RE: Proof of Good Governance
Replying to some comment with all “your” suggestions.
- Ability to negate voting power -> if implemented in the form described in your GitHub issue, this provides opportunity cost on individual bases. Because of the opportunity costs, this proposal if implemented would resultingly be flatly obtuse from a game theory perspective. There are merits for additional controls over rewards distributions but this specific negating control mechanism is inconsiderate of second order effects and overall obtuse compared to its stated purpose. Instead, new rewards pool controls are best experimented on in new token ecosystems. Thats why SMTs, naturally. Which you laughably told me were a bad idea, “because there can only be one global currency”, twice.
- n^2 -> talk about “stealing”. n^2 can only seem “fair” when you’re sitting on top of the STEEM rich list, like you are. Now that STEEM rewards are linear there is no more stealing, finally. But keep in mind, STEEM is only one form of a distribution game, and truelly it is an opt in system, which is itself another premise from which to argue around these topics.
- Identity as a consensus for distributions is my idea (page 53 Smart Media Token Whitepaper). It will be implemented in SMTs via Oracles.
You told me twice, in 2016 and 2017, SMTs were a bad idea, “because there can only be one global currency”, before going off to market multi currencies in your new project. Now you’re back to propose microscopic changes to the STEEM rewards contract. There is no need for forcing these proposals in the face of SMTs.
Contributed from my iPhone. Please excuse grammatical mistakes and errors.