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RE: Steem Preferred Stocks... Benefits of a type of Steem Power that does not confer voting power.
Also the idea is good, it will not have a quick immediate effect.
Imagine situation with community made of 1000 minnows having 10SP each, and 2 whales having 1 million SP each.
If one of the whales decizes to get his 1 million of "preferred stocks " , the immediate effect will be, that second whale doubles his vote weight with almost no impact on a minnow vote weight.
Yes, if a whale decides to not vote, their vote power is distributed amongst the rest. But it is not disproportionate. Let's do the math on your hypothetical Steemosphere:
Minnow power is a total of 10,000, Whale A now collects interest of equal to getting about say, 33% of potential curation rewards, and their other 66% goes to vote rewards, Whale B still only gets about the same curation reward as before, about 33% of the share distributed this way for this purpose along with the remainder being rewards.
The minnows voting power has not doubled, but increased in proportion with their mass share, in this case, 2,010,000 is the total SP in the system, so the minnows as a collective have 0.5% voting power. The Whale's share of curation rewards is 33% of their redistributed share of new Steem, but it has not fully doubled, it is now maybe at 64%.
But that little extra, which I haven't precisely quantified, is more than a doubling. The votes have gone down by nearly 50% in number, but the trade-off the non-voting whale makes does not yield the full 33%, they only get, let's say, half of the maximum, a bit under the yield of an average curator. So whale B's earning about 20% of available curation rewards on their slightly above average curation skill, and the remainder is distributed to the Minnows, Whale A is only taking 11% out of the share in their interest rate boost, which means that 1100x as much curation rewards are now available for the minnows.
Remember, curation rewards are distributed according to vote count as a factor, and this benefits the minnows as well, who now have the potential to earn as much as 11x as much curation reward with Whale A not voting.
My numbers may not be exact, but it demonstrates that whales who don't vote, trade, in my example, potential 33% proportion yields of reward distribution, and all the work attendant, for 11.111% of guaranteed boost to their SP, but 111% rise in potential curation rewards for the minnows.
The optimal configuration for the proportion I am not sure about, but I think you can see that in fact, the benefit for the voting whales is not as great as it is for the minnows, whose potential reward for good curation has gone up in this scenario 10x.
I have not been rigorous in my math here, and I think it would be of great benefit for someone to do the math and work out the optimal ratios, whether they are proportional to the ratio of Common vs Preferred, or whatever, but I think it is sufficient to say that, even if the increase in potential curation rewards, that comes out of the difference between the rise in SP, versus the way it redistributes the remainder, even if it is proportional, it still benefits all the same, but I think actually, the reward will be on average proportional, but minnows will have the capability of becoming more powerful curators out of this, and being minnows tend to be creators, schooled probably in some degree in the art of curation itself...
If it also happens to attract more investors, you have to then factor in the rate at which the total pool rises in value at the same time. I am quite confident that it would benefit the whole, overall. Someone will surely now after my half-arsed napkin paper scribble quality math on this, take up the challenge do take the existing redistribution map, and apply it to your hypothetical scenario, and give some more solid figures about the change.
Remember, curation rewards are proportional to votes, as much as to the overall share of available curation rewards. I am pretty sure this means that the benefit for skilled minnow curators is enormous, potentially.
Yes, I know, I tend to oversimplify things and jump to conclusions)
Now I can see that this scenario is more benefitial for minnows that it seemed to be in the first instance.
However in the real world minnows have a tendensy to follow whales anyway.
Recently I was surprized by @smooth saying that his single vote now have only about 40$ weight. But in fact it always more like 150$, because many dozens of people and bots try to target it in order to get curation reward.