down, so this post is an effort to do that.

Some Background

First though, let's lay out the context: why do we care at all? I think most of us are already on the same page here, but for the sake of clarity, let's explore it anyways. There's a million messaging mechanisms out there, and some of them are already quite widespread, with email and SMS (texting) being your basic, as-close-to-universal-as-anything-gets options. Why do we want something else?

Well, we each have to answer that question for ourselves, but at this point I know that emails and texts are being collected and stored by people I don't know or trust. Private conversations between me and people I do know and trust are being intercepted, and could easily be tampered with in transit, by people I do not know or trust. From the start, that knowledge alone rubs me the wrong way. Even if I don't have something I actively want to hide, we're talking about my intimate details not merely being laid bare, but indexed and made searchable, to people I do not know or trust. Why would I want that? All else being equal, why would I not prefer to have that data kept private? Of course I prefer it is kept private.

But let's not be coy: we all have secrets and private thoughts and discussions. If you claim not to have secrets, I'll know never to trust you with any of mine. I absolutely do work with some information that I do want kept private, and I want good technical solutions for accomplishing that. Moreover, I know that there are people out there whom I actively distrust, who are actively recording mine and everyone else's conversations online.

So what, then, do I want in a messaging system? Well, thanks to my background in cybersecurity, I understand quite a lot about what is possible and what is desirable, and perhaps I can help some of my readers shortcut directly to the end of this search without going to grad school for cryptography like I did.

A Bit About Security in General

Everything in security is about adversaries. I want X, someone else wants (not X). Plug in whatever you want for X, and start figuring out strategies: we employ one strategy to get X, someone else employs a counterstrategy. Security is about playing those games out in our heads until we come up with our strategy for getting X, such that there is no effective counterstrategy.

And security is always open-ended: is there actually an effective counterstrategy that we didn't foresee? We don't know. If there is, and our adversary finds it before we do, we obviously want to figure out what that counterstrategy is, and then define our counter-counterstrategy to thwart it.

In practice, these games tend to continue indefinitely with each side either finding a still more effective strategy, or losing interest and giving up. In practice, there is almost always a more effective counterstrategy out there still to be found, it's just a question of motivation. This is the origin of the truism "every system can be hacked."

So from the start, we can state with confidence: there is no such thing as a truly secure X app, but there are probably a whole string of options, each a closer approximation to that standard than the last, having been designed to withstand all known counterstrategies. This general pattern holds true for pretty much every area in security, be it cyber or otherwise. Every lock can be picked, but if you care, you can get one that makes it really, really hard so that most lock-pickers will give up before they succeed.

In information security specifically, which is the most relevant field to messaging systems, there are three main goals that all secure systems try to attain. These are known as the CIA Triad (no relation to the Central Intelligence Agency):

  • Confidentiality -- Only those who are supposed to know the information can see it
  • Integrity -- Only those who are supposed to be able to modify the information can modify it, and they can only modify it in the appropriate ways
  • Availability -- All those who are supposed to have access to the information do have access to it, readily and easily

Within the study of information security, a system's security is formally defined as that system's ability achieve those three goals. If a system fails to meet any of those goals, it is insecure to the extent it falls short of them. The point to understand here is that security is not all-or-nothing. A system might have awesome confidentiality and integrity, but be really hard to use, and within information security, that system is not as secure as it could be. Whether that system is more or less secure than a system that has awesome confidentiality and availability, but makes no promises of integrity, is formally undefined and is entirely a matter of opinion.

There is no official badge of secure-ness that a system can get; it doesn't work that way. Information security gives us a language with which to understand and discuss what parts of a system are or are not secure against what attack strategies. It doesn't give us an objective rule or score as to how secure a system is.

And Messaging Apps, Specifically?

In messaging apps, then, security means that only the people I intended to be able to read my message can read it (confidentiality); that the message they got was exactly what I sent (integrity); and that all of them could easily read it (availability). So to warm up, let's look at our examples from earlier, email and texting:

  • Confidentiality
    • Email makes no attempt to hide the contents of communications from parties other than the addressed recipient
    • Text messages are encrypted between cell phones and the tower, but this encryption has been thoroughly broken since the 90's, and no attempt is made to hide the contents of messages while in transit between cell towers
  • Integrity
    • Email makes no attempt to prevent tampering of the contents of the message in transit, nor does it make any attempt to render such tampering evident after the fact
    • SMS makes no attempt to prevent tampering of the contents of the message in transit, nor does it make any attempt to render such tampering evident after the fact
  • Availability
    • Emails are usually delivered and people usually don't have much trouble getting them, but no formal guarantees are made that emails will be delivered in order or at all
    • Texts are usually delivered and people usually don't have much trouble getting them, but no formal guarantees are made that text messages will be delivered in order or at all

So neither of these systems ranks high in confidentiality or integrity, but both do pretty well in availability. SMS is arguably better at confidentiality, but when its feeble attempt at encryption has been breakable to every hacker in his mom's basement since 1999, it's hardly even worth mentioning.

OK, So What Do We Want?

In general, we want an option that covers all three areas (confidentiality, integrity, availability) reasonably well. So let's briefly discuss the state of the art in each of these areas:

Confidentiality is generally provided by encryption. Encryption means scrambling the message so unauthorized people can't read it. There are a lot of different algorithms to encrypt things out there, and most of them are broken and can be decrypted by people who aren't supposed to be able to. So we want to be sure to use an encryption algorithm that isn't broken, such as AES (the Advanced Encryption Standard, which is really just a title given to the algorithm most trusted by the National Institute of Standards and Technology, or NIST, at any given time. This title is currently held by an algorithm named Rijndael).

But encryption is a bit more complicated than that. Consider SMS: as we discussed above, SMS uses broken encryption, and it only uses this encryption between the cell tower and the cell phone. Everywhere else, no encryption is used. So even if SMS used AES, it wouldn't be very confidential because it would only hide the message for part of its journey. For encryption to give us full confidentiality, it must be End to End, which means that the sender encrypts the message so that no one except the intended recipient can decrypt it. Even if the message is not decrypted by a middleman, the mere existence of a middleman who could decrypt the message breaks the End to End property of an encrypted system. In practice, designing a system where no such middlemen can exist is quite tricky, and just because a system is called "End-to-End Encrypted" doesn't mean it really is.

So to sum up confidentiality, we achieve this through encryption, but not only do we need encryption, we need a trustworthy encryption algorithm, and that algorithm has to be deployed in such a way that we don't accidentally empower unauthorized parties to decrypt our messages. This is quite tricky to do in practice, and people make mistakes at it every day.

Integrity is sometimes provided by the encryption algorithm, but is sometimes provided by other algorithms. For example, AES alone does not provide any guarantees of integrity -- an AES encrypted message might have been tampered with, even if the tamperer didn't know what the message said. Suppose Eve has recorded several encrypted messages from Alice to Bob, including one that says "Yes" and another that says "No." Without actually knowing which one is which, Eve could simply swap one for the other, and this will destroy the integrity of the conversation without necessarily compromising its confidentiality.

Cryptographic protocols ensure integrity in a number of ways, and the issues at hand are complex enough to warrant several posts, so I won't attempt to cover them in detail here. It is important to note, however, that integrity and confidentiality often go hand in hand: while it's entirely possible to have either one without the other, we usually secure them both together, and when one goes, the other often goes with it.

The state of the art is that computers and software are now getting quite good at establishing a securely encrypted link to someone with guarantees of confidentiality and integrity of the messages between you and that someone, but the software can't guarantee that that someone is who you think it is, so to be sure, the humans must take some additional steps to verify that no third parties sneaked into the middle and started quietly passing messages back and forth between you and your intended recipient, possibly reading and/or changing them in transit. This is known as a Man in the Middle attack, or MITM.

Usually we solve this problem by trusting a central server to keep track of who is who and make sure that everyone is really talking to who they think they're talking to, but that server could just as easily lie and grant itself or someone else MITM access. Blockchain technology provides a decentralized, trustless solution to this problem, allowing software to associate a human-provided username to a particular account without trusting anyone who might lie about that pairing, but this is pretty cutting edge, and I don't know if anyone is doing this securely yet or not.

Availability is the red-headed stepchild of information security. While security blowhards will pontificate long and hard about confidentiality and integrity, frequently speaking as though these are the only goals that matter, in practice availability is the metric that actually guides people's choices in software. Consider email and SMS: although they both abysmally fail at confidentiality and integrity, they're highly available, which is to say they're easy and reliable, so everyone uses them. Simultaneously, other systems like GPG/PGP may have strong confidentiality and integrity guarantees, but only cryptography experts know how to use them, and even they rarely actually do because they're so much effort. So while confidentiality and integrity get all the press, availability is what makes the decision, and availability essentially boils down to "Yeah, but can my grandma use it?"

And therein lies the rub: a 'secure' messaging system that no one uses is not actually secure, because it's not available. Usability is part of security. It is a key part. Don't let anyone tell you otherwise. A truly secure system isn't just hard to break technically, it must also be easy to use correctly, and hard to use incorrectly.

In many cases, security boils down to a choice: do we take confidentiality and integrity at the cost of availability, or do we take availability at the cost of confidentiality and integrity? My goal is to find an acceptable balance of both.

Down to Brass Tacks: My Recommendations

In case it isn't yet clear from all of my discussion on security so far, determining whether a particular messaging app is secure or not is really freaking hard. To emphasize, when someone out there releases some app and says "This is a secure messaging app," that claim means absolutely nothing until a lot of really smart people who understand security at least as well as I do spend a lot of time and effort reviewing the underlying protocols and application code to verify that claim. I consider myself qualified to do such a verification, but I rarely do because it's a bloody ton of work to do well. For this reason, it's generally only security professionals (expensive) and academic institutions that go to the trouble.

Of the secure messaging apps I have made any effort to review, my recommendations today boil down to two different apps: Wire and Signal. To be clear, I have not undertaken a formal review of these apps myself (someone would have to pay me to do that, and I would charge a lot); however, I have read their own security claims and have examined the formal reviews of others.

Wire (https://wire.com) is my favorite, since it ranks pretty well in all categories. It's easy to use, it has pretty rigorous security standards, it's a partially open source system (the client apps and parts of the server code are open source), it has undergone formal third party security review (with acceptable results), and there don't appear to be any known serious flaws or vulnerabilities.

If Wire is my favorite, Signal (https://whispersystems.org) is my second favorite. Though far less feature-rich than Wire, it is based on the well-known, thoroughly reviewed, and widely implemented Double Ratchet protocol designed by Open Whisper Systems. This is probably the best protocol out there for confidentiality and integrity, since it's so well-known and battle-tested, being the protocol behind Signal, What'sApp, Google Allo, and Facebook Messenger, to name a few just off the top of my head.

The reason I recommend signal over these other apps is that, although these other apps are more user friendly and widely used (availability), they are also privacy risks as they are all closed source apps owned by companies known for hoovering up and storing forever any and all private data they can find. Thus we can safely assume that, unless additional evidence shows otherwise, when using these apps we have no confidentiality from their makers. Signal, in contrast, is open source, and the company behind it, Open Whisper Systems, publicly commits to protecting their users' privacy by retaining as little information as possible about the users' communications, even where doing so prevents them from implementing user-friendly features. This improves confidentiality at the cost of availability.

So Signal may offer a bit more confidentiality and integrity, but Wire is a lot easier and more fun to use (roughly: higher availability). I also note that Signal requires a phone number, which they use to improve integrity at the cost of privacy (a facet of confidentiality). Also, for maximum security, both of these apps support an additional manual key verification step to ensure that no Man in the Middle has crept into the connection.

Honorable Mention goes to Keybase (https://keybase.io) which was recently pointed out to me. Based on the widely respected, but rarely used, GPG/PGP protocol, Keybase makes GPG easy enough that people can now use it painlessly. Furthermore, Keybase leverages the Bitcoin blockchain to help provide confidentiality and integrity guarantees without the manual verification steps that most other apps benefit from. Of course, manual verification can also be performed for optimal security. From what I see so far, Keybase might be more secure than Wire or Signal; however, I haven't spent enough time looking into it to form a trustworthy opinion.

And Now for the Snake in the Grass

Extreme Dishonorable Mention goes to Telegram (https://telegram.org), which I want to highlight specifically as an app which, in my opinion, is not secure at all.

Telegram is marketed, quite emphatically ("Telegram is more secure than mass market messengers like WhatsApp" is a direct quote from their FAQ page), as a secure messaging app; however, since shortly after its publication, Moxie Marlinspike (a well-known and respected hacker, co-author of the Double Ratchet protocol that powers Signal and others) pointed out irregularities in the protocol which render its security claims suspicious.

One would expect a reasonable team acting in good faith to re-evaluate their protocol's security, and perhaps enlist a respected security firm to review their designs, after such a cold reception by the cryptography community. Instead, Telegram doubled down and launched an open challenge to break Telegram's security. This would seem to indicate their confidence in the security of their protocol, and put the ball in the court of those claiming it is flawed. Instead, Marlinspike pointed out that this challenge was designed in such a way that it can't be won, no matter how bad the crypto is. He even provided an example of a trivially breakable crypto protocol, and pointed out that even that protocol can't be broken according to the rules of the challenge.

This conversation is fairly old at this point, but Telegram continues to persist and market itself as a secure messaging app. There are plenty of unsubstantiated claims in the wild that Telegram is secure, but I've never seen one with any substantiation based on the underlying cryptography. There are, however, plenty of articles on how it's not secure, from respected sources that provide substantial evidence for their claims. And there are now at least two papers formally presenting actual attacks on Telegram's protocol: 1, 2 (I have not reviewed these papers in detail; I see no reason to spend the time on it).

So why so much hate for Telegram? Because they still actively market their app as secure, and at this point, I can only assume that claim is an intentional lie. I try to give people the benefit of the doubt, and apply Hanlon's Razor ("Never attribute to malice that which is adequately explained by stupidity"), but at some point I have to ask myself: can I really believe they're that stupid? Or, are they trying to deceive people? I honestly cannot imagine that someone can be that stupid; I think anyone acting in good faith would have questioned themselves by this point, and in this case, once the question is honestly asked, the answer is honestly obvious. So while I have no positive proof that they are intentionally lying, all signs seem to point that way. Please tell me, dear reader, am I being unreasonable?

Conclusion

So to wrap things up, let me emphasize that this is a complex issue, and it's one that I do not take lightly. I have a great deal of experience that I believe qualifies me to opine on what is and is not a secure messaging app, but I do so with hesitation because even for me, it's a lot of work to form a quality opinion. It is for that reason that I don't have an opinion on every messaging app out there. I have found a couple of apps that I do trust for my day-to-day messaging, and I'm always on the lookout for more, but at the end of the day, this is a game of one-upping that we'll be playing forever, because that's how security works.

I recommend Wire and Signal, and possibly Keybase. I strongly warn all to actively distrust Telegram. These opinions are based on thorough and thoughtful, if not professional grade, reviews of the software and security in question, based on a background of formal training in cryptography and cryptographic software protocol design, reverse engineering, analysis, and exploitation at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, thanks to which I am able to understand and participate in technical security reviews.

My opinions are my own, and they are only intended to be good enough to satisfy me, which is a highly subjective standard. They are provided in the hopes that they are useful, but I make no promises that they are valid. If they aren't, please let me know. :)

Thanks for reading

With a background in software development and a passion for security, Nathan has identified blockchain technology as his niche. He is dedicated to creating applications which empower individuals to shape a better world for themselves and others.

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very much informative post ..

For phones my favorite has to be Silent circle its a paid app and they offer an encrypted phone as well.

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In my post I linked to this article by The Grugq, another hacker whose name I recognize. He recommends Silent Circle, and his recommendation is probably at least as good as (read: probably better than) mine. :)

That was so informative, thank you for all your hard work, I have followed you because it was so good. 🕉

There are only few things I dislike about Signal (even though it is still better than most other end-to-end encrypted messaging apps out there).

One is their annoying insistence of using phone numbers, which as you mentioned hurts privacy (especially with the app sending contact information on the phone to their servers to help with discoverability). It is nice that apparently as of December Wire allows usernames. However, I read that they are apparently using an older version of Open Whisper Systems' Double Ratchet protocol, which, short of actually studying in detail what does differences are, makes me a little bit nervous to trust compared to Signal's more battle-tested protocol.

Another, which I am not sure if any of these secure open source end-to-end encrypted messaging apps have currently resolved, is the need for a great user experience when using multiple devices while maintaining synchronization between them. If I am not mistaken, I think the Double Ratchet protocol makes doing this more complicated because there needs to be communication between the various devices to keep everything in sync. It should be possible to, for example, jump between laptop and mobile app to respond to messages in a conversation thread while maintaining end-to-end encryption and having the full identical copy of the conversation on both devices.

I would love to see a messaging application use the Signal Double Ratchet protocol but leveraging human-readable account names on a blockchain to establish the secure end-to-end encryption between the users rather than phone numbers or even usernames in a namespace managed by a central authority.

By the way, there are two properties relevant for messaging applications that you didn't bring up in your post: forward secrecy (so that future compromise of private keys does not need to leak past history, unless explicitly backed up) and plausible deniability (so that even the person you were communicating with does not have cryptographic proof they can show to others that you said any particular thing). The Signal protocol (and I guess Wire's protocol too as a result) have both properties. The trade-off with having forward secrecy is that if users want to have their conversation history backed up, it requires a more complicated process to do so. I am not aware if Keybase has plausible deniability. They have made the design decision to avoid forward secrecy for the sake of easier backup of conversation history, however they are apparently planning to add a special "exploding messages" feature which will have forward secrecy, which seems like an appropriate compromise.

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Great points all around, @arhag, thanks! Yes, Wire's protocol is based in part on the Axolotl Ratchet, which was later upgraded to be the Double Ratchet, which is technically only part of the Signal protocol (as Double Ratchet only manages the cryptography, and not the key exchanges, etc etc). According to Wire, they went off-book from the official Axolotl protocol because they wanted to not require a phone number, and Axolotl (and Signal still today) use the phone number to provide some of their security guarantees, so removing it isn't trivial and takes some innovating.

And yes, I think I was clear that I do not regard Wire's protocol as being as secure, from a confidentiality and integrity standpoint, as Signal; however, Wire is much more available, what with it's easy and friendly usernames (rather than SUUUUUUPER finicky phone numbers in Signal, et. al.) and it's nice UI/UX. And all of that comes with the addendum that, AFAIK, Wire's protocol has not been seriously attacked, even after having been formally reviewed by a university's security department (they found a potential MITM vuln that the servers could exploit on video calls, I think, but MITMing video calls is tricky in its own right, and Wire said they knew about it and were planning to fix it; not sure if they have yet or not).

Yeah, Wire has an acceptable UX for adding more devices. I'm not sure about Signal's. On Wire, you can add a new device to your account at any time. If you or your contacts have previously verified all the keys in any conversation, Wire yells loudly and won't let you send messages in those conversations until you've confirmed that you know there's an unverified key in the conversation (even if it's supposedly your own key). New devices cannot decrypt old messages, only new ones going forward, so a new device gets nothing historical, and if people have been verifying keys, probably nothing new either. The place Wire really fails is when I add a new device, I ought to be able to verify it on one of my old devices, and then have the old device send a signed assertion to all my other devices/my contacts saying "Hey, old key you've already verified here, just letting you know that according to me, the new device is legit too." Now, the contacts can decide for themselves whether they accept that assertion, but in general there's no reason to assume that an old key is compromised just because a new device showed up on the account.

As to blockchain integration, yes yes a thousand times yes, I'd like to see this done really well too. Keybase might be it, but I haven't taken the time yet to look into it.

As to forward secrecy and deniability... Yeah, you'll note I actually never even talked about keys in my article. That alone warranted enough prose that I got scared off. There are so many posts that could be written and not even scratch the surface... Haha. And one can't properly understand forward secrecy and deniability without understanding keys (symmetric and asymmetric) at the very least.

Thank you. I will reconsider my opinion on Telegram.

Really good article. Thanks!
I would like to add that Signal currently works on only Androids and iphones, but Keybase works on both computers and phones, which is a significant advantage in my opinion. Of course both are constantly improving, so things will change.

Could you do an article on Keybase? I think there is more to it, as the core is not messaging, but PGP - and that made simple. Messaging is just one application that can benefit from PGP, but there is more too, isn't there?

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There is Signal Desktop for laptops/etc, however it still requires a phone, much like Whatsapp on desktop.

For me, the main big question about Telegram is the business model. I just can't believe the development is funded by pure benevolence/philantrophy. The only reason they haven't made it a federated, free network is that they want to make money of it, or are already making money from it.

Very interesting post. I have to admit, a lot of it is over my head though. I am very concerned about security online. I just don't like my privacy being violated by anyone or any country. It's just none of their business. No, I don't do anything illegal but my life should be my own. After reading this I realize I really need to take the time to learn more about it. Thanks for your post!!

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I think it's in all of our best interests to spend a little time thinking about this. Whatever app you go with, though, make sure and do some due diligence and look for third party security reviews and search around online to see if anyone has broken their security. It only takes a couple seconds to search 'is X secure' and survey the first page of results! :-)

This was a terrific analysis man. I feel like Neo

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hahaha old meme but still cool

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Ah :))))))

Wow, very interesting read.

Where do you stand with gaining access to the accounts of known terrorists if it means that a future attack could be thwarted? I'm not saying secure messaging for the masses is bad - quite the opposite - I believe our privacy is being eroded in the name of fighting terrorism

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Leaving aside futile preemptive attempts to deny terrorists access to secure communications, I have no more problem with cracking a terrorist's vulnerable computer system than I have with cracking a terrorist's vulnerable skull. Provided of course that by "terrorist" we mean a person who is actively initiating violence against others in order to manipulate the innocent through fear. Such attacks invite defensive force against the attacker through whichever vectors are available to most efficiently minimize harm to the innocent.

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There are some who would argue that pretty much all the organizations committing acts of terrorism today are exactly the same organizations who are claiming that no one except them ought to have access to strong cryptography or else terrorists will use it.

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You can't be serious. Banks already co-opted the state, and in the words of Max Keiser: "Lloyd Blankfein is a financial terrorist". It doesn't matter if the criminal organization is debilitating your existence through nail bombs or financial fraud and usury, the state (current one at least) already is a terrorist organization.

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Why not just block the areas who are known to harbor terrorists right to access the internet. Why must everyone pay for a few bad apples mistakes.

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Starting with the USA because it has the highest number of terrorist?

Interesting food for thought.

I have a question regarding getting others on board. Imagine having a group of friends or colleagues, who are not interested in this stuff at all, and look at whatsapp and email as perfectly acceptable even if they would know it's being read by others.

"I'm not doing anything against the law, therefore they can know everything I do"

How would you go about convincing these people to use another secure app, at the cost of a lower availaibility to them. (And how do you get them all to use the same so that you do not need 8 different clients to communicate with your friends).

About the aggressive marketing of Telegram as secure whilst not being secure,... As a government, it looks to me like a good deal to have someone think he is safe while he is not. The Cracking of Enigma without the Germand knowing it probably shaved about 2 years off WWII...

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Hi, @walkerlv :)

Controlling other people's behavior (which includes "convincing these people to use" and "get them all to use"...) is hard. It takes a lot of planning and forethought and often doesn't actually work. The entire field of security is effectively about controlling other people's behavior, and then cleaning up the mess when things don't go according to plan. :-P

That's why you see my strategy with this post wasn't to say "people should do X, and here's my credentials for why I'm qualified to say that," but was instead was "hey, here's a whole bunch of knowledge and info I've gained on this topic. Perhaps you haven't thought through this yet, so hopefully this gives you a head start and makes the topic a slightly higher priority on your mind now that you know enough to act." :-D Now for you and everyone else, always be wary of people doing that, since it's easy to manipulate people by only giving them particular information. But in general, if you want people to do things, help them understand why it's in their best interests, and then give them the knowledge that empowers them to act.

That will usually be enough, and they'll motivate themselves from there. If they don't, they probably don't yet see why it's in their best interests to act, so you've got to figure out how to connect this thing you care about with something they care about.

So as for the "I have nothing to hide" crowd, they're tricky because they're choosing to ignore reality. You could ask them why they trust the state, ask them to question whether the state in real life seems to be made up of the good people doing good things they associate with it, or is that just opinion formed from TV and marketing? But all of that is just as likely to bounce off because it challenges a more fundamental belief that they aren't willing to question. You've got to figure out what that deeper belief is, and fix that first. Once you've dug deep enough and found and eliminated the root lie, they'll fix everything after that on their own in time, as long as they don't adopt another lie along the way.

And yes, I strongly suspect Telegram as being in cahoots with malicious states, in an attempt to honeypot people into trusting as private an app which is intentionally designed to not be private from the state. The psychopathic level of their false advertising, and the kind of marketing they get from apparently unrelated organizations... Telegram was famous briefly for being used by a group of 'terrorists' to 'secure' their communications, which sounds like pure storytelling to me. It's exactly the same strategy for getting people to act that I used in this post. Think about that.

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This had got to be the most elaborate and most thought out answer I ever received to a question on steemit.

Thank you for taking the time to do this. You make many excellent points, in the short run, I doubt I'll get people to switch from using email and whatsapp :)

Killer write up. I haven't finished reading this yet (but will). I'm personally a huge advocate for Signal. Primarily due to them being open source in nature and well respected in the security community. I also enjoy the ability to use it across platforms as a Chrome extension, even though I'm not really a huge Chrome fan, myself.

There are many valuable lessons here and not all of them relate to security. I learned a lot, thankyou. This article exemplifies what Steemit can do to teach people. A knowledgeable person talking intelligently and succinctly about a subject with great relevance in an area of massive misinformation and providing context. You also teach that there are no shortcuts to truly knowing something for yourself and we are all starting to find out how hard that is now we are finding out that so much of what we used to trust, can't be.

What're your thoughts on Secure Scuttlebot?
SSB

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Ooh... This is interesting. And so wonderfully clearly explained. The security model looks quite straightforward, and I like their laissez-faire approach to the key exchange problem. Once a feed has some history, it's trivial anyways since time is factored in... You'd have to check for that, though. Manual kex is easy enough, though.

Might be possible to do an eclipse attack on someone... Not sure.

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If you dig around on it a bit, there's a developer in MXC working on it. Not too far away :)

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Ha, not at all. Cool!

At this point I prefer wire over signal.. and matrix over both of them... I vote always for total decentralization,free software(as in libre) signal is not totally decentralized as far as I know.. wire it is/half wa source they still opening the code step by step and Matrix is the only one fully open source but not all channels are encrypted I think you have to enable it..

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I'm not familiar with Matrix. I agree, full decentralization is desirable, but it's also hard to achieve, especially with an acceptable user experience. And as I said, availability tends to end up being the deciding factor in real life. Perhaps that's one of the reasons why Telegram is so popular: their security is a joke that forgot to be funny, but they seem to be quite well funded, and it shows in the stability of their app.

@modprobe Great post! Pretty new to all these technologies . I will sure follow you, bcause I'm interested to learn more.
Thanks

Good post and good review. I use signal and make sure when I use it the other person is using it too. The one thing Signal should do is add a pin or key pad to open the app itself for ios. I haven't seen that feature on it. I learned a while ago the hard way that nothing is secure. If the Police or Feds want in, they will get in. In my case they did it in real-time with a device called a stingray (kind of like a man in the middle attack) once they deploy that its over. They can see everything and pull everything off of the phone in minutes. The funny thing they did with me before changing my password was strike a conversation with me through my safari browser. So every time I would type something, they would reply when I would refresh the page. It was a scary experience to know that my privacy can be violated so easily and for no reason. In the end, all I got was an apology and the police telling me it was a mistaken identity issue. Oh and if you think pre-paid flip phones(dumb phones) are safe think again. When I switched over to that they were dropping my phones, and adding new contacts to my contact list. This was over 2 years ago, but for now I use signal. Thanks for making people aware with your post.

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Yes, a stingray is a perfect example of a man in the middle attack. And yes, I'm told pretty much all phones sold in the US have malware embedded in the firmwares to give stingrays and who knows what else full access to all data on your phone. They rape your battery, too, I hear.

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Yes, at the time I knew nothing about the draining battery thing, and my phone would get so hot I couldn't even touch it. On the flip phone I could hear them but only on my side of the conversation. So it wasn't perfect, unless they wanted me to hear them! It's a scary feeling having someone control your phone like that. I can see where they can upload stuff to a phone and use it as evidence against them if they want to be evil with it. Plus police departments sign a non-disclosure agreement with the Feds not to admit they used it. They have let people walk on crimes that otherwise would had brought them 10 plus years all because they don't want to admit to using a stingray. Looking forward to more posts!

Hi, very good post. Just to add one to the discussion I can recommend Wicker app. Seems it got lot of strong sides. Have anyone here tried it?

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I've heard of it, but I don't know anything about it yet

This was a beast of a post! Really enjoyed it, and learned a few things for sure. I agree about your stance towards security. Ultimately, whether you have something to hide is beside the point (although, as you also pointed out, there are of course things we want hidden).

I want to really thank you for pointing the way to the applications you mentioned. That'll go a long way towards helping me build a more informationally secure life.

I installed Signal on my cellphone and it did require a phone number during setup but does it ever need you to use that number again? (I haven’t used Signal long enough to know.) I used a landline number that I have regular access to but is there anything to stop you using a payphone for anonymity?
Unlike some apps it didn’t insist I use the number of the cellphone itself nor did it check the number for “validity” (some apps won’t allow VOIP numbers, or require human intervention to do so).
UPDATE: I just now tried to install Wire. It also required a phone number and was happy to send a code to my landline. The app then failed to accept the code, with the helpful error message “something went wrong”.

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Wire does not require a phone number. It does allow you to provide one if you like.

With Signal, you need the phone number later because the phone number is the only way to add people. Also, note that you may have to enter the phone exactly as they originally entered it in order for it to be found. I know that's how What'sApp works, and with What'sApp, you can't even start the conversation from within the app. You've got to leave the app and add them to your contacts first, then go back to the app and search to see if it found them, and then go back and edit the contact to twiddle the formatting of the phone number if it didn't, until it finally does or you give up. It's pretty much the worst UX imaginable, I have no idea why people put up with it. At least Signal lets you do it all from within the app so it takes like a tenth of the time and effort.

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Wire is very misleading!
Anyone only trying to install it on a cell would assume a phone number was required because the “create an account” page in the app only gives that option.
It was only because you said Wire didn’t need a phone number that I bothered to install it on my PC where the “create an account” page allowed me the option of using an email address instead (which I could then use to log in on my cell). Who designs these things?

Thanks for all of the information. I use and app called confide which you didn't mention here.

Great job breaking them down. Far as I'm concerned...I'm always assuming I have no privacy which is sad in a way. If I want to get something important to someone...Might as well go old school... Note sent by courier pigeon!

in my opinion, nothing is secure especial in IT. But your post deserve my upvote and resteem...

Thank you for the review. Secure messaging applications I fear are becoming more and more important this day and age.

Thanks for taking the time to organize your thoughts and opinions on this subject - very helpful information and easy to read.

Thanks for the post. Very interesting. I'm coming up in the IT world and probably see myself doing the same as you in the future. A follow from me.

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If you mean the academics, I wouldn't recommend it. Maybe hang out with your local university's club if they're any good, but otherwise, I would just do wargames and CTFs online if I could go back. I would not bother with academia, and certainly wouldn't pay for it.

I could point you to some decent resources if you tell me what types of security particularly interest you :-)

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Thanks for the reply. At this moment in time I actually don't know what I would be going into. Any insight or guides would be greatly appreciated.

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Well, that's a longer conversation than Steem comments can handle. Feel free to look me up on Wire and we can talk about it! :-)

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Haha yes true. I proposed a private messaging system for that same reason. I'll join and contact you.

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Alright, my username on Wire is @nn

I know for a fact I'm going to reread this a couple of times. Thanks so much!

Wow, an extremely interesting article. I have been wondering about whatsapp security lately and considering a move to another messaging app. Not that I have anything to hide but it's not nice to know that your private messages are being read by a stranger.

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What'sApp is based on Signal's protocol, so it's probably secure against random internet hackers. But it's owned by Facebook, so assume that it's telling facebook everything you say and who you say it to. Signal itself can be trusted a bit more (to the extent that you trust OWS more than facebook. I personally trust OWS a lot more than facebook).

What do you think of Minds.com?

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I haven't tried it. Does it have a messaging service built in?

Thank you for sharing your knowledge.

Thnx @modprobe , this is one of the most helpful articles I've been reading lately. Will u be making more of these? would be great.

Cheers,

ernstjan

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I certainly can. Are there any topics of particular interest to you?

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Great, like all the topics where average people have trouble understanding like every single bit of the aspect;). Security mainly. I think a lot of people can learn a lot from posts that are easy to understand like this one.

cheers.

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Yeah, but I know a bloody ton about security, so where do I start for my next post? :D

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haha you're asking me? that's funny. I don't know because I'm clueless. I will think about something easy where a lot of people could benefit from and I'll come back at you later okay? :D

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Sounds good. :) What's a security-related topic you wish you knew more about? It's a very open-ended question, but I welcome all answers!

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Maybe something about online wallets/ hardware wallets etc. The safety of those wallets? I think most people lack information and I know there's information about it, but I think u could be better at explaining than most of the things I've been reading. Thnx

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Good idea! I'll think it over :-)

I like this post...

There seems to be many practical uses for this technology .

Great article keep it up!

great stuff

Very interesting post!

Excellent Post !

Great post.

It's sad that most of today's users are not concerned at all about the security of their information, specially their messaging apps.

No wonder the most widely used have very weak or no security at all (Whatsapp, Viber, Messenger, Skype, among others).

Hopefully one day however people start realizing how important this is and start doing something about it ; and that's something that won't be happening any time soon - or so I believe.

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To be clear, What'sapp and others often have strong security, but bad privacy. You should assume Facebook is reading and recording everything you send on What'sapp, even if random Internet hacker can't, because Facebook makes What'sapp, so when you use it, they control your data before and after it gets secured.

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"others often have strong security, but bad privacy" is such a concise way to refer to the problem with this type of outlook.

Following as of now...

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I couldn't have said it better!

Congratulations @modprobe!
Your post was mentioned in my hit parade in the following category:

  • Pending payout - Ranked 6 with $ 691,45

Very interesting post :) I go and read more :)

Thank you for sharing this. Very important to know!

One thing worth mentioning is the recent exposure of CIA malware which allows an attacker to screengrab while these apps are being used, circumventing any encryption altogether. Be ever wary.

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Yeah, if you have any reason to believe you have any kind of malware on your device, I would not recommend trusting it with anything until the OS is reinstalled fresh, and all data ported back over only after several different malware scans. I never trust malware to be only a little malicious. :-P

Very interesting indeed your publication thank you for sharing it with the whole community friend @modprobe

This post makes me feel like how I felt back some 5-6 years ago when I wanted to give up the internet an almost technology on a whole. How does one truly know when they have privacy? I have an headache just thinking about that.

Will be back to this post for a re-read.

Very interesting

Everybody use messenger but very few people like you know about security.

well written article, thanks for your hard work !

I like your work, I resteem it.

Thank you for the write-up, modprobe. Cryptocat is secure as you are going to get for a free messenger.

This post received a 83% upvote from @randowhale thanks to @modprobe! For more information, click here!

bitmessage is an Secure Messaging Apps,What other security apps do you know?

I'm sorry to disagree but I would neither recommend Wire nor Signal. Those are centralized services and not free software. Signal seems so fishy as it maps to phone numbers so they can easily tell whom you a are communicating with and when. So you end up in the same level of privacy as WhatsApp (or worse, as the service targets only privacy-aware users) , feels like a honeypot.
You cannot expect any privacy/security with closed software.
Messengers I do recommend are XMPP (Conversations for Android, Gajim on desktop), Matrix/Riot, and the fully decentralized ones: Ring, Tox and BitMessage

Keren

just assume that nothing is confidential.. thats the only thing you can do... agree it or not..

Wow very Nice article. What do you think of the status app. They just finished the ico which caused etherum network crash. What About security? Thx for your feedback.

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I haven't looked into it. What's your take?

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I like the concept what they are doing, but like most people I cannot judge security because its a complex thing. But it must be good because it could kill your reputation in a day.

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But they are really serieus, before the ico they already gave https://blog.status.im/status-network-token-bug-bounty-a66fc2324359 a bug bounty of 50.000. Maybe you can find a bug. ;-) what is youre best real use case crypto besides steemit? ( mine will be GAME-MGO)

very thoughtful post Nathan. I'm curious as to your thoughts on mobile secure messaging? i currently use Hushed and from what I've read it seems like the best balane of easy to use and secure...

With that said...I'm also curious as how we can verify the claims some of these services make? Be it whisper or hushed...any of them really. How do we track the progress and security of each? Ensure that they're open source and regularly test them? Does that give us definitive evidence that our messages are indeed end to end encrypted without any sort of 3rd party intercept that might be able to crack the encryption?

Sorry for all the questions, your post just got me to thinking. Thanks again for sharing.

Hi! Have you heard about @krwhale? It is similiar with @randowhale. For your information please click on.

Quality article! I just downloaded Wire and Signal!