Guardian of the steem universe : A different perspective on the role of whales within steem ecosystem [ part 2]

3 months ago
64 in steem

Part 1 https://steemit.com/steem/@snowflake/guardian-of-the-steem-universe-a-different-take-on-the-role-of-whales-within-steem-ecosystem

This is a follow up to a post I made a couple days ago. The idea was very well received by the community which encouraged me to dig even deeper into it and explore different possibilities. Some feedback and comments have been very useful for me to come up with what I believe would be the best design for steem.
Before we get into the actual proposal I want to explain why I think steem in its current form will have a very difficult time to go viral and reach mainstream adoption. I will then explain how the proposal addresses all of these issue.

Steem is still very complexe and difficult to understand

Steem is still very confusing and hard to grasp for people. These are the kind of questions users often ask themselves: Why do all the votes on my post come up at the 30 min mark ? Why does this post with 20 votes have higher reward than this one with 180 votes? How can my post have 4 views and 70 votes? Why did I receive a smaller payout than what was advertised on my post? Why do most comments have no rewards? What is a curation guild and why should I care ? Why isn't counter moving up when I upvote things ? Users shouldn't have to ask any of this.

Steem price is held back by flawed incentives

Like I said in part 1, the current set up is totally meaningless to the average user. The incentive to buy steem and power up in order to gain more influence is clearly not working. 99.8% of steemians have basically no influence in the system. They would have to spend huge amount of money to be influential.
I like to compare steem power as upgrades and power ups options in video games because they have a lot of similarities. These options are how game developers get paid, they are the source of their revenue. Now imagine if these things would cost a fortune to acquire nobody would buy them and game developers would go broke. Steem is no different, it needs a revenue model to sustain itself, if no one buy steem power steem the token will end up worthless.

Steem is not scalable

The vast majority of the steem power is held into very few hands, 0.2 % of steemians own 85% of the total voting power.
The narrative has always been , just give it time it is going to redistribute itself. This is false. I have written an entire article explaining how the redistribution of power will be a perpetual issue due to the price increase. You can read more about it here
https://steemit.com/steemit-ideas/@snowflake/what-if-i-told-you-i-ve-uncovered-a-top-secret-community-this-community-is-so-secretive-that-if-you-want-to-work-your-way-up-its . The higher the price of steem the harder it will be for people to gain influence in the system, this also reduces the incentives for people to buy steem power which is another problem.
Also one thing that has been overlooked is the fact that whales will often sell their share to buy it back at a cheaper price.
Here is a quote from @abit which is very telling :

If I see there is an opportunity that I can buy back same stake at a lower price, or I think the price will go down and have little chance to come back in the future, I'll sell some for sure.

By doing this whales increase their power and influence in the platform. I quoted @abit here but he is definetely not the only whale doing this. This is the mindset of pretty much every trader, but whales are more successfull doing it because they have the money to move the market.

Curation guilds are a good initiative, they have done a lot to improve reward distribution but they are not a real solution. These guilds do not incentivize people to buy steem power, they make the system even harder to understand and they take the natural process of upvoting away from users. They are also a centralized solution and not accessible to everyone. Don't expect people to submit post so they can be voted on , this concept is flawed for mainstream adoption.

A scalable design also means that the system can accommodate all users. More specifically that users are able to send themselves a few cents without having a whales swimming around.
Facebook records about 40k post every second, can you imagine 200 whales or maybe a few thousands going through 40 000 post per second? The day this happens this is how they are going to look like

Steem is run by bots

Bots are just the manifestation of a broken system. To me a bot vote is like a fake vote, it is meaningless especially to the content creator. You might say it is not totally insignificant because it adds a payout but when you get 100+ votes and a mere couple cents added...most people would take 100 real views over a few cents any day of the week.. How can steemit earn the reputation of being a site for quality content when most of it is voted by bots?

Steem is not fun

There is no real excitement in being part of steem because 99.8% of users can't play the game or don't understand the rules.
Steem is like playing a video game , being stuck at level 8 and being required to pay $10 000 to get access to level 9. Actually it's even worse than this because on steem you never even get to go to level 1, you are just stuck and so you leave the game.

Here is a quote from @son-of-satire who definetely gets it

I really like your line of thinking, and empowering the minnows would most definitely have a positive effect on the community. It must be so satisfying clicking the upvote button and seeing that you have given someone else a reward. I imagine that would get addictive before long, and people would want more and more STEEM power to increase how much of a reward they can give.
Give the minnows some power, some purpose, and they will give so much more back to the platform. More minnows will arrive wanting a piece of that power for themselves, and they will stay once they have had a taste of it. Many of them will love it so much that they will invest their own money into STEEM so that they can award people with a dollar, or two, or three, achieving a higher level of gratification each time.
People are sick of centralized power. It's all around society and people have had enough. If Steemit can find a way to decentralize the influence, then we will see people swarm in by the millions. That's what I think at least.

I totally agree with @son-of-satire and he is 100% right. Steem has the potential to be something so much better, we could create a whole different dynamic where steem power becomes addictive to people, the more they buy the higher the steem price goes, the bigger they can give with it and so they will want even more. That's how you create a steady demand flow.
The steem power token was meant to be a tool to enable people to reward each other so why are only 0.2% of people able to use this tool?

I want to propose a totally different design, one that will re-align the incentives with the vast majority of steem users, create a more scalable system, fuel demand for the steem token and make steem more fun and engaging. This proposal will also address the bot issue and make the system a lot easier to understand for newbies.

The idea is very simple.

2 categories of user will be created : Users and moderators.

Users (all accounts < $8000)
Users can upvote/downvote as usual
Users won't receive any of the inflation nor will they receive curation rewards.
Users will just upvote for the things they like and downvote for the thing they don't like.
Users's voting influence will be proportional to the steem power that they have.

Moderators (all accounts > $8000 )
Moderators can only downvote ( moderate ) content
Moderators will receive inflation proportionally to how many steem power they have.
Funds that were previously allocated to curation reward will be distributed to moderators in proportion to their steem power.

I don't know what exact inflation percentage should go to moderators but we could always increase it if the incentive to remain in that category isn't strong enough.

Basically only moderators will receive inflation, they will have a financial incentive to use their account to moderate only.
Moderators who still want to use their steem power to upvote content will be able to do so by splitting their account, but they won't receive any financial reward when doing so and their vote might get moderated ( especially if they abuse it).

What interface changes would be needed to accomodate the new system ?

  • First of all I think we should replace the word downvote with moderation vote.

At the blockchain level a downvote has only one purpose, reducing the rewards, which is why I think a moderation vote is more suited. It is also important that users do not misinterpret the action of moderators. Downvote has a bad connotation that I think we should get away from. Moderators will be the guardians of the platform, they will ensure that the best content gets the best reward and that everyone is fairly compensated, this adds tremendous value to the site and has a lot of merit.

  • Payout amount information should not be visible on the interface until it's actually paid out, the only information visible on a post during voting period should be users's upvotes/downvotes and the amount one’s own vote added to the payout. The purpose of this feature is to hide moderators's action during voting period.
    Moderators vote should not be visible on the interface at all, not even after reward was paid out.

A post during the voting period would look like this. Below you can see I have added 5 cents to this post but have no idea what the payout is or will be.
The total payout will be revealed only when voting period ends.

  • A report button on posts would be useful to facilitate moderators's work. This is not really needed right now but when moderators are hit with 40 000 posts per sec you will understand its usefuleness.

I'm sure you have noticed that in the proposal curation rewards have been removed entirely. Let me explain the reasonning behind the decision. First let's see what steemit says about them.

Earn STEEM by being the first to upvote popular content
Every post submitted to STEEM is voted upon by users. These votes help other users identify content that is worth their limited attention and bring significant value to the platform. Steem recognizes that sifting through the abundance of new submissions is work that deserves to be rewarded.

So essentially curation rewards have been created to help sort good content from trash content. But is this really a problem? When you go on other forums are you overwhelmed with garbage that you can't view the great content? No. Do you usually see crap articles on the reddit trending board? No. This is because upvoting good content is a natural behaviour, people will do it regardless of the incentives. To me curation rewards are trying to solve a problem that really don't exist and they bring with them a lot of bad incentives.
For example curators are encouraged to vote early, more precisely around the 30 min mark in order to earn the highest curation reward, this has turned the platform into a completely fake system where everything is run by bots and driven by money.
Curation rewards is also the cause of the general users confusion

See what I wrote earlier

These are the kind of questions newbies ask themselves: Why do all the votes on my post come up at the 30 min mark ? How can my post have 4 views and 70 votes? Why do most comments have no rewards?

All of this is caused by curation rewards.

As you can see a problem also caused by these rewards is that nobody votes for comments because users have no financial interest in doing so. What once used to be a natural behaviour has now become a restricted one..steemit created curation rewards to improve content selection but the incentives made it worse.

If you want the best content the last thing you want is have bots sort it instead of humans. Bots are programmed to vote for posts that will earn the highest curation rewards not the highest quality content. The only reason bots havn't turned this place into complete shit yet is because there are still real humans running them. You know what curation rewards remind me of? A bribe. You basically vote for something not because it's good but because you will earn something out of it if you do, a bit like lobbying a politician.

So how does this proposal address all of the issues referenced above. Let's go through them one by one

  • steem is still very complexe and difficult to understand

It will remove all the complexity, particularly the one introduced by curation rewards. It would make the system a lot more familiar to what users are used to on other forums and social media site.

  • steem price is held back by flawed incentives

The proposal will re-align the incentives with the vast majority of users, they will finally have a good reason to buy steem power and understand the purpose of buying it.

  • steem is not scalable

It will allow steem to instantly adapt and handle any increase in the amount of posts/users. Not a single quality content post will be left without payout because at least a few people will see it and vote for it ( every vote will now make a difference) The report button will facilitate moderator's work by bringing overpaid content to light.

  • steem is run by bots

Most bots will go extinct the minute curation rewards are removed. Some users may still be running them to make sure their favorites authors gets their votes everytime but bots won't be a nuisance like they are today.

  • steem is not fun

Following the analogy made earlier in the post, new users will be at level 1 by default. In other words their vote would and should be worth at least 1 cents when they register so they understand the rules and get a real taste of the game straight away. Steem power should be like a product that you want to sell, you give users a free degustation or a free trial so they come back for more.

The proposal will also solve a few other issues :

  • It will increase comment voting, no longer will users want to preserve their voting power to vote for something that will earn them curation reward. Voting power will be seen as something that you spend and buy more of. The devs wouldn't have to create a seperate pool for comment reward (which I consider band aid solution similar to curation guilds), people would just upvote comments instinctively.

  • It will solve the issue where a steem price increase would make gaining influence more and more difficult which would reduce incentive to buy steem power overtime. The $8000 number that seperates users from moderators is an arbitrary number and could be increased or decreased, this will allow steem to realign incentives if necessary as the platform grows and always meet users expectations.

  • Hidding payout amount as innocent as it seems, will turn out to be a big positive for steem. It will make the site a lot less focused on the money aspect and a lot more fun to be part of.

I've been thinking about these issues a lot, I've tried to offer some alternative solution but most of them were vulnerable to sybil attacks. I am convinced that such design would work as intended.
Everyone needs to understand that a system like this would benefit us all including the whales. Whales really will not lose much as they could still split their account if they really wanted to use their voting power to vote. It's just that the incentives will be constructed in a way that makes it not the most attractive option.
I've always said that if we want steem to evolve there will have to be some trade offs along the way. I believe this one is very good because it doesn't take away much from anyone . Essentially what the proposal says is that you either curate and have power or moderate and have money, but it also gives power to moderators because they will still have the same voting weight that they currently have that they can use to moderate content.
A design like this would be really easy to implement and could be tested on the real network without any code modification, all it would take is 'moderators' to stop upvoting for 24 hours and see how users vote and moderation is handled.
Users sceptical with regards to the motives behind me wanting the change just need to look at my wallet, this proposal would put me in the moderators category and I am also subscribed to biophil's bot so you would think removing curation rewards and bots from the system is the last thing I want to do. It is NOT because I understand all the positives that would come out of that and see the bigger picture.
Devs want to make steem as simple as possible, you can't get simpler than this and the fact that the proposal happens to solve so many issues all at once tells me it's the right path forward.

People use social media spontaneously as a way to document their lives or share experiences and moment with friends,etc..social media is all about natural interactions, to me it was always a bad idea to mix money with social media, because I thought it would take away some of the authenticity and genuineness. If you want money to be integrated in a social website it needs to be abstracted as much as possible so it doesn't become the primary focus of the whole site. Steemit has turned the social media experience into a weird thing where people discuss, flag, bots, whales,etc....sure some people may like it here but in the current form steemit is not ready for prime time.

Please share, resteem and make your voice heard if you want to see this happening. I am only one voice among many.

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Sort Order:  trending
68
  ·  3 months ago

One idea (not so thought out):

  1. Vesting rewards are made somehow modestly superlinear (as curation rewards are now)
  2. If an account upvotes, it forfeits its share of vesting rewards (what you call inflation) for some period of time. This becomes a market (i.e. you don't need a fixed limit) because the rate of return would increase the less stake "opts out" in this manner and larger accounts are more incentivized to not upvote and instead take the vesting rewards since these rewards are superlinear. Small accounts would not care and still upvote because their vesting rewards would be tiny or zero (currently curation rewards are literally zero for the smallest accounts because of rounding).
  3. Downvoting does not affect the vesting rewards, and might or might not have its own downvoting incentive (designing a workable one seems hard)
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64
  ·  3 months ago

The main reason whales are upvoting is curation rewards. If we remove them entirely and implement your idea I think many whales will abstain from voting which will give more power to the minnow. I think your idea is a very good balance, basically even minnows who want more power could just stop upvoting and they would receive more share than other. The problem is that curation rewards offer an incentives to still upvote, if you want your idea to work better you need to remove them entirely so that people have 0 incentives to upvote ( like my proposal did) Seriously talk to the devs about this, and tell them to remove curation rewards. Idk know if you read my post entirely but i explained why curation rewards are bad and serve no good purpose at all.

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68
  ·  3 months ago

Yes I meant in this proposal to remove curation rewards. Although I have mixed feelings about that, as I do feel that curation rewards (in some form, maybe not the current one) serve a useful purpose. But I do agree the system could work without them.

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64
  ·  3 months ago

Have you ever discussed this proposal with the devs or did you just come up with the idea?

Also curious to know how curation rewards would serve a useful prupose?

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68
  ·  3 months ago

Some similar ideas have been discussed in the context of having "investors class" of SP/VESTS that would incentivize opting out of curation (also something @arhag has discussed/proposed). This particular variant I just came up with.

I don't really have time to get into the question of curation rewards, but some aspects of it are pretty obvious: motivation to buy SP (though as you say, only in large quantities), for those who are good curators, incentive for stakeholders to actively vote and not succumb to voter apathy, etc.

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64
  ·  3 months ago

@smooth There is one thing though that your idea doesn't address is that when the steem price increases it makes it more difficult for users to gain influence and so the the incentives to buy steem power will go down over time.
Another thing also is that the influence of minnow will fluctuate a lot more than in what I proposed. I still think the idea has merit though.

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65
  ·  3 months ago

steem price increases it makes it more difficult for users to gain influence

it doesn't. At least, not really.

for example, lets say there's 1 trillion vests in the whole system. Steem costs $1. I buy a .001% share for $10, 000.

Now lets say steem doubles in price to $2. You're correct that now, my $10K only buys me a half sized (.0005%) share.

But -- its buying me that share in a double sized system. A system that offers twice the rewards.

FOr example if my $10,000 .001% share of steem buys me a vote worth 10 cents when steem is worth $1, my $10000, .0005% share buys me a vote also worth 10 cents when steem is worth $2.

DOes the guy who bought his $10k worth of steem first, when the price was lower, have an advantage over the other guy who bought it when the price was higher? sure. So for example, if you buy $10K at $1, then i buy it at $2, youre going to have twice (actually 4 times because of quadratic weighting) as much influence as I am. But thats the way its supposed to work

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68
  ·  3 months ago

youre going to have twice (actually 4 times because of quadratic weighting) as much influence as I am.

Not 4 times. That only applies to the extent you are the only one voting on the post. If A has 1, B has 2, and C has 3, then A+C yields a reward of 16, but B+C yields a reward of not 64 but 25.

Overall your point that buying influence doesn't suffer much as the price goes up (but does a little, and that's okay) is a good one

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68
  ·  3 months ago

You are right about the fluctuation at least. Switching this on or off on say a 24 hour basis might be too much, and the "investor VESTS" idea might be a better way to go. In that case the obvious approach would have it taking 13 weeks to swtich between classes of VESTS, so there wouldn't be wild fluctuations but more likely some sort of loose equilibrium (as there is currently with SP vs. STEEM)

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65
  ·  3 months ago

The main reason whales are upvoting is curation rewards.

check out how much most whales make in curation rewards and you might change you mind about this position.

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68
  ·  3 months ago

I don't think he is incorrect. A large portion of the whale voting power that is actually deployed (largely through guilds and bots) does generate large curation rewards, even if not all individual whales do.

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60
  ·  3 months ago

curation rewards are bad and serve no good purpose at all

well, maybe author rewards are also evil then ? )
Since people would keep voting for posts even wuthout curation rewards, I think the same would apply to authors too, they will keep posting even without rewards )

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64
  ·  3 months ago

Curation rewards create a lot of bad incentives ( mainly they encourage bot/fake voting), author rewards don't.

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68
  ·  2 months ago

That could be disputed. For example, authors with a following milking it but posting crap because they know their followers often upvote regardless of quality or have low standards.

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56
  ·  2 months ago

Well my thoughts on this heads in the direction of what is best for everybody. In my experience without being whale status is this: I vote without even thinking of what is in it for me but instead vote because I know the content contains love, integrity, and understanding. I use Steemit because I love the knowledge base it shares while allowing "me to be me."

Facebook, Twitter, Google Plus, etc... are all designs of a social experience where no truth can dwell and no though can shine through because all lies seperate in the end... Meaning,

quote-love-is-not-consolation-it-is-light-friedrich-nietzsche-135798.jpg

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64
  ·  3 months ago

This is a good idea. So when their share is temporarily deprived it would go to all other accounts that havn't upvoted instead? I think you are onto something there smooth. Assuming there is still curation rewards the penalty would have to be greater than what people earn by upvoting with curation rewards?
I believe that curation rewards should go though, the idea you propose would be much more efficient if curation rewards didn't exist, they are very bad for steem and serve no purpose beside creating bad incentives. Curation rewards should just be distributed as inflation to SP holders.

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68
  ·  3 months ago

So when their share is temporarily deprived it would go to all other accounts that havn't upvoted instead?

Yes exactly.

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72
  ·  3 months ago

2 is interesting but disinterested idle accounts would end up accumulating a good deal of the vesting inflation pie for being passive. Would that be a good thing? I don't think it would.

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68
  ·  3 months ago

I think you have to choose your poison here. Whale accounts being active may well be worse for the system than them being passive. If that is the case, it makes perfect sense to reward the passive.

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65
  ·  3 months ago

There's one other potential poison with the idea. Making vesting rewards superlinear would also act in favor of more concentration (or if you look at the other way, act in opposition to current efforts toward a more even distribution)

Granted, if the whales who all this power was concentrated in weren't voting, that would ameliorate some of the negative effects of high levels of steem concentration. But some (for instance, hesitance of new investors due to the fear of being dumped on) would be unaffected by this abstinence.

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68
  ·  3 months ago

Curation rewards are already superlinear (and very harshly so at the mid-low level where they often round down to zero). I'm not really proposing anything that isn't neutral with respect to distribution at the direct level of curation rewards vs. whatever you get for not curating, and it might on the whole be a net positive for distribution if a wider and flatter base of voting influence means that a wider range of content is rewarded (and less is skimmed by "guilds" and other such schemes).

Quoting myself with emphasis added:

Vesting rewards are made somehow modestly superlinear (as curation rewards are now)

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65
  ·  3 months ago

Curation rewards are already superlinear (and very harshly so at the mid-low level where they often round down to zero).

I hadn't actually looked at the equation for curation rewards. I was under the impression that they were based on SP, but linearly so (and i missed the parenthetical statement to the contrary when i replied).

If theyre already superlinear then yeah it would be (or at least could) be distribution neutral. Though, both curation rewards and vesting rewards in the new system would probably have to be less superlinear than curation rewards are now.

Because the extra concentration caused by superlinear vesting rewards to idle accounts like ben and dan (up until a couple weeks ago) would have to be counterbalanced.

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68
  ·  3 months ago

[nested]

I hadn't actually looked at the equation for curation rewards. I was under the impression that they were based on SP, but linearly so (and i missed the parenthetical statement to the contrary when i replied).

They are in practice somewhat superlinear because rewards are, and curation rewards are 25% of post rewards (ignoring reverse auction).

Simplified example would be someone with 1 million SP votes on an unvoted post and generates a $4 post value, so $1 in curation. If someone else with 100 000 SP votes on an unvoted post under the same reward pool conditions, that would generate a 0.04 post value, and 0.01 in curation.

In reality it isn't anywhere near this extreme, but the effect persists.

Because the extra concentration caused by superlinear vesting rewards to idle accounts like ben and dan (up until a couple weeks ago) would have to be counterbalanced.

Maybe, maybe not. In looking at incentives you have to consider that those accounts could become non-idle at any time and begin earning curation rewards and contributing to increased concentration (which as you point out has happened). So ensuring that even currently-idle accounts have a incentive to stay idle (and considering what would happen to concentration if they didn't under each alternative) is an important consideration.

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59
  ·  2 months ago

So true.

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54
  ·  3 months ago

Nice insight smooth, if I understand correctly, Please tell me if I am thinking of this correct:

Since minnows making 15% on $10 don't care, whales are going to not vote just to collect 15% annually on their asset that they can afford to sit on because they are well enough off? I totally get this. If you were already a world traveler, then why would you want to take time away from your lifestyle to get paid an extra 5% to whatever the high end of this range is (what is it?).

Would you give this this up for another 5% annually on your already fat stack:

oops, sorry, smooth, maybe I should put

just to be politically correct.

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68
  ·  2 months ago

Yes that is basically the idea. Encourage whales to opt out of voting by providing passive income as an alternative (exact mechanism TBD, and that is often the hard part)

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54
  ·  2 months ago

Oh, so that has NOT happened yet? Sorry, confused..

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68
  ·  2 months ago

No it isn't. This post and my reply to it were ideas how to improve the situation.

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56
  ·  2 months ago

How about if we just got the whales together and had them create multiple steemit markets using alternate cryptos but all under the platform of steemit..

71
  ·  3 months ago

Allocating a good portion of the reward pool to yourself is something whales could do today so why don't they? There is multiple reasons for that but the primary one is that they are going to be downvoted if they do. So it really is no different to how the system works now.

This is really the big argument against the proposal that I keep running into. It is a valid concern.

Assume that we have everyone in the system playing 'fair' and following the 'rule' where all users above $8k are mods. Then assume there is one smart malicious user with $80k of SP. This user is able to produce a bunch of sock puppet accounts with 'OK' content. Stuff that isn't bad enough to warrant downvotes, but not hard to throw together..

If that user split their SP into 10 user accounts, their upvotes would be a much larger portion of the total voting pool, and they would be able to siphon off a very large portion of the rewards pool compared to today when many other whales are using up the majority of their voting power.

I don't know if the amount they would get from moderator rewards would be enough to incentivize a selfish user to keep all their SP in a moderator account.

...

I want this to work, but I also do not have a non-subjective/non-opinionated rebuttal to that concern.

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64
  ·  3 months ago

I know what you mean. It would be interesting to make some calculations to see how much a user could earn by doing this and how much he could earn by being a moderator within same time period.
I also think that the reputation system could help identify such behaviors, if someone is constantly upvoted by accounts that have not introduced themselves or just inconsistent accounts.

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71
  ·  3 months ago

I've done some 'fuzzy math' in my head, and I believe it would be a lot more if they could get away with it. I think the real undecided factor of this are how good of a job could moderators do catching this behavior, and how many people would prefer to try this over just taking their moderator rewards.

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56
  ·  2 months ago

So how about allowing a user to take a portion of SP and transfer it into a new account that is set with an instructional guide on how the account should be used. This will give the whales an opportunity to use their knowledge base in the form of instruction, also creating a new and improved ecosystem..

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71
  ·  2 months ago

Sorry, I don't really understand what you are proposing.

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56
  ·  2 months ago

Whale= power
minnow=imprisoned
dolphin=bridge to understanding

If whale fundsdolphinaccount then minnow account uses ether smart contract to ensure that minnow account has structured guide to become new whale...

I am working on the development now @ https://github.com/MELCHEZEDEK776

Sorry that was butchered but my conscious is Quantum computing

70
  ·  3 months ago

I think your ideas are very good and agree with some points you made. Especially, I support removing curation reward part and I believe this will reduce many problems we currently have, such as bot-domination and just following whales' vote.

Regarding complexity, Korean community members and I discussed about the n^2 reward calculation these days. Obviously, superlinearity is one of the most affecting factor that adds the complexity, and if we can remove Sybil issue by moderation I think linearity will meet KISS.
A sort of voting cap ($8000) was also discussed in Korean community as well, and we think it would be good if Sybil is moderated here again.

Please keep in touch (on steemit.chat?) and I am looking forward to more discussion and brainstorming.

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65
  ·  3 months ago

Regarding complexity, Korean community members and I discussed about the n^2 reward calculation these days. Obviously, superlinearity is one of the most affecting factor that adds the complexity, and if we can remove Sybil issue by moderation I think linearity will meet KISS.

Keep in mind that superlinearity is not there to combat the sybil issue (in fact, its what makes the sybil issue an issue in the first place. A sybil attack wouldn't make any more money than regular voting without the n^2 curve).

The purpose of the n^2 curve is to remove the incentive for self-upvoting. And it doesn't even really do that for everyone, just people with a small enough amount of SP not to be able to get a payout on self upvoted posts.

This is a problem that the founders double solved -- because both the ability to downvote and the n^2 curve are sufficient to police self upvoting. But the n^2 curve has the negative side effect of exacerbating the already very serious problem of over-concentration of SP.

Here's what i suspect happened. Ive read that originally they wanted to make a system without downvoting. To stop abusive self-upvoting, they created the n^2 curve to reward consensus. Then they realized the n^2 curve made the system vulnerable to sybil attacks, and that they needed downvoting to close the vulnerability.

What they might not have realized is that the downvoting that they adopted to address the sybil vulnerability was also sufficient, in and of itself (and in fact better suited) to combat the self-upvote vulnerability that the n^2 curve was created address.

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70
  ·  3 months ago

I might be unclear on Sybil part, but I mentioned what you pointed out, especially Sybil with split accounts.
Downvoting and n^2 are all shown in the white paper. I also remember in the beginning steemit has downvote button next to upvote one, but didn't remember why it was disappeared.
IMO, n^2 system surely prevent self-upvoting but also makes people to follow whale's voting. Also given the uneven distribution of voting power, as you mentioned, it makes the game more unfair and complex.
One of the most problem of n^2 curve is helpless feeling of minnows and dolphins, which bring about less incentives to buy more SP unless it is hundreds of thousand dollars. Many people realized that buying hundreds dollars of SP never meaningfully increase their voting power. In this sense, I like @snowflake's ideas of voting cap.

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64
  ·  3 months ago

Feel free to contact me @snowflake on steemit.chat

71
  ·  3 months ago

It's a cool idea. I've only skimmed it for now, but I will come back and review it in more detail later. Also resteemed :)

Some initial thoughts:

  • You will need to get buy-in /agreement from the major stake holders in order for this to go anywhere
  • Having the limit in MV instead of dollars would be better for scalability
  • What would stop people from just splitting their SP across lots of littler accounts?
  • Would the benefit of being a moderator outweigh the benefit of being a regular user?

(Sorry if any of these were already addressed and I didn't catch them during my skim)

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65
  ·  3 months ago

either that or just hardfork it.

that said, i agree there are a lot of sybil issues that the OP doesnt address.

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64
  ·  3 months ago

If the whales were willing to downvote shitty, overpaid content they would be doing so now.

Whales don't downvote shitty content because they'd rather save their power to upvote but in a system where they can only downvote they would do it a lot more.

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64
  ·  3 months ago

sybil issues that the OP doesnt address.

Can you elaborate on this please?

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71
  ·  3 months ago

I don't know how the math would work, but I suspect a whale splitting their SP into hundreds of 8k accounts could probably earn more by upvoting sock puppet accounts than from the interest they would get by being a mod.

The counter to that is that hopefully the other mods would be able to catch that and do their jobs as moderators.

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64
  ·  3 months ago

The counter to that is that hopefully the other mods would be able to catch that and do their jobs as moderators.

Yes that's the idea. Moderators would downvote content that's overpaid. It doesn't really matter if it was upvoted by many sockpuppets, if the content is shitty payout will go down.
We would have a system were post would go through a lot more scrutiny, which will increase the quality of content selection.

Another incentive for whales to not split their account is that by letting other users vote they will increase the demand for steem and so the value of their account.

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65
  ·  3 months ago

Yes that's the idea. Moderators would downvote content that's overpaid. It doesn't really matter if it was upvoted by many sockpuppets, if the content is shitty payout will go down.
We would have a system were post would go through a lot more scrutiny, which will increase the quality of content selection.

And the "evil whales" running the split accounts would astroturf the downvoted content, and say look at poor XXX hes getting downvoted by the big bad moderator. Dan is such a troll. Then dozens of fake voters would say "oh noes! we're being oppressed" And the moderators would back off.

If TPTB had the spine to downvote overvalued content, the system would work fine as is.

We would have a system were post would go through a lot more scrutiny, which will increase the quality of content selection.

The whales (most of them) might agree to this increased scrutiny in principle, but they won't put it into practice.

If the whales were willing to downvote shitty, overpaid content they would be doing so now.

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71
  ·  3 months ago

Count me in on team @snowflake for this one! I don't have a lot of influence, but I'll push for it as much as I can :)

I hope you don't mind, but I wrote a modified / TLDR version:
@snowflake's really interesting proposal - Turn whales into moderators and give dolphins all the voting power (TLDR Version)

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65
  ·  3 months ago

Yes that's the idea. Moderators would downvote content that's overpaid. It doesn't really matter if it was upvoted by many sockpuppets, if the content is shitty payout will go down.

foundation

Another incentive for whales to not split their account is that by letting other users vote they will increase the demand for steem and so the value of their account.

This has not been enough of an incentive for many of them to curate responsibly in the past, and there is no reason to believe it will in the future.

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64
  ·  3 months ago

Count me in on team @snowflake for this one! I don't have a lot of influence, but I'll push for it as much as I can :)

Great! Hopefully we can get the whole community behind the idea :)

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68
  ·  3 months ago

If my account was worth $80,000 and the limit for curation was $8,000, then I could theoretically just divide my balance across 10 accounts (each being $8000) and still have the same impact (relatively) as one account worth $80k.

That's how sybil would play out here. You can get around the new set of rules simply by creating more accounts.

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64
  ·  3 months ago

Here is my reply to @timcliff

Because all those small accounts will not receive any financial benefit from doing so. The inflation will only be allocated to account > $8000 and it will be higher than it currently is because it would include all current curation rewards . Also the more accounts decides to split the more inflation will be allocated to the one who don't. Basically you would increase your power by only using it to moderate.

Yes you could split your accounts but there won't be any financial incentives to do it. Overtime accounts that have chosen to split will lose power over accounts that didn't.

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68
  ·  3 months ago

I don't think they'd necessarily lose power over accounts that didn't.

Given two situations:

  • Accounts over 8k earn a proportional percentage of inflation based on account size
  • Accounts under 8k earn curation rewards based on performance

It's very likely that you could create a voting algorithm that would outperform the proportional percentage of inflation. So in fact, a smart dev could probably earn more by dividing up their stake into smaller accounts and continue to play the curation game just like they do today.

I'm happy to be wrong here, but until math proves it, I've got to believe that the system that's based on performance (as opposed to flat percentage) will be more profitable.

To be completely honest, the only solution I see to the problem you present is to completely remove curation rewards. Whales would stop voting on content to just earn rewards, and would leave room for the actual members of the community to vote on what they find interesting/valuable.

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65
  ·  3 months ago

unless they got kickbacks from the posts they rewarded. thats the thing, youd be giving the 80K guy (not to mention the 800K guy) a huge amount of influence if he elected to split his account into smaller accounts. he be able to assign a massive amount of the reward pool with noone to gainsay him.

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71
  ·  3 months ago

One thing that I missed on my first pass through was that there would be no more curation rewards. Users with a lot of SP could split into multiple accounts and gain additional influence, but there would be no financial benefit to doing that other than the ability to vote on your own (and friends) posts.

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68
  ·  3 months ago

I totally missed that too!

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64
  ·  3 months ago

To be completely honest, the only solution I see to the problem you present is to completely remove curation rewards.

Man, did you read my post? :-)

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68
  ·  3 months ago

Hahaha, apparently not good enough! It was uh... before I had my coffee :)

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65
  ·  3 months ago

jesta's comment covered my idea on how a sybil attack would go.

An absolutely transparent sybil attack might be downvoted by the moderators, but i seriously doubt one with even the flimsiest pretext of being a legitimate post would be.

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64
  ·  3 months ago

he be able to assign a massive amount of the reward pool with noone to gainsay him.

Moderators would downvote overpaid content, this user would be wasting his power if he was upvoting shitty content. He'd better off rewarding real content that's not going to be downvoted.

Allocating a good portion of the reward pool to yourself is something whales could do today so why don't they? There is multiple reasons for that but the primary one is that they are going to be downvoted if they do. So it really is no different to how the system works now.

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64
  ·  3 months ago

You will need to get buy-in /agreement from the major stake holders in order for this to go anywhere

You mean the witnesses? I think the community needs to be more vocal about this, because it really would benefit everyone. Like I said we need to think about the bigger picture. Whales are the biggest stake holders and would benefit the most with a proposal like this because it will increase the value of their stake.

Having the limit in MV instead of dollars would be better for scalability

If the limit is in MV, the limit would have to be reajusted every time the price of steem increase. Why do you think it would be better for scalability?

What would stop people from just splitting their SP across lots of littler accounts?

Because all those small accounts will not receive any financial benefit from doing so. The inflation will only be allocated to account > $8000 and it will be higher than it currently is because it would include all current curation rewards . Also the more accounts decides to split the more inflation will be allocated to the one who don't. Basically you would increase your power by only using it to moderate. Another incentive for whales to not split their account is that by letting other users vote they will increase the demand for steem and so the value of their account.

Would the benefit of being a moderator outweigh the benefit of being a regular user?

Yes, I believe so. Money is really what matters to most people at the end of the day, and the fact that moderators will still have their power to moderate makes it a more attractive option.

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71
  ·  3 months ago

You mean the witnesses? I think the community needs to be more vocal about this, because it really would benefit everyone. Like I said we need to think about the bigger picture. Whales are the biggest stake holders and would benefit the most with a proposal like this because it will increase the value of their stake.

Well, while this could be done without a HF - to do it right, a HF would probably be required. So witness buy-in is required.

They are not the only stake-holders though. You would also have to convince a majority of the whales, as well as the dev team to take it on.

Just because it is a good idea is not a guarantee that you will get everyone to buy into it. Getting the consensus of the community will be half the battle. (There is still a lot of convincing that needs to be done.)

If the limit is in MV, the limit would have to be reajusted every time the price of steem increase. Why do you think it would be better for scalability?

I think having it as a percentage of stake makes more sense than a dollar amount. If STEEM is worth the same as BTC one day, would that mean everyone with more than 8 STEEM would be a moderator?

Having it as an adjustable witness parameter might not be a bad idea either.

...

The rest makes sense.

I will say, I do really like the idea. If you would be able to get buy-in from the community (mainly the whales and devs) I would support it as long as there aren't any major objections to the idea that someone brings up (which I am not able to think of myself).

One last thing though - you have two completely separate proposals here mixed together. There is the moderator part, and then the hiding of payments. I'm actually against the hiding of payments part.

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64
  ·  3 months ago

You would also have to convince a majority of the whales, as well as the dev team to take it on.

I'm not sure how I could convince people... If people can't see for themselves that the system is broken then I can't really help them. I guess we will have to wait until the current design shows its limitation. People need to see it to believe it kinda thinking.. maybe when the price hit $0.001 they will start wondering why..

If STEEM is worth the same as BTC one day, would that mean everyone with more than 8 STEEM would be a moderator?

This is why the number that seperates users and moderators should be in USD, if it was in SP you would have to change it as the price of steem increases. It would be very inconvenient unless you could do it without forking the code.

One last thing though - you have two completely separate proposals here mixed together. There is the moderator part, and then the hiding of payments. I'm actually against the hiding of payments part.

The hiding payments part is actually an integral part of the proposal.
If you don't hide payouts during the voting period users would see their posts go from say $1 to $8 back to $2 and back up to $6, users would just be totally confused and it would be playing with their emotions, no good.
I think people tend to think that moderators won't really vote much, they would just check for overpaid content. This is not true, moderators will vote a lot. If they want the rewards to go the right place the will have to.

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65
  ·  3 months ago

bait and switch.

Oh buy this SP and power up. Youll b e able to vote to reward content you like.

SIKE! you can only downvote now. You just got steemed!

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71
  ·  3 months ago

I've mentioned this elsewhere, but I would not be in support of this unless there was support / buy-in from the majority of the stakeholders. If the whales do feel that this is what it does, then I guess we are back to the drawing board.

I've talked to a few whales, and there doesn't seem to be major opposition that part (at least from the people I've talked to.) Plus, if it really bothers them that much - they can still split their SP into multiple accounts :)

The idea is that hopefully the ability to actually influence rewards by investing in SP will encourage a lot more users to get involved in the platform and invest in moderate amounts of SP in order to be more influential.

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65
  ·  3 months ago

The idea is that hopefully the ability to actually influence rewards by investing in SP will encourage a lot more users to get involved in the platform and invest in moderate amounts of SP in order to be more influential.

This is a laudable goal. But this seems like a very complicated and very exploitable way to try to achieve it.

If giving smaller accounts more influence in rewards is your goal, then IMO step one is to get rid of n^2. Thats certainly less exploitable in terms of self-upvoting than what youre proposing (and the only reason we have it is to prevent self-upvote abuse), and it would probably be way more effective at actually producing a measurable increase in the actual effect a regular user could have on reward distribution.

58
  ·  3 months ago

Though I can't get on board with everything in the post, I will resteem this in hopes of sparking the conversation.

Edit: I just want to say I think it's a good post overall! Many important points and perspectives raised.

60
  ·  3 months ago

I remember in your previous post you said that 8000$ worth account would be able to make 10$ worth upvotes if your idea will be implemented.
That wouldn't work because one could just create a bunch of sock-puppet accounts and earn 500$ daily by upvoting these accounts.
To discourage that 8000$ account shouldn't be able to make upvotes worth more than 0.1$
But who would bother to power up from 80$ to 8000$ then ?

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  ·  3 months ago

Just to clarify the numbers used in my previous post were completely random. I don't know exactly how much accounts worth $8000 would be able to give.

That wouldn't work because one could just create a bunch of sock-puppet accounts and earn 500$ daily by upvoting these accounts.

Moderators will downvote content that's overpaid. If someone want to upvote sockpuppets and hope to get a payout from it he will have to post great content, in which case he probably deserves the payout. Moderators will be responsible to give posts their right value. They will be the biggest stake holder so it's in their interest that the system is fair for everyone.

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60
  ·  3 months ago

It might be not exact numbers, but this dilemma remains anyway:
-you give more power for litte investment and the intensity to game the sistem appears
-you give less power for investment and no one is interested to power up
Moderators could possibly identify only very big and apparent cases, if I upvote 40 sock-pupprts 5$ each...or even better create a bigger circle of 1$ upvotes - there's no way to stop it when downvoting manually.

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64
  ·  3 months ago

It is very easy to spot uncommon behaviour on a public blockchain, and most of the work would be done by bots.
Whales could upvote sockpuppets with the current set up, why aren't they doing it? They would be detected easily.

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60
  ·  3 months ago

whales could upvote sockpuppets with the current set up, why aren't they doing it

Well, yes, because there's just a few dozens whales around it would be rather easy to spot it and counterflag, but not with many thousends of users. Bots would be no help because there's nothing uncommon by someone upvoting the same bunch of accounts day by day. In fact any SteemVoter user is doing it right now.

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64
  ·  3 months ago

Like I mentionned in the proposal, a report button could help moderators find shill overpaid content.
But I really don't think it's going to be necessary, moderators could use all sort of filters to narrow down list of users who could potentially abuse the system, then they will only have to monitor only a small part of the network.

59
  ·  3 months ago

Waving my hand at STEEMS CRUISE SHIP captain. This platform is Great! I went back to read one of your very first or second post. I must say I am late to the party, but better late than never. Still going over all your info, which is a lot! Just wanted you to know some of us are actually listening and eager to help. Whale, Dolphins, and Minnows.

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  ·  3 months ago

Good to hear!

66
  ·  3 months ago

This post has been ranked within the top 50 most undervalued posts in the second half of Feb 10. We estimate that this post is undervalued by $7.62 as compared to a scenario in which every voter had an equal say.

See the full rankings and details in The Daily Tribune: Feb 10 - Part II. You can also read about some of our methodology, data analysis and technical details in our initial post.

If you are the author and would prefer not to receive these comments, simply reply "Stop" to this comment.

49
  ·  2 months ago

I didn't see this until today.
I like the two class of shares system but I honk the biggest issue is the steepness of reward curve . Can't wait to see how comments are impacted with next hardfork. When is that due? How long until 13 week power downs are over?

61
  ·  3 months ago

Great concept, @snowflake

  1. Except for my last two posts, the payout to me as an author has been zero or less than a dollar. So, as a minnow, at this stage I fully support your proposals
  2. Contrast these two posts: Lower votes, higher payout as compared with Higher votes, lower payout
  3. The bots are alive & well. They are not yet smart enough to identify a correction made to a 9 day old post, as yet
71
  ·  3 months ago

are you on steemit.chat?

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64
  ·  3 months ago

yep

62
  ·  3 months ago

Would this issue be settled better by forking Steem? In the altcoin world, that's what typically happens.

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64
  ·  3 months ago

I would be interested to know about this too. I was discussing this with @smooth the other day. The code is licensed so you need permission to create your own coin. But what about forking the existing code? If the license prevents users from doing this then I would argue it's not really censorship resistant. I would like to hear from @ned or @dan about this.
The idea however is not to seperate the community but work together.

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62
  ·  3 months ago

Okay, got it. But I think it's possible to fork the underlying code, else Golos wouldn't have appeared.

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64
  ·  3 months ago

I am not exactly sure about the details but the steem team made a deal with golos which is why they were allowed to fork the code.

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62
  ·  3 months ago

Oh, okay; thanks.

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65
  ·  3 months ago

But I think it's possible to fork the underlying code, else Golos wouldn't have appeared.

It is possible, but only with steemit incs express written permission (which golos had).

Its somewhat debatable how enforceable this license provision is though.

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65
  ·  3 months ago

The code is licensed so you need permission to create your own coin.

Not necessarily. You could create your own coin on the steem blockchain (as well as your own rewards system) without a hardfork.

Because the steem blockchain allows you to sumbit and vote on arbitrary data, it allows you to potentially nest other blockchains inside of it, like one of those russian dolls.

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69
  ·  3 months ago

Good idea.

66
  ·  3 months ago

Was wondering if you would like to do a V.O.T.U. interview. We like what you have to say. We can do a text Q / A or Voice during the Podcast. Let us know. Thanks

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64
  ·  3 months ago

Not really into giving interviews but you can send me your questions on steemit.chat @snowflake

70
  ·  2 months ago

Great post. I'm just now seeing it (and the first part) because someone I follow resteemed it. I'm now following you and I resteemed this also. I love that these conversations are taking place and people are thinking about how to improve this system.

Steem is like playing a video game , being stuck at level 8 and being required to pay $10 000 to get access to level 9. Actually it's even worse than this because on steem you never even get to go to level 1, you are just stuck and so you leave the game.

Such a great analogy. I joined Steemit right as it was mooning to $4. My vote, at one point, was worth almost a $0.25! It was so exciting! That, I think, was the hook for me. It's been a discouraging decline ever since. Right now I see things go up by about a penny when I vote, so I still at least get some encouragement, but if it was higher... that would just be so cool.

I hope these conversations continue and we further improve this system as we move forward.

69
  ·  3 months ago

Mostly good idea. Some of my concerns:

  • technically how to hide moderator's action? We are on a blockchain which doesn't have stealth feature yet.
  • moderators need to know exactly the pending payouts of all posts, so they can decide whether it is needed to down-vote a post. That said, we can get that data from the blockchain, so likely there will be services to show that info to the public, so other people will know that data as well, although it can be hidden from Steemit.com.
  • shitty contents are easy to be identified, but vote buying is hard to be identified when the post quality is OK.
  • report button can be abused or sybil attacked.

//Edit: more:

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64
  ·  3 months ago

Good points.

Hidding it on the interface level would be easy and suffice imo. I really would like to see the word downvote turn into moderation vote just for the general sentiment, and so that when people looking at the blockchain don't misinterpret it.

56
  ·  3 months ago

I really enjoyed your post and I totally agree with your observations.But like timcliff said in his comment the question is if the big guys understand this.

63
  ·  3 months ago

Interesting post proposal. I'll check back later and go over this all again. Thanks for your contribution.

Upvoted

@shayne

68
  ·  3 months ago

Thanks a lot for sharing my quote. I do believe that is the key to mass adoption.

I would love to see your proposal ran out over a three day probationary period to see how things go. I don't know what it would take to do that though. Would it require a hardfork?

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64
  ·  3 months ago

We could get a rough idea of how it would work if whales stopped upvoting for say 24 hours. They would just moderate/downvote. It would essentially increase everyone's influence for 24/h. We wouldn't get the full picture but still a good overview. I don't think we would learn much from it though, maybe the fact that minnows aren't irresponsible voters or that downvote aren't that bad after all but in terms of the security of the model I think it would be best to test the code on a testnet or something. Removing curation rewards would remove a lot of complexity in the code so that's good for security i guess.And yes I think such change would require a hardfork.

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68
  ·  3 months ago

Well, it's your idea. So, I suppose it falls on you to try and talk the whales into witholding upvotes for a period of time as an experiment. I would advise that if you manage to pull this off, you make it between 36-48 hours. As with payout lasting longer than 24 hours most of the time, I feel to get some fruitful results we would need to extend the time to account for that.

I hope to see it happen.

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64
  ·  3 months ago

There is some interest in the community for the idea, even some whales seem to be interested by it so we will see how it pans out. There are still a few issues that needs to be addressed in the proposal to make sure its not gameable. @timcliff also came up with some interesting ideas

51
  ·  3 months ago

I am still very new to Steemit and the whole system is a lot to take in and understand. One of the things that didn't sit well with me at first was the unequal distribution of power and influence- sounds like the current world 'system'! Although I still don't fully understand Steemit yet I think it is brilliant that people like you are thinking outside the box to try and improve the system.

59
  ·  2 months ago

you nailed it

When I started you could give 1c for about .6vests.
It was really satisfying to pay $400 to move the needle 1c. That's the only reason I added money to make my vote matter. I wonder if the changed the exponential curve to some kind of polynomial if they could let smallish accounts "matter" at $400 and but the whales to takeover in the end. I imagine $400 would be enough to deter Sybil attacks.

Also if the whale down votes were as powerful as ever they could correct obvious Sybil attempts

So basically 0 influence to 1c from 0to$400then it's flat until $5000 or so then it starts growing exponentially again.

This is more simple than your two classses of users method. Just change curation formula.

68
  ·  2 months ago

Ideas that your plants are very innovative, and I think that they are necessary for adoption in a widespread manner of steemit, I see many times confused people, because they don't know how to work on the platform, or every thing, which means personally propose that not only power those accounts that have more than $8000 as moderators, but are you power those writers who are influential in different languages , Spanish, French, Chinese, German, Portuguese among others, creating thus, a diversity in the platform more fair.

53
  ·  2 months ago

sou novo aqui mas tenho muito a aprender em steemit,vi sua postagem e gostei muito do que eu ler,mas acredito que ainda eu chego lá tenha um bom dia.

57
  ·  2 months ago

Ton of great discussion going on around this subject, hence the upvote. The idea of getting rid of curation rewards and enabling inflation only for those who don't upvote is intriguing. What is your current view on this snowflake?

Wouldn't this enable minnows to have bigger voting power and have that "I'm helping someone on the internet"- feel good moment? This could be considered as a charity work. We can all agree the current system does not work. Too much shady things going on with curie and voting guilds. The system is too easy to milk by those willing and the distribution of tokens is so bad that people see it as disheartening.

Let me know your thoughts and I hope you keep on this issue.

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64
  ·  2 months ago

What is your current view on this snowflake?

I've explored many different possibilities to solve influence issue and it looks like incentivizing whales to not upvote is the only way to go.

50
  ·  2 months ago

nice

53
  ·  2 months ago

nice explanation

63
  ·  2 months ago

@snowflake 1st link broken

74
  ·  2 months ago

I am sorry i only found this just now. I like your line of thinking and it shows great promise.

54
  ·  2 months ago

Best post I've read about Steemit till now. You have my cent : )

64
  ·  3 months ago

I like things the way they are, a lot of thought and energy went into getting this platform just right, hasty changes are likely to harm more than help.
(lower inflation and faster powerdowns, have done nothing to increase the bottom line)

The problem as I see it is the class snobbery that is controlling too much of the rewards pool.
If the high sp accounts spent their time upvoting the zero payout posts at https://steemit.com/cashout rather than plotting how to squeeze more minnows off the end of the tail to the benefit of the 'non-controversial' authors and posts, that would help.
This is supposed to be a platform for the masses, and I feel compelled to point out that most of the masses are unwashed.

If you introduce only negative voting for the high sp holders the animosity towards them is only going to increase.

The way I see it, self control within the present rules, and lower expectations of insiders making 'middle class wages' for doing what we can crowd source for free, will increase the reasons for new people to put in the effort of learning the platform, and perhaps investing some cash.

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64
  ·  3 months ago

lower inflation and faster powerdowns, have done nothing to increase the bottom line

They have done a lot to improve the design but there are still a lot of things to improve.

If the high sp accounts spent their time upvoting the zero payout posts

This is not scalable, you need every users to curate to handle all the posts.

If you introduce only negative voting for the high sp holders the animosity towards them is only going to increase.

Animosity towards them is caused by the huge influence disparity, give minnows power and the animosity will go away.

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64
  ·  3 months ago

In order,...

  1. Those two features appealed to me, I could see lowering the rate, but watching my sp go up when I refreshed the window was nice.
    Powerdowns, imo, should have been 10% a month, take it 'all' out in 10 months.
    Making this less can only increase sell pressure, and violated the original concept of hold until we are wealthy.

  2. Imo, the whales should vote however they want, but when they empower 'insider' groups that then gouge the rest of us for 'deserving' pay, that is an issue.
    The community can decide what they support just fine without gurus.
    If one needs more views, then one should interact with more folks.
    I'm not having any problems finding followers, and I'm controversial.

  3. Animosity will go down when more influence is left in the hands of the masses.
    That can easily be done by the whales voting in person and not banding into groups for purposes of self enrichment at the expense of the little guys.

I don't know enough about the curation rewards to speak on if that is a pool that the whales should leave for the masses, too.
I get that they should get their curation awards, too.
Curation rewards are, to me, like interest for holding sp, and therefore, legitimate.

I just ask that they get them for personally voting their conscience and not for creating manpower pools/bots.

Changing things so that whales only downvote is, to me, a horrible idea, but all the marbles don't belong to me.