RE: Witness consensus status to fix the actual steem’s economic flows (ENG)
Are you considering "Bad Voting" itself to be when the post is downvoted on by others, offsetting the curation reward generated from the initial vote itself?
Both
There's a floor on "bad voting" (in terms of returns) when you don't consider down voting in the equation. In the situation where a bot casts a $1 vote on a post with no votes and 25% curation, the curation reward is ~$0.25. That's the floor, unless someone down votes it
That is so FAR, FAR below the actual return encountered in that wild that isn't really worth considering. The market price of votes assumes mostly self-voting where the return is close to 100% (+/- a bit).
If including downvotes under the proposed rules
My view has always been that downvotes are the most important thing here. Merely changing curation on its own isn't very effective. One reason for this, as noted in the previous paragraph is these are really all (somewhat disguised perhaps) self votes where the split between curation and author doesn't matter AT ALL. It is all being captured into the price.
My comments on what would change with increased curation with respect to bid bots were narrowly directed at the assumption that bid bots keep all the curation rewards. That's sort of (if decreasinly so) the case now but would absolutely not be the case under 50/50. Whether that really changes things in a fundamental way is doubtful (see above).
It's a razor margin already
Okay, agreed, and it would be after any change too. Why are we discussing this at all?
Well... because it was the reason cited above to push for 50/50, so it was what I focused on :)
We have agreed here for a long time I believe, down voting needs some serious attention, and IMO it needs it more than the change in ratio of authors:curators.
I'd rather see downvoting incentives (or more specifically, the removal of it's deterrent, aka "the lost in potential revenue") implemented and see how that plays out in regards to bots, rather than packaging both of these changes into a single HF.
What incentivizes down voting, though? Isn't it true that down voting does pretty much nothing for you in terms of making money within the Steem economy (besides the nearly immeasurable effect of distributing a small percentage of payouts back to the reward pool) and almost assures you that you'll eventually get head-hunted by one or more (probably many) of the accounts that you vote down? In other words, "SP wastage".
My thought on this is that you absolutely MUST find some way to incentivize "good down voting", something akin to the curation reward system, only in reverse, or you'll get more of what we have right now, regardless of having a separate pool for down votes (the fear of retaliation will still be there and with no real incentives to down vote in the first place).
Maybe a SMT for the down voting side of curation would solve this problem. Have it work just like up/down voting does in relation to Steem, except taking only down votes into account. Those who down vote earliest on any given post get the largest percentage of the down voting rewards for that post, with respect to their total SP, and they get considerably more the more SP that down votes on that post after them, with the (down vote) rewards pool distributing a fixed supply, irrespective of how many accounts, or how much SP, down vote(s) over any given period.
Does this type of SMT stand any chance of reaching a dollar (or even Steem) valuation capable of offsetting the fear of down voting retaliation? I think it's worth a shot.
Nothing incentivizes it specifically, this change is more about removing the disincentive from downvoting (which right now is that if you downvote, you're losing out on potential curation rewards).
I'm not sure how an incentive model specifically could work for down votes, but at least removing the penalty for down voting would (IMO) make for a better system.
But that's my point, we ARE inherently disincentivized from down-voting, regardless of whether you remove the voting power penalty or not - it's the fear of retaliation (flag wars) which indirectly hits you with a voting power penalty in the form of having rewards downvoted away by those that we downvoted in the past.
So my suggestion is that we counter that inherent disincentivization (or the natural tendency for the majority of people to side step the possibility of voting retaliation, or "flag wars", by simply not participating) with some form of incentivization, something like an SMT that rewards "smart (useful to the system) downvoting", in an attempt to convince a larger portion of the population to play this game in a useful way, which actually might bring something like a "real consensus" as to what is good or bad content.
I do find validity in the argument put forth by @kevinwong that the extreme ratio in baseline profitability of 4-1 between self-voting and curation deserves addressing and the system would benefit from addressing it (which is what the 50/50 change does, by reducing this ratio to 2-1). It is an element of shifting the economic incentives toward useful curation outcomes and away from the useless self-voting extraction outcome. (Note: "shifting" does not mean, by itself, "fixing", it means just that).
That said, I'm not personally against just the downvote change and I think it would be helpful on its own.
Hi, I'm deeply concerned with the idea of a 50/50 reward scheme...
The numbers just don't add up. At least this not where we are supposed to be driving the platform. Please read this post, I would love to have your feedback on the subject.