How does the Chinese government make social media posts for strategic intervention rather than participatory debates?

abstract:
The Chinese government has long suspected that the employment of up to two million people will quietly insert large numbers of pseudonyms and other deceptive works into real social media posts, as if they were genuine opinions of ordinary people. Many scholars and most of the reporters and activists claimed that these so-called “fifties party” positions were loudly argued in the political and policy debates by the government. As we have shown, the vast majority of positions that are publicly criticized as 50c on social media are also true. However, there is hardly any systematic empirical evidence or, more importantly, the strategic objectives of the Chinese government to implement this activity. In the first large-scale empirical analysis of this action, we showed how to identify the secret authors of these posts, the posts they wrote, and their content. We estimate that the government produces and publishes about 448 million social media reviews each year. Contrary to previous claims, we show that the Chinese regime's strategy is to avoid arguing with party and government skeptics, or even to discuss controversial issues. We show that the objective of this large-scale covert operation is to transfer the public and shift the topic, because most of these posts involve the Chinese cheerleaders, the revolutionary history of the Communist Party or other symbols of the regime. We discuss how these results are consistent with the knowledge of China's censorship system and suggest how they can change our broader theoretical understanding of "common sense" and information control in authoritarian regimes. And their content. We estimate that the government produces and publishes about 448 million social media reviews each year. Contrary to previous claims, we show that the Chinese regime's strategy is to avoid arguing with party and government skeptics, or even to discuss controversial issues. We show that the objective of this large-scale covert operation is to transfer the public and shift the topic, because most of these posts involve the Chinese cheerleaders, the revolutionary history of the Communist Party or other symbols of the regime. We discuss how these results are consistent with the knowledge of China's censorship system and suggest how they can change our broader theoretical understanding of "common sense" and information control in authoritarian regimes. And their content. We estimate that the government will produce and publish about 4. 4.8 billion social media reviews. Contrary to previous claims, we show that the Chinese regime's strategy is to avoid arguing with party and government skeptics, or even to discuss controversial issues. We show that the objective of this large-scale covert operation is to transfer the public and shift the topic, because most of these posts involve the Chinese cheerleaders, the revolutionary history of the Communist Party or other symbols of the regime. We discuss how these results are consistent with the knowledge of China's censorship system and suggest how they can change our broader theoretical understanding of "common sense" and information control in authoritarian regimes. We estimate that the government produces and publishes about 448 million social media reviews each year. Contrary to previous claims, we show that the Chinese regime's strategy is to avoid arguing with party and government skeptics, or even to discuss controversial issues. We show that the objective of this large-scale covert operation is to transfer the public and shift the topic, because most of these posts involve the Chinese cheerleaders, the revolutionary history of the Communist Party or other symbols of the regime. We discuss how these results are consistent with the knowledge of China's censorship system and suggest how they can change our broader theoretical understanding of "common sense" and information control in authoritarian regimes. We estimate that the government will produce and publish about 4. 4.8 billion social media reviews. Contrary to previous claims, we show that the Chinese regime's strategy is to avoid arguing with party and government skeptics, or even to discuss controversial issues. We show that the objective of this large-scale covert operation is to transfer the public and shift the topic, because most of these posts involve the Chinese cheerleaders, the revolutionary history of the Communist Party or other symbols of the regime. We discuss how these results are consistent with the knowledge of China's censorship system and suggest how they can change our broader theoretical understanding of "common sense" and information control in authoritarian regimes. Contrary to previous claims, we show that the Chinese regime's strategy is to avoid arguing with party and government skeptics, or even to discuss controversial issues. We show that the objective of this large-scale covert operation is to transfer the public and shift the topic, because most of these posts involve the Chinese cheerleaders, the revolutionary history of the Communist Party or other symbols of the regime. We discuss how these results are consistent with the knowledge of China's censorship system and suggest how they can change our broader theoretical understanding of "common sense" and information control in authoritarian regimes. Contrary to previous claims, we show that the Chinese regime's strategy is to avoid arguing with party and government skeptics, or even to discuss controversial issues. We show that the objective of this large-scale covert operation is to transfer the public and shift the topic, because most of these posts involve the Chinese cheerleaders, the revolutionary history of the Communist Party or other symbols of the regime. We discuss how these results are consistent with the knowledge of China's censorship system and suggest how they can change our broader theoretical understanding of "common sense" and information control in authoritarian regimes. Not even discussing controversial issues. We show that the objective of this large-scale covert operation is to transfer the public and shift the topic, because most of these posts involve the Chinese cheerleaders, the revolutionary history of the Communist Party or other symbols of the regime. We discuss how these results are consistent with the knowledge of China's censorship system and suggest how they can change our broader theoretical understanding of "common sense" and information control in authoritarian regimes. Not even discussing controversial issues. We show that the objective of this large-scale covert operation is to transfer the public and shift the topic, because most of these posts involve the Chinese cheerleaders, the revolutionary history of the Communist Party or other symbols of the regime. We discuss how these results are consistent with the knowledge of China's censorship system and suggest how they can change our broader theoretical understanding of "common sense" and information control in authoritarian regimes. And suggest how they can change our broader theoretical understanding of "common sense" and information control in the authoritarian regime. Not even discussing controversial issues. We show that the objective of this large-scale covert operation is to transfer the public and shift the topic, because most of these posts involve the Chinese cheerleaders, the revolutionary history of the Communist Party or other symbols of the regime. We discuss how these results are consistent with the knowledge of China's censorship system and suggest how they can change our broader theoretical understanding of "common sense" and information control in authoritarian regimes. Not even discussing controversial issues. We show that the objective of this large-scale covert operation is to transfer the public and shift the topic, because most of these posts involve the Chinese cheerleaders, the revolutionary history of the Communist Party or other symbols of the regime. We discuss how these results are consistent with the knowledge of China's censorship system and suggest how they can change our broader theoretical understanding of "common sense" and information control in authoritarian regimes. And suggest how they can change our broader theoretical understanding of "common sense" and information control in the authoritarian regime. Not even discussing controversial issues. We show that the objective of this large-scale covert operation is to transfer the public and shift the topic, because most of these posts involve the Chinese cheerleaders, the revolutionary history of the Communist Party or other symbols of the regime. We discuss how these results are consistent with the knowledge of China's censorship system and suggest how they can change our broader theoretical understanding of "common sense" and information control in authoritarian regimes. Not even discussing controversial issues. We show that the objective of this large-scale covert operation is to transfer the public and shift the topic, because most of these posts involve the Chinese cheerleaders, the revolutionary history of the Communist Party or other symbols of the regime. We discuss how these results are consistent with the knowledge of China's censorship system and suggest how they can change our broader theoretical understanding of "common sense" and information control in authoritarian regimes.