Book Review: "The Governance of China, Vol. I" by Xi Jinping

"Hellooooo, I'm the Nostalgia Critic. I remember it, so you don't have to."
That's how every episode of Doug Walker's Youtube series "The Nostalgia Critic" used to begin. It was a fitting opening line too. In most episodes, Walker would review a movie or TV show from the '80's or '90's and explain the reasons why it just wasn't as cool as the "remember when we were kids" goggles make it look to us. To do these reviews, of course, Walker had to force himself to actually watch what he was reviewing, and there were many episodes where the viewer could see that doing this and keeping his sanity intact was not an easy feat.

Well...
Clears throat
Hellooooo, I'm Patriam Reminisci. I forced myself to read 497 pages of verbal diarrhea cobbled together from the speeches of a head-of-state so infamous for hot air that not even the cult-like citizens of his own dictatorial state will read it unless required to do so because of Party membership, so you may thank God you don't have to.
And with that out of the way, let's get down to the review of this brick.

Author: Xi Jinping... Oh Really?

The first thing one notices upon picking up this book is that it's not actually a book, but a collection of speeches and excerpts from speeches diced up and assembled in what China Intercontinental Press desperately hoped was a sensible enough order to give the illusion that Xi Jinping has had a definitive, signature vision for China's domestic and foreign policy. Unless slogans are synonymous with policy he does not, but I digress. The opening flap has a notice in massive letters proclaiming the rights under which the speeches have been assembled (seemingly because China, having been lambasted for infringing upon intellectual property laws, is now at pains to demonstrate at every step that they have not), and that "the author" reserves all rights to royalties made from it.
The thing that makes this fact the most ironic is that the speeches in question are not even of Xi's own composition. Like most heads of state, Xi has speechwriters to prepare his addresses for him, and all he does is reads them off of notecards or a teleprompter. In other words, Xi Jinping read a host of speeches he got someone else to write, then got yet another person to cobble together pieces of these speeches, got still another to edit it and ship it to a publisher with his name on it, then signed directive after directive requiring every member of the Party to purchase a copy, and collected the royalties from it.
Damn. Now THAT's not just a racket, that's what I'd call "a racket with Chinese characteristics."
No wonder there was a Volume II (which I do own a copy of, but I'm just not quite masochistic enough to read it yet).

The "Flourishing Central Race"

In terms of "ethnic supremacist rhetoric," this book could give Mein Kampf a run for its money. The most commonly occurring phrase in the English translation (I underlined this phrase in blue every time it appeared and when I went back through to count how many times it appeared, I stopped counting at 121 with more than half the book still not counted) is "Chinese Dream," and the second most common phrase is Xi's explanation of what this "dream" is: "the Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation." However, Jacob Shapiro of Geopolitical Futures takes an interesting look at the words that are translated here as "Chinese nation," and they are not what they seem, as I have explained before.

"The Chinese version is “zhonghua minzu weida fuxing.” The important part is “zhonghua minzu” – which has been translated as “the Chinese nation,” “the Chinese people” and even “the Chinese race.” The problem isn’t really the phrase’s lack of an English equivalent but that, even in Chinese, its meaning is ambiguous... On its own, “minzu” can translate as “nation” or “ethnic group.” The word doesn’t originate from the Chinese language; it comes from the Japanese “minzoku,” a combination of the Japanese words for people (“min”) and for tribe (“zoku”). Minzoku has no English equivalent. It can’t be reduced to “shared culture” or “blood ties” – it includes and transcends these ideas at the same time. Minzoku, like the German word “volk,” has a primordial, racial connotation. The use of these terms was part of the emergence of Japanese and German fascism, whereby the community took precedence over the individual, and the dominant ethnic group was seen as superior to all others.
-Jacob Shapiro, Geopolitical Futures

What Shapiro forgot to mention is that "Zhong" is a Chinese character whose meaning, depending on whether it is used as a noun or an adjective, is either "middle" or "Central." If we are to swallow the Chinese government's line that this book outlines Xi jinping's definitive view for China (notwithstanding the above-mentioned question over whether credit can really be given to Xi), this paints a rather dark picture of a racially motivated state fueled by the assumption of their own superiority, laced with the repeated implication that "it is our time to rise."
Naw, ethnocentrism? From China?! Say it ain't so!
In any case, much like Xi Jinping's New Year's Address it takes effort to find anything substantial in it, but one does find a few moments where the author actually says enough to let us know how insane he is.

That's What Xi Said

Much like Jin Canrong's China's Wisdom, the juxtaposition of Chinese mythology over history begins early, with the "China is 5,000 years old" myth (a myth soundly debunked on pages 24 - 27 of Ben Chu's Chinese Whispers) popping up on the very first page (p. 3). A few sentences later is the Communist Party's standard-issue line about how the PLA led the people to victory over the Japanese in WW2 (p. 3) (never mind the twin facts that it was the Nationalists who led the Chinese struggle in WW2 while the PLA hid in the bushes and that this struggle was by all measures unsuccessful until two American atomic bombs changed things). This is followed up with an assertion that the Communist Party's rise led to an immediate transformation of China from backward to prosperous (p. 3 & 4) (even though the founding of the PRC brought about a catastrophic drop in China's GDP which led to a depression that lasted until Deng Xiaoping's reign), and a quickly shoehorned insistence that "all ethnic groups live in harmony (p. 4)" in China (Tibet and Xinjiang would like a word with you, Mr. Xi).
In this same introduction, Xi speaks of China's determination to "make a new and greater contribution to mankind (p. 4)." A quick glance at some of China's other political literature, such as Cao Dawei's China's History (105, 116, 121, 124), reveals that China's definition of a "contribution" is nothing more or less than eradicating "backward (read: 'non-Chinese')" ways of life and superimposing their own way of life (complete with mindless obedience to the head of the Chinese State in perpetuity) in their place. He also speaks of how urgent he feels it is for everyone in China to "free their minds (p. 4)," which he goes on to define as "stop questioning the Party, and those of you who are in the Party, stop questioning Party Leadership." War is Peace, Freedom is Slavery, right? He goes on to urge the Party to "share weal and woe" with the People (p. 5), a repetitive catch-phrase cut straight from Mao's infamous "Little Red Book," and it's not hard to see what subtle hints he was dropping by repeatedly hearkening back to Mao. The introduction ends with the assertion "China needs to learn more about the rest of the world, and the outside world needs to learn more about China (p. 5)," which sounds innocent enough until you realize it puts China on one side of a scale and all 192 other countries (193 if you count Taiwan, as you should) combined on the other, and implies the two are of equal importance, and a quick message reminding "our friends from the press" to "continue their efforts for mutual understanding," which is a long-standing euphemism for "paint whatever you print or air so that it makes China look good, even if you have to lie."
All that is just pages 3 - 5, and it's all downhill from there.
After a few quick reminders that "only [the Party] can save China (p. 7)," though it's never clear just what they're being "saved" from, the book goes on to surprise me in only one way, and that is its near-failure to surprise me. Every single thing that the basic Western stereotype would expect of a Chinese indoctrination manual is in here, and the wording is never subtle. Here are some of the points of standard Chinese Communist Doctrine that are laid out in this volume.

• Anyone in the world who is of any Chinese ethnicity, even if they are a fourth or fifth generation foreign citizen, considers themselves Chinese and as such are obligated to follow the Chinese head-of-state (pages 37 - 39).
• Young Chinese should be fanatics, ready to fight and die for the glory of China and eager to threaten and harass anyone who dares "slander" China (p. 53 - 60, 185 - 199).
• All the "lesser nations" of the world look to "Great China" with awe, and eagerly await her ascendancy, after which they will be happier as vassal states than they ever were as independent nations (p. 61 & 62).
• As an example of how much better off they will be, look to the conquered ethnic minorities in China (such as Tibetans and Uighurs, or the now-nearly-extinct Manchu), who all love their Han conquerors and are grateful to be included in the "Chinese Dream (p. 69)."
• The most important thing for parents to teach their children, always, always, always, is submission to the State (p. 200 - 206).
• The PLA's first loyalty is not to the People or the Nation, but to the Party (p. 237 - 245).
• All Chinese have a duty to support propaganda work (p. 171 - 175).
• In the selection of high officials, devotion to Party Doctrine is more important than ability (460 - 473).

The book also includes an absolute circle-jerk of Han Jingoism wherein Xi enumerates all the "contributions" made by ancient China to its neighboring countries (most of which are a "unique" retelling of China's subjugation of tributary states), complete with pages and pages of self-congratulatory work about the "glory" of spreading China's culture abroad today via the Confucius Institute, which he condescendingly refers to as an "enrichment" of any country "lucky" enough to have one (p. 283 - 289).
Of the two most interesting running threads throughout the book, one was the eerie way Xi speaks of his government doctrine as if it was a religion, repeatedly calling on Party members to meditate daily on what "the Path of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics" means, remain true to "the Party's advanced nature and purity (p. 426)," "keep in line with the Party Central Committee ideologically and politically as well as in their actions concerning the Party's basic theories (p. 427)," and "stand firm against various erroneous views aimed at abandoning socialism (p. 11)." With this analogy of Communist doctrine as a religion, it therefore becomes evident that Xi views Marx's theories as prophecy, calling his work "mostly predictive (p. 102)," and saying the Party "must adhere to this principle in order to grasp the basic laws governing the advance of history (p. 29)." This call from the "Archbishop of Chinese Socialism" to his "priests" to stay true to their "prophecy" is, in a typically religious manner, followed by a promise of celestial victory and global dominance shortly afterward, in a typically Han Chauvinist manner.

"As Mao Zedong said, 'Once China's destiny is in the hands of the people, China, like the sun rising in the east, will illuminate every corner of the land with a brilliant flame.' "
(p. 29)

The second is the way Xi's priorities are repeatedly listed as "The Party First, China Second." On page 402, in the midst of a discussion on misconduct within the Party, Xi stresses that the "image" of the party (the Chinese are always obsessed with image) has a direct impact "on the very survival or extinction of the Party and the State." Not only are the two listed here as being nearly synonymous, but the Party is listed first. Later on on page 422, Xi defines "being earnest and upholding personal integrity" as "remain[ing] loyal to the Party, to the organization, to the people, and to their colleagues." Again, note the order of importance here.
The book leaves no questions regarding the PLA's loyalty either: not to the Country, not to the People, not to their Constitution, but to the Party.

"We must uphold the Party's leadership of the armed forces."
(p. 238)

"China's military must never lose sight of the fact that following the Part's command is its core duty."
(p. 240)

"The armed forces must never falter in upholding the Party's absolute leadership."
(p. 241)

In fact, being well-versed in Party doctrine is considered more important than being able to actually fight a war."

"We must treat theoretical and political education as our first priority so that the Party's leadership of them will take firm root in the minds of our officers and soldiers."
(p. 238)

Almost the exact same words appear again shortly after.

"In our efforts to strengthen our armed forces we must treat theoretical and political education as our first priority."
(p. 240)

It doesn't stop with the military though. The segments of the book that are addressed to the Party rather than to the general public keep browbeating the reader with this reality that loyalty to the Party comes before loyalty to the People or the Nation over and over and over again. It seems to have reached its climax on page 440, with this declaration.

"All Party members must always remember that we are first and foremost CPC members and our primary duties are to work for it, remain loyal to it, and at all times identify ourselves with it."

So, wait a minute, Comrade Xi. You keep insisting a Party member's first loyalty is to the Party and that this comes before all other loyalties. Does that mean it also comes before our loyalty to the People?"

"I have long been wondering if we were confronted with a complex situation such as a 'color revolution,' would all our officials act resolutely to safeguard the leadership of the Party and the socialist system?"
(p. 464)

Well, I guess that answers THAT question, and the warnings of a 'color revolution' appeal to the paranoid "beware of eeeeeeevil foreign 'influences' " streak in every CPC official.

There is another segment that makes me wonder if Xi heard himself when he delivered the speech whence it was taken. On pages 137 and 138 he recounts a tale of a group of Western Missionaries who came to Qing Dynasty China to make a map. Their map was, for whatever reason, found unacceptable by the Qing Court (probably for a stubborn insistence on drawing it based on facts and not on the emperor's wishes), and its distribution was prohibited in China. Xi's wonderfully revealing remark is "Hence, for quite a long time the West knew China's geography better than the Chinese people did (p. 138)."
So let me get this straight. Men from the West came to China to report what they saw, for all the world, and the Chinese leadership did not like what they read so they prohibited it from being known in China, resulting in the West knowing China better than the Chinese did, and Xi Jinping is marvelling at this? The only thing that could make this more perfect would be if this chapter had been back to back with the chapter wherein Xi reaffirms the necessity of censorship (p. 218 - 220), which results in Westerners hearing about atrocities and horrors in China (such as the Tiananmen Square Massacre) which the Chinese have never heard of.
And, of course, I have already commented in a previous entry on the way he asserts a view of Taiwan that seems to stem from a universe where Spock has a beard.
However, there are a few things the book actually manages to get right, and those are interesting to note as well.

Admissions of Imperfection? From China?!

"Karl Marx and Friederich Engels had no practical experience in the comprehensive governance of a socialist country, as their theories about a future society were mostly predictive."
(p. 102)

Okay, I did comment earlier on this book's near failure to surprise me, right? Well, right there is why I said "near-failure" and not "failure." Here, in print, is an admission that Marx and Engels wrote their entire Manifesto, the Manifesto which forms the entire backbone of Communism anywhere in the world, past, present or future, based on nothing more than speculation and guesswork.
And this admission came from the dictator of the largest allegedly "Communist" nation on Earth!
Of course, lest he commit heresy from the pulpit, Archbishop Xi of the Holy Communist Church quickly clarified that Lenin and the Soviets had set out to gain this experience later, but the fact remains that if anyone is paying attention, Communism (perhaps all of Socialism altogether) was just repudiated by its own current Patriarch.
Among the book's other surprising admissions are two rather straightforward confessions of some of China's underlying weaknesses (which, frankly, I'm surprised they allowed into any foreign language edition).

"Nevertheless, we must be clear that our economy, though large in size, is not strong. Its growth, though fast, is not of high quality. The extensive development model... is not sustainable."
(p. 132)

And...

"Generally speaking, the foundation of our scientific and technological innovation is not solid enough; our independent innovation ability, especially in the area of original creativity, is not strong."
(p. 135)

These two admissions are slipped in rather quietly and apologetically, and he switches back to bluster shortly after, but in a culture like China, where admitting weakness of any kind simply is not done, the fact that these admissions are in print at all shows that the weaknesses being addressed must be so deep that Xi feels the Party-State's existence (not merely its power but its existence) depends on desperately trying to fix them.

Perhaps the most startling admission is the way Xi repeatedly warns the Party "y'all mofos are losing the support of the people." Three entire sections of the book ("Close Ties with the People" beginning on p. 399, "Combat Corruption" beginning on page 42, and "The CPC Leadership" beginning on page 445) have a constant, rumbling undercurrent of reminders that a Party which came to power in the second of China's two populist uprisings in the twentieth century must always be mindful that another one could topple them, and that the People's entire measure of the Party's legitimacy is nothing more than their own standard of living, having sacrificed any hope of self-governance in exchange for the promise of "obey us and we'll make you rich." Though it's only the direct focus of the book for these three segments, this nagging fear of losing the People and thus facing a revolution lurks beneath the surface of Xi's mind on nearly every page of the entire book.

"Fifth, we must improve the people's standard of living, with a particular focus on low-income groups..."
(p. 124)

Perhaps this is because...

"Facts prove that he future and destiny of a political party and government depend on popular support. If we stray from the people and lose their support we will end up in failure."
(p. 17)

And on the very next page...

"Serious violations of Party discipline and state laws that have occured inside our Party during the past few years... have produced shockingly harmful political consequences."
(p. 18)

He's not concerned about the victims of the crimes, but he's fiercely concerned about the "political consequences." Also, notice that Party discipline comes before State law.

"I give these examples to warn all Party members. If we allow these problems to spread like weeds, the consequences will be disastrous, and the tragedy of Farewell My Concubine, which Mao Zedong used as a metaphor for losing power, may come true."
(p. 407)

This basically speaks for itself. If there is one thing Xi Jinping actually gets down to business about and actually seems to take seriously, it's not his much-lauded "Belt and Road Initiative," which, indeed, gets very little attention in this book. It's the message to the Party that if they don't wake up, they who love to remind themselves of the "glory" of the revolution that brought them to power could find themselves facing a revolution that will remove them.

So, Is It Worth Reading?

Well, if your job involves a lot of time dealing with China, I suppose it's worth knowing just what the Party wants the world to think of China, provided you do not open the book with the mistaken impression that the picture of China you're about to get is accurate. However, even then I would not read it unless you've spent some time in China AND read some of their literature so you can decode some of the doublespeak and Party-ese in it; after all, the Chinese are experts at innuendo and double entendre. Indeed, it's only the concept of saying what you mean and being frank that seems to elude them.
For anyone else though, I don't see any reason why it's necessary to read the entire book. If you find yourself with some time on your hands and feel the need to punish yourself, The sections "New Model of Major-Country Relations," "Close Ties with the People," "Combat Corruption" and "The CPC Leadership" are quasi-informative.
If you want to hack your way through all 497 pages (including the absolutely surreal afterword, wherein a sycophantic biographer bends over backwards to paint Xi Jinping, a "revolutionary princeling" as a "Man of the People," which is the exact title of the afterword) you can, but I'll be honest. I regret that I ever did.

Works Cited

Cao Dawei. China's History. Beijing, 2010. China Intercontinental Press
ISBN 978-7-5085-1302-7

Chu, Ben. Chinese Whispers. London, 2013. Weidenfeld & Nicolson Publishing.
ISBN 978-1-7802-2474-9

Shapiro, Jacob L. "Defining Xi's 'Chinese Dream.' " Geopolitical Futures. 17 Oct, 2018. Web, 11 Jan, 2019.
https://geopoliticalfutures.com/defining-xis-chinese-dream/