Venezuela has been in the mouth of all the media in the world for some years. If with Hugo Chávez the Caribbean country was already permanent news, after his death and with the resurgence of attempts (legal and illegal) to remove the chavismo from Miraflores, it is every day on the front pages of the main international newspapers, with information distorted and Manichaeans in an increasing proportion. Venezuela has become, as it was Cuba decades ago, the new "bad word" in the RRII, with the aim of forcing a change after more than fifteen years of chavism in that country, which ends up consolidating on the right regional after its arrival in the governments of Argentina and Brazil (the latter, via parliamentary coup).

What really happens in Venezuela?

When the opposition to Maduro, based in the heterogeneous MUD, conquered the National Assembly last December, it promised that in six months it would end the government of the PSUV. This in the words of the president of the AN, the veteran leader Henry Ramos Allup. In those months, moreover, there was the most serious moment of the economic crisis in that country, with a sharp decline in international oil prices (a variable that is beginning to change as a result of the agreement between the OPEC countries) and growing difficulties in the future. food supply. The government devised an initiative that allowed it to partially overcome the adverse scenario, even with notorious difficulties: the CLAP, Local Supply and Production Councils, which constituted a bypass - as Chávez did with the Missions regarding the State itself - against the private distribution of food, where hoarding still shines today.

Three quarters passed and the right, which has great external support and the alignment of various media in the internal, did not manage to conquer Miraflores. What factors affect that I could not? Miscellaneous:

a) Unlike Brazil, the MUD does not control the judiciary or the vice president of the country. Nor to the Armed Forces. A formula "to fear" is unthinkable.

b) Chavismo permeates the identity of a large part of the Venezuelan people, even in adverse conditions. Even with those who might be "disillusioned" with the current state of affairs. The opposition consultancy Datanálisis, in a recent poll, shows that at least 5 out of every 10 Venezuelans continue to vindicate Chávez's legacy. Hinterlaces, on the other hand, shows that there is a progressive recovery of the ruling party in the face of new economic initiatives.

c) The opposition continues to show two clear tendencies, in a similar situation to the one experienced in 2014: a dialogist sector and another openly rupturist, which demands "heating the street" again. Capriles, who belonged to the first side two years ago, now seems to pay a more confrontational line, similar to the one he commanded in 2013, after the triumph of Maduro. That bid, far from being buried after the victory of the MUD in December, remains on the table and increased. Some blame others for Maduro to continue in Miraflores, and vice versa. The most radical sectors, with Tintori and Machado at the forefront, seek an anti-Chavez insurrection for which there do not seem to be objective conditions in the medium term, as demonstrated in the previous point.

d) The progressive rise in international oil prices and an improvement in indicators such as country risk seem to show that a rebound is possible after months of great complexities. On the first proposal, the recent tour of Maduro by OPEC and non-OPEC countries leaves a floor of agreements that would envisage a growth of expectations for next year.

In conclusion, with Christmas and holidays close seems an imminent "institutional collapse" as the one that arises a sector of the MUD. The referendum also seems distant, since the right should put together again 1% of signatures in the 5 contested states. However, the strategy of "heating the street" will seek to be legitimized again, especially from the international level: the regional conditions - especially Argentina and Brazil, by their respective new governments - are very different from 2014, when the guarimbas sought to overthrow Mature. But the MUD must have something very clear: even when it has an undisputable external support, it must first build conditions of internal governance, something unthinkable if at least 5 out of 10 Venezuelans continue to vindicate the legacy of Hugo Chávez, as we enunciate. In the end, one can try to erode and delegitimize a government at a distance, but one can not govern (and be previously elected) only with bombastic OAS declarations.