Yes, It Was the Chinese Military Who Sank a Philippine Fishing Vessel; Yes, This Is an Act of War

"We denounce the actions of the Chinese fishing vessel for immediately leaving the incident scene abandoning the 22 Filipino crewmen to the mercy of the elements... We condemn in the strongest terms the cowardly action of the Chinese fishing vessel and its crew for abandoning the Filipino crew. This is not the expected action from a responsible and friendly people."
-Philippine Defense Chief Delfin Lorenzana, 12 June, 2019

"Maybe the other side didn't mean to brush against our boat."
-Philippine Defense Chief Delfin Lorenzana, 19 June, 2019

Okay, I waited for a while before writing about this for two reasons: I wanted to do some reading on the history of the issue, and I wanted to wait and see the responses from Zhongnanhai and Malacanang (plus, I wanted to cheat and write about the issue with the benefit of a small bit of hindsight). But as the incident occurred on 9 June and it's now 25 June (so much time has passed that the Philippine president even expects China to be releasing their official lie... er, "findings" about the incident soon (Lopez (1)), the time has come to address China's sinking of a Philippine fishing boat in what Philippine Defense Chief Lorenzana describes as a "hit and run (ABS-CBN Staff (1))," followed by actions on the part of the Chinese captain which were cowardly at best, and at worst were proof of a deliberate and premeditated attack. Let the record plainly show that all evidence points to the latter.

In Case Anyone Hasn't Heard About the Incident...

"[The Philippine vessel] was anchored at the Recto Bank, meaning it's not moving. It was anchored because it's already evening. It was hit by the Chinese vessel. After the collision, the Chinese vessel immediately left, escaped. It's like a hit and run."
-Armed Forces of the Philippines Western Command (AFP Wescom) spokesman Lieutenant Colonel Stephen Penetrante, 14 June, 2019

"Do not allow a little maritime accident, uh, or intentional, go to... (mumbling unclearly)"
-Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte, 17 June, 2019.

"According to our report, it's far from accidental."
-LTC Penetrante, 14 June, 2019.

According to the captain of the destroyed Philippine fishing vessel F/B Gem-Ver 1, it was the evening of June 9 when the Gemver was fishing near Recto Bank in the Spratly Shoals, an area of sea where the Philippines, Vietnam, and China have overlapping claims (though China's claims have absolutely no basis in reality). That is when his fishing boat was rammed by a Chinese fishing vessel, later identified as Yuemaobinyu 42212. Immediately, Gemver began to sink and its crew were forced to abandon ship, and the Yuemaobinyu departed the scene at high speed (Talabong (1)). The Filipino crew had to row (and swim, with barrels as their flotation devices) for hours, through one of the most shark-infested seas on Earth, before they were saved by a Vietnamese fishing vessel (Talabong (2)), which corroborated the Filipino Crew's Story (Emasquel II (1)).
Of course, the Chinese embassy in the Philippines gave a statement on the issue which, predictably enough, denied any wrongdoing by the Chinese sailors, dressed the collision up as an "accident," and insisted that its findings (an interesting choice of words given that the Chinese government has not, as yet, completed an investigation) were "final" and "conclusive," and that any dispute would be (that all-purpose term China uses as for any statement that disagrees with their lies) "irresponsible (CNN Philippines Staff). Of course, denying wrongdoing was not enough for the Chinese embassy. They had to go a step further by portraying themselves as victims, claiming the poor, helpless Chinese captain (who was in Filipino/Vietnamese disputed waters, thousands of miles from anything that can legitimately be called "China") was trying to help save the Filipino crew "besieged by 7 or 8 Philippine vessels."
This statement, which was swiftly debunked by satellite tracking data (ABS-CBN Staff (2)) roundly and holistically mocked as an "insult to the intelligence of every Filipino (Esmaquel II (2))," and was later removed from the embassy's Facebook page (Esmaquel II (3)) (though not from the embassy webpage itself).
The only thing about the aftermath more sadly predictable than the Chinese embassy's flimsy denial, was that Xi Jinping's ugliest concubine, Rodrigo Duterte, took the side of the Chinese government rather than his own countrymen, calling the collision a "little maritime accident (Lopez (2))" and saying there are "circumstances that give doubt to the version" told by the crew. Duterte went on to all but outright state that his decision to meekly accept Beijing's lie and not push the issue was motivated by the simple fact that he's afraid to stand up to China.

The Philippines will not escalate tensions with China by sending military ships to the South China Sea following the collision, he added, reiterating his nation isn’t ready to go to war with Beijing.
-Andreo Calonzo, Bloomberg

The most ironic thing about Duterte's insistence that the incident is not China's fault is that even the South China Morning Post, a Hong Kong-based publication not entirely out of reach of Beijing's influence, said that it is! An article in the Post on 25 June implied that the onus was on China to help smooth things over with the Philippines, though the article's writer stopped short of directly contradicting Beijing's "accident" claim (Pitlo III).
Frankly, the Yuemaobinyu 42212 crew's decision to flee the scene rather than rendering assistance already casts doubt on the "accident" claim, but even if it was, then it is not only an act of cowardice but a violation of standard maritime conduct (GMA News).

"According to our report, it's far from accidental. If it's accidental, it's SOP (Standard Operating Procedure) they should stop, they should rescue these fishermen. But when they hit FB Gem-ver 1, they didn't stop."
-AFP Wescom Spokesman LTC Stephen Penetrante, 14 June, 2019.

Frankly, all evidence available at this point shows that the first sentence in the above statement by LTC Penetrante is the one that really matters. Ramming attacks by Chinese fishing vessels are nothing new (McGregor, 262), and they are a long-time part of China's "cabbage strategy," a tactic whereby China asserts its claim over a disputed area of sea by putting swarms of civilian vessels in the shallow water nearby (circling it), with their law enforcement craft just outside of that (also circling, but in the opposite direction), surrounded in deeper waters by the Chinese Coast Guard (likely circling the opposite direction as the police boats) with a few show-the-flag passes in the distance by the gray-hulls of the PLA Navy, surrounding a disputed landmass with so many layers of Chinese administration that it is "lie layers of cabbage (Kazianis)." It is worth noting that this strategy is one that the Chinese have increased the intensity of in very recent months (Pascual).
In this environment, Chinese civilian vessels can be as aggressive as they want to be toward non-Chinese vessels because for one thing there will be dozens of their countrymen nearby to corroborate whatever lie they tell, and for another, there is enough Chinese presence to intimidate rival claimants from sailing there in the first place. More to the point though, it is quite likely at this point that the Yuemaobinyu 42212 was not and is not a civilian vessel, but a vessel of the Chinese military.

When is the Chinese Navy Not the Chinese Navy?

answer: when it's the "People's Armed Forces Maritime Militia."

"As the People's Liberation Army upgrades its navy, commissioning dozens of new ships under a watchful global eye, a less noticed force, China's maritime militia, is also improving its operational capability."
-Zhao Lei, China Daily

Many outside of China and its maritime neighbors have probably not heard of the "People's Armed Forces Maritime Militia," and even those who have heard of it may be unclear about what precisely this unit is. The name makes it sound like it is a form of naval reserve unit, sort of like a mix of the U.S. Coast Guard and the National Guard, with perhaps a dash of the U.S. Merchant Marine thrown in. The reality is a bit simpler. This unit is a division of the PLA Navy which operates in civilian clothes, on board ostensibly civilian vessels, for the sole purpose of hiding behind foreign military forces' tighter Rules of Engagement for dealing with civilians, enabling them to get away with maneuvers that would result in a military vessel being fired upon (Gady. As Andrew Erickson (1) writes, Beijing wants the best of both worlds: military personnel on a military mission, with the protection afforded to civilians by restrictive ROE's. Quoting editor Yao Xudong of the PLA's own newspaper in his article for the Center for International Maritime Security, he translates "putting on the camouflage, they qualify as soldiers. Taking off the camouflage they become law abiding fishermen," though the latter clause seems to only qualify in regard to their perceived role rather than their actual role. The US Naval War College's China Maritime Report No. 1 (2017) summarizes the rationale for this a bit more bluntly.

"Chinese leaders clearly see value in the PAFMM’s blurred status. Among the chief motivations for building the militia is that it is not technically a direct subcomponent of the PLA. This rationale was also present during the establishment of the PAP in 1982 as an internal security force to relieve the PLA of the controversial task of suppressing domestic unrest. Such ambiguity affords the PAFMM great leeway in supporting China’s national interests and maritime claims. It offers freedom to act in ways that would otherwise tarnish the PLA’s professional image and heighten escalation risks.
-Maritime Report No. 1 (Emphasis added)

In other words, this branch is sent to do the dirty work because they get away with actions that would invite military retaliation if it was done by gray-hulled vessels flying PLA colors. China does not try to cover up the PAFFM's existence, even going so far as to allow their doctrine manuals to be published (and translated into English), but the goal of identity confusion and causing foreign naval forces to second-guess any decision to fire upon them is rather glaringly obvious (Cavas).
But let there be no mistake: though these sailors may be recruited from the ranks of China's fishing fleet and though they may sail in what are (on the exterior at least) civilian fishing vessels, there is no ambiguity about their true role. This is a division of China's military. If anyone doubts it (even having already read a declaration of the same in both China Daily and the PLA's Newspaper), look at the photo below of their training, from the China Daily article quoted above, and ask if these look like civilian fishermen.

Indeed, this plainclothes (at least sometimes) division of the Chinese military has already participated in numerous military actions where the overt presence of PLA "gray hulls" would have invited a swift and brutal US Navy retaliation. Gady writes:

"During the recent South China Sea transit of the U.S. destroyer USS Larsen, the People’s Liberation Army Navy vessels behaved professionally. However, according to a U.S. Navy source, “there were Chinese merchant vessels present that were not as demure as the Chinese Navy. One came out of its anchorage in the island and crossed the destroyer’s bow... The Lassen did not alter course as the merchant ship circled around.”
-The Diplomat

In another article, this time for The Maritime Executive, Erickson (2) cites 10 other publicly documented examples of the deployment of the Maritime Militia across a time span from 1974 to 2016, and there is not a single instance where their mission was non-military in nature. One of these instances included an attempt by a "fishing vessel" to catch a tow cable being carried by the USS Impeccable with a grappling hook, which sounds eerily similar to Beijing's "creative" version of the Recto Bank incident.
In an article for The Daily Beast, David Axe describes one of these incidents (China's 2012 invasion, illegal annexation and occupation of Japan's Senkakku Islands) in jaw-dropping detail, reporting that the number of so-called "fishing vessels" sent by this militia for the invasion was as high as 250.

It should also be noted, this tactic isn't new. The Chinese, never famous for adaptation, improvisation or innovation, have not updated their playbook since the Han Dynasty. In one form or another, they have been using either naval paramilitary forces or naval forces in civilian disguise on board civilian vessels since 221 A.D!

"[In] April 1978, a swarm of about two hundred Chinese fishing boats, their occupants armed with light weapons, had suddenly appeared in the waters around the islands. More ominously, Japanese intercepts of the boats' radio communication showed that the vessels were being directed from Chinese navy-controlled ports in the coastal provinces of Shandong and Fujian."
-McGregor, Richard. Asia's Reckoning, p. 71

"[During the Opium Wars], although the British held the Chinese Navy in contempt, they actually feared the fishermen and pirates who were sent to fight in their place."
-Paul Midler, What's Wrong With China, page 184

"[Lu Meng] selected a group of able sailors, disguised them in plain clothes that merchants usually wore, and placed them at the oars. Concealed in the hulls were crack troops."
Luo Guanzhong, Romance of the Three Kingdoms (Vol. 3), page 1349

One would think that the world would finally wake up and recognize this rather cowardly tactic for what it is, and treat the Maritime Militia as what they are: surface combatants. Thankfully, it appears the US is finally doing that with their recent warning that henceforth all Chinese Coast Guard and Maritime Militia vessels would be treated as combatants(Pickrell), though that will matter very little until and unless one of two things happens: an incident in which the US is forced to back up this declaration, or the same declaration is made by other nations with maritime claims over the waters around the West Philippine Sea.

So What Does This Have to Do with Recto Bank?

Put simply, mountains of evidence indicate Yuemaobinyu 42212 was part of the Maritime Militia.
First of all, the Maritime Militia's increased activity (and brazenness) in recent months, including targeting Australian military aircraft with lasers (Yeo suggest China is getting cockier and more willing to throw their weight around in the mistaken belief that no one will say anything. Secondly, ramming a boat and sinking it in a hit-and-run in contested waters is consistent not only with previous incidents involving the Maritime Militia, but also with Chinese written military doctrine ([Cavas](China’s 'Little Blue Men' Take Navy’s Place in Disputes)). Thirdly, a sketch made by the captain of Gim-ver 1 almost perfectly matches the type of steel-hulled trawler (armored specifically for ramming (Yeo) most frequently used by the Maritime Militia (Magsino).
If that's the case, then this was a deliberate attack on a Philippine vessel, in Philippine waters, by the Chinese military, resulting in loss of assets and almost resulting in the loss of 22 lives, with the full knowledge and sanction of the Chinese chain of command. That's an act of war, and under the US/Philippine Mutual Defense Treaty, if Duterte has the balls to call it such, then the US is obligated to act, as the US Ambassador to the Philippines unswervingly affirmed (Mateo). Given that China has already attacked a NATO ally and threatened a Pacific ally, in 2019, given that they have already been engaged in what their own military describes as "drug warfare" against the US and the Philippines, and considering that they have been engaged in what Deng Xiaoping called a "new Cold War with the US" since 1991, I am having a hard time understanding why we're not already in the process of sinking the PLA Navy and turning China's coastal cities into parking lots. It's already been made plain that China wouldn't stand much of a chance.

Thumbnail image from Yahoo! News Philippines

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