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RE: In Defense of Consortium Blockchains
This became a lot less useful when the power down time was changed from two years to 13 weeks. Now even if an account has permanently given up voting rights, the stake can be moved to a new account that hasn't (and it isn't even necessary to wait until all the stake has been moved; a potentially-large amount of influence can be regained in just one week).
Yes, I see what you mean.
I was going to mention that, but I had already gone off on too many tangential points. But since you mentioned it…
And readers note we’re referring to STEEM on this particular power-down delay issue, not EOS.
Remember at BCT I was strongly objecting to that change, both because it allowed some whales to cash out faster and because it changed the incentives and game theory.
I remember one of the arguments in favor of the change was that those whales who were not interested could get out and that it would stop penalizing short-term speculators which were deemed necessary to support the price and marketcap. I felt the argument conflated two separate concerns: the lockup of minted tokens and the debasing of those who were not powered up. I felt instead the debasement could be taken from everyone who was powered up also. Most of those who are powered-up received free (minted) tokens and get voting and curation rewards power from powering up. The design was too asymmetrical in my view. But one of my blog posts pointed out that I came to realize the entire voting paradigm was a design flaw. So then I punted on the debate and started to think about other paradigms for accomplishing the goals of onboarding and such.
I reiterate that IMO Steem has been a very valid and important experiment. I am happy it was created and that I was able to participate.
P.S. It’s an aspect that I would want to restore in any altcoin project I may launch, but it will be done with quite a different method which is going to surprise everyone I think.