An Exploration of the Ontologies of Self and Groups

Writing for Social Epistemology in the Spring of 2016

Source

I

In his Politics, Aristotle puts forth that man is by nature a social animal. For “the gift of speech evidently proves that man is a ... social animal ... and Nature, as we say, does nothing in vain.” However, though speech may be grounded in the light of nature, “epistemology has traditionally ascribed a secondary epistemic status to beliefs indebted to testimony.” For this reason a Levinasean defense of the importance of testimony will be given, initiating an exploratory pursuit of related theories linked together, first, by Descartes, next, major continentalist thinkers and, then, champions of Existentialism in order to elucidate the notion of consciousness as it relates to both the individual and to groups by highlighting similarities in both cases to, ultimately, aid in further understanding of the ontologies of self and groups.

II

There is a universal pertaining to being, it’s the shared experience of not being able to escape consciousness, the vigilance without an end. There is another universal attribute of being, it is that as agents we are free, and that this freedom is our ability to do something unregulated and spontaneously. I’m at home by my being and acting in the world. I’m comfortable within my world view. I’m a concave without a convex, pure interiority. I am, that is, until I’m violently disrupted by my being called out by the Other’s saying. Though I was already vulnerable through sheer materiality, I become vulnerable in a new light when the Other comes into my world view. The Other shows that I am exposed and vulnerable to his intentions, his actions which may force upon me unlike anything in nature. Before I was Robinson Crusoe facing indifferent gusts of wind and showers of rain. Now I am faced with gusts of intentions and showers of purpose. Now that I am vulnerable I must justify my being and my freedom to the Other. I must defend myself via the saying, that is the response I give in the face of the Other. My saying is linguistic (whereas the said need not be). In saying I am engaging in testimony, for I express through language that I am an agent deserving of freedom in the face of the Other. I cannot know the Other because the Other is like death, both are outside of my consciousness. But in my saying I derive a convex and establish a new world view through which I discover myself.
But what is this notion of self? Before pursuing any inquiry Descartes ransacked the whole of his beliefs and withdrew any that hinted of doubt. Not knowing whether he had feet to stand or whether he could in truth derive that 2+3=5 to measure out the dimensions for a stable foundation, he appeared trapped in an inescapable, bottomless hole of ignorance. But if anything is in this hole of ignorance it is I that am in this hole; for I think I’m in this hole. I think, therefore I am. Cogito ergo sum. However, Descartes explicates his utilizing “thinking” as an umbrella term, meaning all of: perceiving, conceiving, believing, understanding, justifying, willing, and the like. What should happen if we examine the Cogito argument whilst interchanging “think” with each of the terms encapsulated by it in turn?
I suggest that Martin Heidegger's ready-to-hand vs present-to-hand distinction is drawn out in comparing interchanged variations of the Cogito. When I am riding my bicycle I am encountering the object in a present-to-hand relation. That is, my recognition of the possibilities “I” can actualize in the world is changed. For I may zoom across a street before being crushed by cars had I otherwise been on foot. Though when I step off my bicycle to fix the chain that’s slipped off I encounter the bike in a ready-to-hand relation. That is, the distinction between my being and the bike as an object is clear and distinct as I analyse the componentry of the bike instead of perceiving it as a whole that’s extended of myself. For Heidegger, praxis precedes theoria – practice precedes theory. It is only in the present-to-hand encounter with objects that we discover that object’s ontology which enables us to further our ready-to-hand encounter and, thereby, understanding of the object.
Maurice Merleau-Ponty brings embodiment into Heidegger's theory by attempting to bridge the gap between the inner experience and the external world. Merleau-Ponty exemplifies the case of a blind person using a stick to aid in his perception. The blind man’s perception of the world is literally the impressions of the stick in the palm of his hand, but his conception of the world is very much different. For the stick does not merely become a tool for how the blind man sees the world, the stick becomes a part of that man’s being such that the possibilities available to his recognition are changed. Consider a soccer team on the attack. A good team will not be judging where they need to place themselves in relation to their teammates and the goal, they will just place themselves at the precise point. The team as a whole will be composed of multiple differing perceptions, but the team will have a shared conception as they move as a plural subject. A soccer team is not a soccer team in the ontological sense even if it is the most learned in the tactics of soccer if it has never acted out the motions. Here again, praxis precedes theoria.
Existentialism is the theory that man (which is given) is placed as a subject within the external world, though before he acts he is nothing. In other words, existence precedes essence. It is from this state of nothingness that man is faced with a wall of possibilities each objectively as valuable as the next. It is at this wall that man chooses the possibility that he will actualize, and because he chose the possibility that he so did that possibility is given the most value to him. Consider again the most learned soccer team that has not acted out the motions in play. The essence of their group isn’t possibly existent on this account prior their acting. The team exists only when it has acted as a team, and it acts as a team only when it perceives from multiple varying perspectives, on account of its various teammates, and simultaneously conceives as a whole. The players themselves change the conclusion of the Cogito depending on their relation with the ball. If the player is in midgame flow running and kicking the ball downfield, then the player literally is himself with the ball extended of himself in such away as to be indiscernible from himself; in like manner of the stick in relation to the blind man. Yet, if the player switches to a ready-to-hand relation with the ball by judging the ball needs air and goes to pump it up, then he has changed his essence by his actions; for he now does not see the world in possibilities of actualizing elusive soccer moves to score a goal but rather as an agent pursuing a task for a distinct object.

III

I believe this paper has provided fuel for further thought of the ontologies of self and groups. It’s been shown that one’s subjecthood changes dependending on the type of relation it is in upon encountering objects. If the nature of self changes with respect to the mental activity just as the notion of groups changes with respect to mental activity, then it appears both stand and fall by the same sword.

Footnotes

1. Aristotle. "Book I, Chapter II." Aristotle's Politics, A Treatise on Government. Trans. William Ellis. London: G. Routledge, 1895. Print. 12.
2. Schmitt, Frederick F. Socializing Epistemology: An Introduction through Two Sample Issues. Print. 1.

Thanks for reading :)