Do We Have Free Will? A Neuroscientific Approach And Its Consequences

Throughout history the most complex questions humanity has sought to answer have been pondered by philosophers and scientists alike. Among the questions still unsolved is the question of freewill. Do we, as human beings choose freely, or have our decisions and choices been predetermined? As of today, the existence of free will remains unclear. However, thanks to the theories developed by philosophers along with new technologies and sciences, we might be a step closer to a concrete answer. The question of free will is not only a complex problem, but it is also of great importance and bears significant implications for the way society is ordered. In law, for example, knowing if free will exists or not would revolutionize the way in which we assign guilt and responsibility to people for their actions. The purpose of this paper is to explore what is known and suggested about free will through philosophy and neuroscientific research, and to examine the potential consequences for society that this research presents.

It is impossible to debate the existence of free will without first defining it. Nevertheless, this task is complicated enough in itself. A common definition for free will is the capability of choosing between different courses of actions without impediments (Omoregie 2015). Many more definitions exist, for example: 1) voluntary, 2) the power of acting without the constraint of necessity or fate, 3) “the power or ability to act freely” (Mele 2006), etc. As these examples show, free will is not clearly defined, and even philosophers belonging to the same school of thought have constructed different definitions for it. Philosophers’ definitions of free will present varying degrees of ambiguity. One of the reasons for this ambiguity is that it is difficult to discuss the question of free will without building parameters and constraints around the decision-making process itself, given the relative simplicity and complexity of the thousands of decisions the individual makes every day.

From a philosophical perspective, there are several different theories to explore, all of which are later complicated by the introduction of neuroscientific research. For the purposes of this paper, I will explore the theories of incompatibilism, compatibilism, and libertarianism. These ideas are built upon the theories of determinism and indeterminism, the question of whether or not “all choices are completely determined by previously existing causes” (Determinism | Philosophy n.d.) and if all choices are dependent on previously existing causes, does free will exist? The incompatibilists state that free will and determinism are incompatible. If determinism is true, our actions are nothing more than consequences of events in the past. Our actions in the past were consequences of events even further in the past. If we follow this theory to its natural conclusion, we can say that all our actions are consequences of events in the remote past. Nevertheless, what happened in the remote past was not up to us. So if our actions are consequences of events that were not up to us, then the actions themselves are not up to us (Kane 2005). Therefore, according to incompatiblism, if determinism is true, there is no free will. On the other hand, the compatibilists hold a different perspective. The difference boils down to what constitutes free will and how freedom itself is defined. To them, free will is more about the freedom to do otherwise, and freedom is nothing more than the power or ability to want or decide to do something(Kane 2005). In other words, compatabilists believe that if an option is presented but an individual wishes to choose otherwise, if nothing is impeding that choice, the individual will choose the alternative they prefer. In the eyes of the compatibilists, free will and determinism are perfectly compatible.

Compatibilism and incompatiblism are founded upon the idea of that choices are determined by previously existing causes. Libertarians on the other hand pose the reverse question. Libertarianism argues that free will is incompatible with determinism. If human beings have free will, therefore, determinism must be false. The enduring problem with all of these theories is that they cannot be regarded as whole truths, because they lack evidence. Neuroscientists, unsatisfied by the philosophical theories of free will decided to put these theories to the test by delving into the brain to determine the precise moment in which a decision are made. As will be discussed next in this paper, scientists attempt to define free will at the simplest level: a movement motivated by conscious intent.

Some scientists, unsatisfied by the philosophical theories of free will, decided to take the challenge in their own hands. Benjamin Libet utilized neuroscience as a tool to explore the question of free will. He published two ground breaking papers in 1983 and 1985. These papers are the first real attempt to address free will with scientific empirical research. While their brain activity was being monitored, Libet had participants flex their wrists or fingers ‘spontaneously’ and record on a special clock the precise moment when they were recognized to establish a conscious intention for this movement (Libet et al. 1983; Libet 1985). Before discussing about the results, there is a key concept to know, readiness potential. The readiness potential is an increase in electrical activity in a part of the supplementary motor area (SMA) which indicates preparation for motor movement. In these experiments, on average, there was a lag of 350 ms between the recorded time of conscious intention, and the participants movement readiness potential. In other words, on average, participants recorded the conscious intention 200 ms before the movement and the readiness potential happened 550 ms before the movement (Libet et al. 1983; Libet 1985). It used to be thought that first we had the intention of moving and then the brain went through all the processes to produce this movement. Nevertheless, these papers suggest that the brain does all the processes to start a movement before even having the conscious intention of movement.

The natural follow up question would be, if the readiness potential occurs, then does a movement always follow? Libet mentions the capability of vetoing a movement even when the readiness potential has happened, but did not explore it more in depth (Libet et al. 1983). Fellow scientists Marcel Brass and Patrick Haggard sought to answer this question. Their experiment was very similar to those of Libet but with two key differences. They used an FMRI to monitor the brain activity, and on some self-chosen trials, the participants were to cancel (or veto) their pressing of the key. The analysis of the FMRIs suggests not only that the readiness potential for both a movement that went through and one that was canceled is the same, but also, when a movement is canceled, an area of the fronto-median cortex is strongly activated (Brass and Haggard 2007). This tells us that taking the readiness potential as a measure when a movement starts and then comparing it to when the participant has conscious intention might not be enough.

A year later, despite all the criticism and doubt of Libet and his experiments, Chun Siong Soon along with Marcel Brass and others published a paper pushing Libet’s experiment a little further. The experiment, even though similar, had some key differences. The participants were being monitored with an FMRI while staring at a screen at a fix point as a stream of letters was displayed. The participant had two buttons, one in the left hand and one in the right hand. At some point after the experiment had started, when the participant felt the urge to press a button, he/she was to press one button, it did not matter which. The participant had to remember the letter being displayed when he/she made the conscious decision to press the button. Then a ‘response mapping’ screen would appear with four choices in it. The participant then had to select the letter he/she remembered with a second button press (Soon et al. 2008). As stated before, it was unclear if the readiness potential in the SMA was where a decision for movement started; among other things, this was part of what the paper was set to answer. The researchers also wanted to see if with the FMRI information, they could even predict what button the participant was going to press. The results were astonishing. They concluded that on average, predictive information for a decision can be tracked back 7 seconds to the parietal and prefrontal cortex (Soon et al. 2008). In other words, they confirmed Libet’s findings and they were able to predict what button the participant was going to press. It would be as if someone else knew what you are going to do before you knew what you wanted to do.

The results from Libet and Soon suggest that free will is indeed an illusion. Nevertheless there are still many gaps to fill and areas to expand upon to come to a certain conclusion about its existence. Once we know about its existence, we may come to a conclusion regarding what philosophical school of though was closest to the truth. Until now scientists have been backtracking the neural activity that precedes movement and comparing that to the moment participants recognize conscious intention for movement. Libet took it from the motor cortex to the SMA while Soon took it even further, to the parietal and prefrontal cortex. But is it possible to pin-point the precise moment and location in the brain in which this entire process is initiated? This remains to be seen and requires further research.

The majority of this paper has been dedicated to the philosophical and scientific cases for the existence of free will. What however, are the practical and social implications if free will is proven to exist or not? Would this knowledge change our behaviour? Emilie A. Caspar along with other scientists ran a clever experiment to get some insights into this question. The experiment was set to asses three different considerations, “to what extend belief in free will impacts the number of socially unacceptable actions that participants carry out, participants’ vindictive behaviour over their co-participants, and the sense of agency over those actions” (Caspar et al. 2017). For the purpose of this paper I will focus only on the significant results that were obtained and the methods related to these. The experiment was designed as follows. Fourty people were divided into two groups, one control, and one primed, each one with five male and female dyads. Three to five days prior to the experiment, participants were asked to complete two questionnaires onlineThe way participants were primed was with a reading right before the experiment. The control group was given a paper that did not mention free will while the primed group (no free will group) was given one that challenges the existence of free will. The day of the experiment, participants would access the room where the experiment would be held in dyads along with the experimenter. The participants would be given the role of agent or victim at random and then they would switch. They would sit on a table facing each other and the agent would have a keyboard in front of him/her. Then there were two runs, each one with 120 trials (60 for agent victim and 60 for victim agent). The first run was a free-choice one, meaning that the agent was free to press the letter F or H on the keyboard in front of him/her on each trial. If the agent pressed F, he/she would receive an extra five cents but the victim would receive a painful shock while at the same time a loud tone would sound. On the other hand, if he/she pressed H, the participant would not receive an extra five cents and there would be no shock, just the loud tone. The second run was a coercive one, meaning the experimenter would dictate to the agent when to apply shocks to the victim. The experimenter would instruct this at random on 30 out of the 60 trials (Caspar et al. 2017).

The results of this research are quite intriguing. The no free will group administered less shocks that the free will one, but when looked at closer, the difference between males from both groups is not significant, the difference comes from the women. On top of that, when analyzing vindictive behaviour, the researchers found out that in males, the higher the score they had for fatalist determinism (no free will), the less vindictive they were, while in females, the higher the scores they had for free will, the more vindictive they were(Caspar et al. 2017). The researchers suggest this difference might derive from higher scores in empathy from the females. Several replication attempts need to happen before we start taking these results as reliable. Nevertheless, this paper suggests that our perception of free will does affect our behaviour! In females, the less they believed in free will, the less vindictive they were and the less shocks they applied to the other when they were agents before victims. In males, the less they believes in free will, the less vindictive they were.

Throughout the centuries, philosophers have debated and pondered the existence of free will. Recent neuroscientific research challenges our current philosophical understanding of free will, suggesting that it may in fact not exist as we currently understand it. Furthermore, research has shown that certain beliefs about the existence of free will affect individual choices. What does this mean for society as a whole? There are tremendous societal implications if free will is empirically proven to be an illusion. Imagine a situation in which a researcher would always be able to predict what movements you are going to do, even before you are aware of them. This would be a direct threat to free will and would have several direct consequences in society (Smith 2011). The most significant change I imagine would be in our current law and justice system. Punishment is enforced over people who hurt or put others in danger, but all of this is under the assumption that the criminal acted out of his own will and therefore deserves to be punished. Then, how can we judge a person for his/her own decisions if these decisions did not come from his/her own free will? I believe our justice system would have to shift towards more reformative and rehabilitative options. Furthermore, the consequences would not stop at a societal level, but also would have an effect on the way we interact and think about the personal relationships we share with those around us. Not too long ago, I found myself discussing this research with a very puzzled and upset girlfriend. The reason was that I had stated the research done by Libet suggested the nonexistence of free will, to which she asked: “Does that mean that you, for yourself, did not choose me?”. If free will is proven to not exist, humanity would have a difficult time adjusting to this idea. Nevertheless, in the long run, my hopeful belief is that this would direct us to build a society in which we give up praise and blame and adopt a truer understanding of others and the environments that have shaped them (Kane 2005). I believe that achieving a greater understanding of the way we and those around us make decisions would allow us to be more empathetic and perceptive towards discrimination and privilege which, as a whole, would enable us to create a more equitable society.