Humiliated In Their Own House - China Loses at BRI 2019 Summit

Fewer international plans of modern times have garnered more attention (or been mired in more scandal) than China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the flagship "plan (though 'vaguely defined idea' would be a more accurate term (Morris)" of the Xi administration is a massive, multi-trillion dollar initiative to connect the countries along what was once the Silk Road into a Sinocentric economic web through the construction of transportation infrastructure throughout Eurasia, all through loans provided by China. Mockingly referred to by critics as the "Billed and Owned Initiative," it has been rather frequently decried as little more than an attempt to lure participating countries into accepting shockingly high-interest loans for infrastructure projects.
The most glaringly obvious example was Sri Lanka, where China persuaded the Sri Lankan government to build a port and airport that the Sri Lankan government knew would never make enough of a profit to even service the interest on the loan China was offering to build it (Panda). To assuage these fears, China promised to provide enough air and sea traffic to make the port and airport profitable. Once the Sri Lankan government had Yuan signs in their eyes, China slipped a clause into the contract saying that if Sri Lanka defaults on the loan, China seizes the port and airport for 99 years.
Then, once the agreement (which did not include China's promises to "provide enough traffic") was signed and construction began, Sri Lanka, of course, could not make the payments, and China seized the ports, denying that they had made any promises beyond extending the initial (VERY high-interest) loan. This caused numerous nations to re-examine their Belt-and-Road agreements with China, and a trend emerged: these contracts were almost universally high-interest loans with unpayable repayment terms and clauses that enable China to seize ports and strategic assets (often the very ones being developed with the funds from the loan) in the event of default (you know, kind of the same way Chinese employers lure foreign employees into entrapment schemes and saddle them with ironclad, inescapable slave-wage contracts that are different than what was promised, except on a geopolitical scale). China, predictably, enough, devoted immense energy to denying this allegation, even in venues when the allegation had not been made (Zhao).

One Belt, One Rough Road

If you're listening to this litany of teeth-grinding, mouth-foaming denials and thinking "methinks the lady doth protest too much," you're certainly not alone. Malaysia was one of the first countries in China's backyard to change its mind about accepting BRI loans (Bland). Then Myanmar scaled back a BRI-connected project significantly and an Indonesian presidential candidate got a popularity boost by promising to "review (read 'reject')" the BRI agreements already in place with China (Tweed, Marlow & Li). Even China's "Iron Brother," Pakistan, began looking askance at the increasingly neocolonialist scheme (Tiezzi).

This backlash against China is not limited to the BRI. The second half of 2018 saw a massive surge of nations around Southeast Asia and the South Pacific pushing back against China, and not being afraid to show it at high-profile international summits. First there was the Pacific Islands Forum last Summer, where China's delegation left in disgrace after being publicly rebuked by the president of Nauru. Then came the 2018 APEC conference, which ended in another series of humiliating defeats for China, and the G20 Summit didn't go well for them either.
With this record, China came to the second Belt and Road Summit (in their own capital city) desperately needing to regain lost face. If anything though, they lost more.
Before the summit even began, the signs already made it plain that the crowd would not be as receptive to China's rather overt imperialism as they were at the last BRI Summit. The US, obviously, did not send a delegation (Nakazawa), nor did some other regionally important economic players who attended the last one, including "Turkey, which has publicly criticised China over is treatment of the Uighurs, a Muslim minority, Poland, Spain, Fiji, Sri Lanka, and Argentina, according to the Eurasia Group, citing geopolitical issues as a possible reason (Kuo)."
Also notably, the head of the World Bank, an American, declined an invitation to attend, opting to visit Africa instead (Lawder). His purpose for this visit? To demonstrate the World Bank's ability to provide an alternative to the High Interest loans China offers for BRI projects (something Japan is also doing (Sun (1)). Given the paranoid mindset prevailing in Beijing during the summit, I doubt the significance of the timing was lost upon Xi Jinping.

One Belt, No Subway

If there is one group who was most definitely negatively impacted by the forum, it was the 22 million who live and work in Beijing. The summit was held at the National Convention Center, which sits right across the street from Olympic Park. As a result, the security perimeter around the forum, "guarded" by PLA low-ranking-conscripts in full dress greens, included the Park, and its corresponding subway station (which, by the way, is a transfer station between two major lines, and happens to be the only station anywhere near the unfortunate temporary accomodation I've been stuck with, making the process of navigating Beijing's subway with a walking cane even more aggravating than it already was). The map above isn't very clear so I've emphasized this location with a "1."
Both lines running through that station simply ceased all embarking and debarking at that station while the summit was on, and I don't imagine I need to explain how many headaches this caused for a few million unfortunate commuters (myself included). The fact that this closure was not announced in advance didn't help matters any, and the presence of so many armed troops on the streets of a city full of civilians, not even 45 days away from the 30 year anniversary of the Tiananmen Square Massacre, was unnerving at best.
Speaking of armed PLA troops, I could almost understand their presence in the immediate vicinity of the convention center, but I couldn't help but note their presence at other subway stations throughout the city while the summit was in session. At Jiangtai ("2" on the map above) and Taoranting ("3" on map), neither of which is anywhere near the Convention Center, the PLA was encamped at the subway entrances, stopping anyone who was found guilty of not having a Chinese face, and demanding to see their passports and visas. Given that there's apparently not a man or woman in the PLA who speaks a word of English, it took nearly 3 hours for me to explain at one of these checkpoints "I don't have mine because it is at the PSB getting a visa renewed, and here is the document your own government gave me to prove that."

A Summit As Opaque and Unorganized As the Plan It Was Named For

The BRI summit came against the backdrop of cancellations and postponements of various projects by participating countries, and a general unease with China’s handling of its one-trillion-dollar initiative.
-Valero

China was well aware that their task at this summit was to defend their scandal-ridden initiative against a highly sceptical audience (Malay Mail), and Xi Jinping's opening remarks (which were noticeably softer in tone than Wang Yi's raving denials prior to this) showed that (Cai). Having vehemently denied "debt-trap" allegations before (and thrown the usual Chinese temper tantrum about the very notion that anyone would dare accuse the "Central Nation" of malicious intent), his opening speech was almost a confession that it had been, and with that confession, a pledge to "re-evaluate" the terms of the high-interest loans so that it will be less of one (Sun (2)). One can't help but be reminded of an abusive husband begging his wife (or wives in this case) "please don't leave. I promise I'll change."
However, more than simply defending the Belt and Road Initiative itself, there was a broader goal China desperately needed to reach. This summit, from the day it was announced, was hailed by the Chinese government as the event where China would prove to the world that it was opening up. If that was their intention, they failed miserably. Even the exact dates of the forum were not known until less than a week before the summit was to begin (Malay Mail). Once the summit began, "chaotic" and "uninformed" became the watchwords for the entire summit, according to many attendees. Many attendees were told there were many events they were not permitted to attend, though hose who were permitted to attend various lectures often found themselves waiting at the venue for hours, or scrambling to get in after they began (Lo). Other attendees noted that there just wasn't a lot of content to fill up three days (Lee & Elmer). Chinese media were ordered not to discuss "sensitive" topics and foreign media were denied access at all (Harada). One attendee described it as "basically a one day publicity stunt for China," writes Lee Jeong-Ho of Hong Kong's South China Morning Post.
When all was said and done, little had been said, and less done. The joint statement issued by the heads-of-state in attendance was rather vague and generalized, with promises made by Xi that even Hong Kong's media publicly doubted he can fulfill (Shi & Cai). A handful of small economic lightweights signed "memorandums of understanding," which is China's name for a vague "yeah, this sounds like a good idea" declaration that has no concrete, definitive obligation, expectation or goal from either party, and which serves little purpose except to enable China to claim the signatory has "joined" the Belt and Road Initiative. All-in-all, the only beneficiary of the summit seems to be Beijing's hotel industry, and China has once again been made to look rather foolish at an international forum, this time one which they themselves hosted.
On the other hand, kiosks peddling plenty of copies of Xi's Governance of China: Volume 2, from which Xi gets royalties, were rather ubiquitous at the summit. That may have been the point all along.

Works Cited

Bland, Ben. "Malaysia Rethinks $20B "Belt and Road" Project." The Maritime Executive. 31 January, 2019. Web, 4 May, 2019.
https://www.maritime-executive.com/editorials/malaysia-rethinks-20b-belt-and-road-project-on-strait-of-malacca

Cai, Jane. "Xi Jinping Sends Message to US and West That ‘China is Committed to Opening Up’ at Belt and Road Forum." South China Morning Post. 27 April, 2019.
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3007885/xi-jinping-sends-message-us-and-west-china-committed-opening

Harada, Issaku. "Belt and Road Roadblocks: Beijing Forum Falls Short on Transparency." Nikkei Asian Review. 28 April, 2019. Web, 3 May, 2019.
https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Belt-and-Road/Belt-and-Road-roadblocks-Beijing-forum-falls-short-on-transparency

Kuo, Lily. "Belt and Road Forum: China's 'Project of the Century' Hits Tough Times." The Guardian. 24 April, 2019. Web, 2 May, 2019.
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/apr/25/belt-and-road-forum-chinas-project-of-the-century-hits-tough-times

Lee, Jeong-Ho & Elmer, Keegan. "Can China Do Soft Power? Poorly Organised Yet Tightly Controlled Forum Raises Questions." South China Morning Post. 27 April, 2019. Web, 3 May, 2019.
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3007953/can-china-do-soft-power-poorly-organised-yet-tightly

Lo, Kinling. "Delegates Lost and Confused at China's High-Profile Belt and Road Forum." South China Morning Post. 25 April, 2019. Web, 3 May, 2019.
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3007710/way-belt-and-road-forum-or-it-way-or-way

(Malay Mail Staff). "China to Recalibrate Belt and Road, Defend Scheme Against Criticism." 24 April, 2019. Web, 3 May, 2019.
https://www.malaymail.com/news/money/2019/04/24/china-to-recalibrate-belt-and-road-defend-scheme-against-criticism/1746386

Morris, Ian. "For China: One Belt, One Road, No Plan?" Stratfor. 7 December, 2018. Web, 3 May, 2019.
https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/china-one-belt-one-road-no-plan

Nakazawa, Katsuji. "Trump Spoils Xi's Belt and Road Forum, Without Even Attending." Nikkei Asian Review. 2 May, 2019. Web, 3 May, 2019.
https://asia.nikkei.com/Editor-s-Picks/China-up-close/Trump-spoils-Xi-s-Belt-and-Road-Forum-without-even-attending

Panda, Ankit. "Sri Lanka Formally Hands Over Hambantota Port to Chinese Firms on 99-Year Lease." 11 December, 2017. Web, 1 May, 2019.
https://thediplomat.com/2017/12/sri-lanka-formally-hands-over-hambantota-port-to-chinese-firms-on-99-year-lease/

Shi Jiangtao & Cai, Jane. "Xi Jinping Makes Plenty of Promises on Belt and Road Plan, But Can China Deliver?" South China Morning Post. 28 April, 2019. Web, 3 May, 2019.
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3007972/xi-jinping-makes-plenty-promises-belt-and-road-plan-can-china

Sun, Nikki (1). "Promoting Japan's answer to China's Belt and Road." Nikkei Asian Review. 25 April, 2019. Web, 3 May, 2019.
https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/Promoting-Japan-s-answer-to-China-s-Belt-and-Road

Sun, Nikki (2). "Xi Pledges Belt and Road Reboot Amid Rising 'Debt Trap' Concerns." Nikkei Asian Review. 27 April, 2019. Web, 3 May, 2019.
https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Belt-and-Road/Xi-pledges-Belt-and-Road-reboot-amid-rising-debt-trap-concerns

Tiezzi, Shannon. "Is the Crown Jewel of the Belt and Road Losing its Shine?" The Diplomat. 24 October, 2018. Web, 3 May, 2019.
https://thediplomat.com/2018/10/is-the-crown-jewel-of-the-belt-and-road-losing-its-shine/

Tweed, David; Marlow, Iain & Li, Dandan. "Souring Deals Put China's Belt and Road Dreams Under Pressure." Bloomberg. 30 January, 2019. Web, 3 May, 2019.
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-01-29/souring-deals-put-china-s-belt-and-road-dreams-under-pressure

Valero, Jorge. "European Bloc Not Considering Joining China's Belt and Road Plans." Euractiv. 26 April, 2019. Web, 3 May, 2019.
https://www.euractiv.com/section/eu-china/news/european-bloc-not-considering-joining-chinas-belt-and-road-plans/

Zhao Minghao. "The BRI is Not a Debt Trap!" China US Focus. 16 October, 2018. Web, 3 May, 2019.
https://www.chinausfocus.com/finance-economy/the-bri-is-not-a-debt-trap