MindWar - The Concept of Psychological Warfare (Modern Origins)

Psychohistory: That branch of mathematics which deals with the reactions of human conglomerates to fixed social and economic stimuli. Implicit in this definition is the assumption that the human conglomerate being dealt with is sufficiently large for valid statistical treatment. A further necessary assumption is that the human conglomerate be itself unaware of psychohistorical analysis in order that its reactions be truly random.
— Isaac Asimov, Foundation, 1951

Antecedent: MindWar 1980

In the later 1970s, Psychological Operations (PSYOP) doctrine in the U.S. Army had yet to emerge from the disappointment and frustration of the Vietnam War. Thus it was that in 1980 Colonel Paul Vallely Commander of the 7th PSYOP Group, asked Major Michael Aquino, as his Headquarters PSYOP Research & Analysis (FA) Team Leader, to draft a paper that would encourage some future thought within the PSYOP community. He did not want a Vietnam postmortem, but rather some fresh and innovative ideas concerning PSYOP’s evolution and application. Dr. Aquino prepared an initial draft, which Vallely reviewed and annotated, which proceeded to revised drafts and critiques until he was satisfied, and the result of that was the concept paper: From PSYOP to MW: The Psychology of Victory.

Vallely sent copies of it to various governmental offices, agencies, commands, and publications involved or interested in PSYOP. He intended it not as an article for publication, but simply as a “talking paper” to stimulate dialogue. In this it was quite successful, judging by the extensive and lively letters he received concerning it over the next several months.

Within the U.S. military, PSYOP has habitually been relegated to a back—seat as a “force multiplier”. The principal strategic decisions are made in consideration of traditional political and military interests and goals. Only then is PSYOP invited to the table, to help achieve already-agreed~upon missions more efficiently.

Vallely’s and the original concept of MW reverses this sequence. Psychological means for achieving victory - essentially through convincing the enemy that he really wants to bring his policies and goals into harmony with ours — are first fashioned in support of basic political realities. The use of “ordinary” military force (bombs, bullets, etc.) is regarded as a “last resort” in circumstances wherein MW by itself fails.

The immediate advantage of that 1980 concept of MW is that it conducts wars in nonlethal, non-injurious, and non-destructive ways. Essentially you overwhelm your enemy with argument. You seize control of all of the means by which his government and populace process information to make up their minds, and you adjust it so that those minds are made up as you desire. Everyone is happy, no one gets hurt or killed, and nothing is destroyed. Ordinary warfare, on the other hand, is characterized by its rejection of reason. The antagonists just maim or kill each other’s people, and steal or destroy each other’s land, until one side is hurt so badly that it gives up [or both sides are hurt so badly that they agree to stop short of victory]. After such a war there is lasting misery, hate, and suffering.

The only losers in MW are the war profiteers: governments, corporations, and entrepreneurs which grow fat on orders for helicopters, tanks, guns, munitions, etc. Consequently what President Dwight Eisenhower referred to as the “military—industrial complex” can be counted upon to resist implementation of MW as the governing strategic conflict doctrine:

Until the latest of our world conflicts, the United States had no armaments industry. American makers of plowshares could, with time and as required, make swords as well. But we can no longer risk emergency improvisation of national defense. We have been compelled to create a permanent armaments industry of vast proportions. Added to this, three and a half million men and women are directly engaged in me defense establishment. We annually spend on military security alone more than the net income of all United States corporations.

To be continued in a future article....