Thoughts about capping rewards in an incentivized way

in #steemit8 years ago

I was thinking about the capping of rewards on posts, to make more "room" for smaller posts to get something from the reward pool and prevent the piling of whales on the same post. 

I think it was dantheman writing that the first whale gets something like 80% in curation reward, so whales don't have the same incentive to upvote when there's already some heavy upvoting, yet the piling up continues up to the thousands.

In theory this is fixable by curation (whale downvoting to reduce payouts) but in practice it is problematic (reputation, less incentives for downvoting compared to upvoting and getting curation rewards etc). 

Now caps are a bit "communistic", so instead of saying "a max cap of 1000 or 5000 should be introduced", I was thinking alternatives. 

One of these alternatives involve a voluntary self-capping, through incentives:

Example: The platform offers a maximum cap of "unlimited", "9999", "4999", "999", "499", "199" that the author wants to cap himself.


These go like these:

If authors are aiming at (unlimited) / 10000+, they get a multiplier of 0.35x on their earnings

If they are aiming at 9999 max, they get a multiplier of 0.5x on their earnings 

If they are aiming at 4999 max, they get a multipler of 0.6x on their earnings

If they are aiming at 999 max, they get a multiplier of 0.75x on their earnings

If they are aiming at 499 max, they get a multiplier of 0.85x on their earnings

If they are aiming at 199 max, they get a multiplier of 1x on their earnings 


(the numbers and limits can be adjusted - they are just an example)


So the lower the cap that one selects, the higher the multiplier of one's earnings: The different multipliers of the range provide the motive to impose a cap on yourself in order to increase your own multiplier. The lower cap you use, the higher the multiplier you are getting. This gives a sense of control on the process.

Now, say an author writes a post and are are aiming at unlimited payouts. They get a multiplier of 0.35x on their earnings. So if they really hit 10.000, they get 3.500. But if they hit 100.000, they keep 35.000. It might sound a ripoff but if there were caps involved at, say, 1000 or 5000, then that money beyond 1000 or 5000 would be lost anyway. Remember: This is a cap-alternative system, so it will by necessity involve reward reduction in huge rewards.

Likewise, if an author declares a post in the 999 max category, and he gets upvotes for 1500$, then he's maxing-out at 999 - he doesn't get to make more than 999 because that's his desired maximum. (To hit 999 you'd need 999/0.75 = 1332$ worth of upvotes.) 

In a way a mechanism is created where users try to "self-penalize" themselves the least possible (maximizing their multiplier) while also aiming at what they consider realistic. 

This could also be marketed in a positive way by doing the maths the opposite way (it has the effect that instead of appearing self-penalizing, it appears self-rewarding for not being greedy).

Spin-offs of the above would be to go with a various reduction curves (from very steep to less steep) after one hits a limit...

I haven't really figured any drawbacks besides (1) difficulty in determining the default value for new users (some celebrities would have a problem) and (2) introducing extra complexity. I'm not in favor of solutions that require more than 10-20 seconds to explain in terms of user interface. 

Anyway, just throwing ideas on the table. They might be useful to those designing the game-theory components of the system.

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An interesting idea, but I should point out two outside factors which make the whale-centric system worth abiding by:

  1. STEEM demand. Other than speculative demand, the only real demand for STEEM tokens right now is to buy influence on Steem. I could promote myself to dolphin by buying ~$1,000' worth of STEEM and powering up. In this way, the system being geared to whales gives an incentive to buy and hold STEEM. Right now, there's no other reason to buy-and-hold except speculating.
  2. Both Reddit and Twitter started off as minnow-friendly platforms - and both of them have had real difficulty monetizing. (Ellen Pao was fired from Reddit in part because she tried to implement more celebrity-friendly moderating, which caused a mods' revolt and a lot of bad publicity. Jack Dorsey's trying the same thing and facing the same difficulty: just look at all the anger when Twitter permanently banned Milo Yiannopoulos because one of the Ghostbuster-reboot stars complained about him.) I think @dantheman and the rest of the devs has learned from both companies' troubles and designed Steem to be whale- and celebrity-friendly from the get-go.

Although I'm stuck at minnow level, I think the system should be left as is. I know that you're proposing a voluntary option, but it's not likely that the whales will use it - and it's not likely that Dan & Co. will implement it. The current system directs minnows to churn out content, hoping for authors' rewards, and that's better for Steem imho.

what incentive do writers have to set their expected turnout accurately? Seems to me that under such a system, whales could state that they expect a low turnout when in reality they expect a high turnout.
To be clear, I 100% agree with your intention here, but I am exploring all options and modes of abuse that could take place in such a system, which I believe is the Steemit Way.

The incentive is a higher multiplier for their actual rewards. If they go lower with the cap (less greedy) they get more.

The whales are voters in the system, not authors, so the proposal only applies indirectly in terms of curation rewards for them.

But in case a big whale writes an article, they may choose to cap it intentionally to avoid extreme upvotes. Say if the Steemit creators want to make a post, they can put the limit to 500-1000 (enough to be "trending") but not more than that (so that rewards could go to smaller authors).

or create a separate place for steemy and whale posts, a separate column, next to trending. trending general and trending steemy...just a thought--great post

what incentive do writers have to set their expected turnout accurately?

Sorry, I don't quite get what you're driving at. Would you mind explaining?

The purpose is not to upset the whale-centric system (it has serious benefits in terms of eliminating sybil votes), but more to increase retention at the lower levels.

Look at it this way: A post that doesn't get 13.000$ but gets only 10.000$, is 3000$ more for smaller posts. You can take that 3k and give 100 authors 30$ that will motivate them to keep going. If the casino effect (the roulette is at 1/37 odds) tends too much to lottery-odds (highly improbable to win, ever), then one might abandon it altogether.

But then you have to deal with how to cap rewards and get that 3k... so instead of doing it forcefully, you allow the user to set the cap and get rewarded for it with an increased multiplier (the lower he goes).

The purpose is not to upset the whale-centric system (it has serious benefits in terms of eliminating sybil votes), but more to increase retention at the lower levels.

That's certainly a nice goal, but it it aims to retain the minnow who wants to click instead of write. I certainly understand: I tried to snap up some curation rewards when I started out here! But I also got the idea that I should be writing instead of just clicking away.

Are you trying to address a perceived unfairness induced by the impression (not "fact," impression) that the whales are making huge bank simply by clicking?

It's more like:

  • trying to spread author rewards between known authors and less known authors
  • incentivizing curation to not go the easy way of clicking "same old" (if the articles are capped or with diminishing rewards due to low multiplier) but discovering and curating good content from less known authors

Okay, thanks for clarifying.

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