Hiroshima and Nagasaki: How the Deep-State Media Sold Extreme Terrorism to Americans (And Continues To)

How the US Mainstream Media (US Government's Public Relations Front) sold HIROSHIMA and NAGASAKI to the American People...

MAIN POINTS:

1. President Truman's Chief of Staff William D. Leahy wrote:

"It is my opinion that the use of this barbarous weapon at Hiroshima and Nagasaki was of no material assistance in our war against Japan. The Japanese were already defeated and ready to surrender because of the effective sea blockade and the successful bombing with conventional weapons." (William D. Leahy, I Was There, pg. 441)
"in being the first to use it, we had adopted an ethical standard common to the barbarians of the Dark Ages" (William D. Leahy, I Was There, pg. 441).

1. Gen. Dwight Eisenhower wrote the following...
   When he was informed in mid-July 1945 by Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson of the decision to use the atomic bomb, General Dwight Eisenhower was deeply troubled. He disclosed his strong reservations about using the new weapon in his 1963 memoir, The White House Years: Mandate for Change, 1953-1956 (pp. 312-313):

   During his [Stimson's] recitation of the relevant facts, I had been conscious of a feeling of depression and so I voiced to him my grave misgivings, first on the basis of my belief that Japan was already defeated and that dropping the bomb was completely unnecessary, and secondly because I thought that our country should avoid shocking world opinion by the use of a weapon whose employment was, I thought, no longer mandatory as a measure to save American lives. It was my belief that Japan was, at that very moment, seeking some way to surrender with a minimum loss of "face."

2. US Strategic Bombing Survey Verdict

After studying this matter in great detail, the United States Strategic Bombing Survey rejected the notion that Japan gave up because of the atomic bombings. In its authoritative 1946 report, the Survey concluded:

The Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs did not defeat Japan, nor by the testimony of the enemy leaders who ended the war did they persuade Japan to accept unconditional surrender. The Emperor, the Lord Privy Seal, the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, and the Navy Minister had decided as early as May of 1945 that the war should be ended even if it meant acceptance of defeat on allied terms ...

The mission of the Suzuki government, appointed 7 April 1945, was to make peace. An appearance of negotiating for terms less onerous than unconditional surrender was maintained in order to contain the military and bureaucratic elements still determined on a final Bushido defense, and perhaps even more importantly to obtain freedom to create peace with a minimum of personal danger and internal obstruction. It seems clear, however, that in extremis the peacemakers would have peace, and peace on any terms. This was the gist of advice given to Hirohito by the Jushin in February, the declared conclusion of Kido in April, the underlying reason for Koiso's fall in April, the specific injunction of the Emperor to Suzuki on becoming premier which was known to all members of his cabinet ...

Negotiations for Russia to intercede began the forepart of May 1945 in both Tokyo and Moscow. Konoye, the intended emissary to the Soviets, stated to the Survey that while ostensibly he was to negotiate, he received direct and secret instructions from the Emperor to secure peace at any price, notwithstanding its severity ...

It seems clear ... that air supremacy and its later exploitation over Japan proper was the major factor which determined the timing of Japan's surrender and obviated any need for invasion.

Based on a detailed investigation of all the facts and supported by the testimony of the surviving Japanese leaders involved, it is the Survey's opinion that certainly prior to 31 December 1945 and in all probability prior to 1 November 1945 [the date of the planned American invasion], Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated.

1. COMMENTS: There's much more evidence and common-sense reasoning supporting this (the Soviet Union also attacked, etc.). If the Japanese leadership structure had somehow maintained power over the nation despite being complete lunatics who wouldn't surrender despite all evidence, Nuking their civilians would simply make them more angry and stubborn. If the US was willing to not consider negotiations and instantly jump to NUKING HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF INNOCENT CIVILIANS it would certainly be willing to make a ridiculous sorry excuse to rationalize it (that nuking civilians to basically make a point was the only way to save millions from small, war-torn, helpless Japan.) I do not believe an American life is worth any more than a Japanese life, and one life is worth so so much.

2. Interesting:
   According to Chomsky and others (it's in the official record, just like the mass-murder in the Korean War), even after Nuking the city with the largest Catholic population, they had a 'Grand Finale' of bombing civilian areas: