Does Science Need To Be True?
My thoughts on yet another lecture in my course on Philosophy on Coursera. It's long, so sorry in advance.
"It has long been my belief that science is colored heavily, as is all observation, by perception and our relative position in existence. I have never doubted science's aim to discover the objective truth of reality, but I do doubt its accuracy if only because any observation we make with our senses, the only instruments we have with which to observe, are inevitably affected and skewed by our relative perception as individuals and as a whole. As such, when it comes to the question of how 'true' science is, I have always been reserved.
{I must stop here and reiterate that the entirety of my position relies on the definition of the word 'true' here. If we were to mean 'true' as in not a lie(honesty), then anything can be true, to include that which is not correct because that truth is dependent only on the knowledge of the proponent of the 'truth' being presented. This definition of truth always incorrect information to be 'true' simply because the speaker of such information does not realize their 'truth' is not accurate. It is not a lie.
However, if we define 'true' here to mean 'accurate' or 'right' then is not a question of the veracity of the 'speaker' but rather the accuracy of the information itself. Thus I take 'true' in this discussion to mean 'accurate' or 'correct'.}
In my reservation of accepting the 'truth' of science, the term 'scientific fact' then causes me to bristle and seems disingenuous because science itself, in order to remain objective and to be about 'truth'(here, honesty and accuracy), must accept its fallibility and not engage in purporting to know with certainty its accuracy. It must accept and admit that it is not certain of itself. It is from this assumption of science that I derive my belief that science, while the best way for us to observe, measure and understand reality, is at its core merely a collection of tried and SEEMINGLY true theories that, for the time, work in our formulas and machinations. Whether or not science and its theories are 'true', to mean accurate, is something that we cannot truly ascertain. We can only know when it is not true and, even then, we cannot be sure that when we 'disprove' a theory or hypothesis, that we are wrongly doing so. As with all questions of objectivity in our observation and understanding of the world, we have no way of knowing.
The best that we can accomplish is to say that 'for what we have need of now and based upon what we can say to know now and derived from what we can observe now, it seems that the theories we accept as 'true' are as true as they can be and work accordingly at this time.'
To evidence this, we need only look at some of the most fundamental 'truths' that we hold even to today. I like to use the theory of gravity because it is rare to never that you will find someone who would argue its 'truth' or accuracy. We believe, with good reason, that there is some force that acts upon matter(and, seemingly energy) so as to cause an attraction between objects and that this force is what allows us to walk upon this rapidly spinning ball of rock and what keeps this and other balls of rocks in orbits and so on and so forth. However, it is difficult to find the common person who will admit that gravity is no more than a generally accepted theory that seems to fit with the reality of our observations. Yet when you look at the history of the theory, you see that it has been all but completely re-written and discarded and replaced by more accurate theories as our observations and knowledge become more refined and far-reaching. For centuries, Newton's Gravity seemed to explain the phenomenon of the force that brings matter together and it was considered 'fact' for much of that time. Yet with our observations into deeper space, we found that the formulas of this theory began to unravel and could not account for the behaviors of matter in the further reaches of space, even within our own solar system. And so enter Einstein who then formulated a new theory and this became our 'fact' of Gravity as it accounted for our observations, past and present. This theory persisted for decades, yet even it has been found to unravel as we have extended our observations even further and cannot seem to make this new 'fact' of gravity reconcile with the behaviors of matter in the universe. And so now we seeking our third 'fact' of gravity.
Our facts, a misnomer to be sure, are, in fact, mere theories. Strongly supported theories, at the time, to be sure, and applicable to our needs and wishes, for the time being, and so relevant, in the present so long as the theory remains standing in the tide of discovery, but nevertheless, the facts are theories, subject to change over time with observations slowly chipping away at them until they begin to tumble, forcing us to reevaluate their 'truth' or accuracy.
It is my opinion and belief that scientific theories are 'true' in the present and for applicable purposes but that they are not true in the objective sense. They are only true because they seem to work here and now and they are relevant to us in the here and now. But they quickly become flawed and even false with new discoveries and as we push the limits of previous observations and ability to observe and so prove that they are not 'true' in an objective sense.
While this may imply, at least to some, that I believe it is only chance or a 'miracle' that science has been able to be as successful in practicality as it has despite its not being 'true', it is not my intent. The 'No Miracle Argument', in my opinion, is a false dichotomy. It claims that either science is essentially true or that its success must be as the result of an unexplainable miracle. I say there is another option. But it relies on the assumption that there is, assuredly, relative truth and, presumably, objective truth. And this way of thinking colors most of my observations and assertions. When we accept that, for all intended purposes, there are two states of 'reality', objective and relative, then we see that we can have a paradox such as 'science is true in so far as to what it relevant(and thus relative) but it is not necessarily true in the context of objectivity.' This is to say that scientific theory may be(and often is) inaccurate, but that, in so far as we are concerned at this moment in time, it is as accurate as it can and needs to be for us to use it for our betterment, advancement and to further our understanding.
To me, this makes the most sense. We live in a universe of dualism. In which nothing seems to only have one side, one way. Our universe seems to be built on balance and balance requires two seemingly opposing weights in order to keep it even or close to even. If this is true in most every aspect within our reality, such as the systems and forces and laws that seem to keep our reality intact and running, then why would it not be true of reality itself? If everything within reality has a dualistic nature, then reality itself is likely to have the same, or at least when it is observed. And so we have the reality that is 'relative' to the observing entities within it, and a reality that is objective regardless of the observations of the entities within it. Thusly, we may say that science can very much be 'true' and not true at the same time and no miracles are necessary. It is true from a relative point of view so long as it sufficiently explains and consistently evidences itself to be true through our relative observation and testing regardless of whether or not it will be found to be not true through further observation and analysis of the world and thus not true in the objective reality.
I am aware that this does seem to strongly correlate of empiricism. But it should be noted that I am not saying that science must be simply adequate rather than objectively accurate(or nearly accurate). I am saying that its accepted theories are, in their time, adequate and that this translates to being relatively accurate but that, with the acceptance of relative and objective realities, theories cannot be known, and based on history are unlikely, to be objectively true. Essentially, as I tend to do, in my view, science is both 'true' and 'not true' as well as, in the time and at the moment, adequate. Thus I see empiricism and realism to be yet another false dichotomy in that they aren't truly arguing each other but rather discussing two different aspects and are even, to a degree, complementary, once we assume and accept the basis of a dualistic reality, objective and relative. "
"Need" is a relative term. Good post by the by!
I think science that is proven to be untrue(falsified) can be called "failed theory" or "no longer science." Phlogiston theory failed, and was removed from the corpus of science. This doesn't mean that all science is correct, it means that human brains are very limited on a scale of "absolute possible intelligence," and that the theories that perform the best (produce the most replicable results) provide an optimal way of thinking about reality. Of course, this is goal-related. If your goal is to feed millions of people, you'd best put capitalist scientists and agricultural engineers in charge, not priests and communists.
The priests and communists don't benefit from totally open discourse, the scientists and capitalists, do.
It's always a matter of degree to which one is correct, not a binary "correct or not." Even totally wrong, disproven theories have a small amount of "value/correctness/utility" because the person who holds them can be said to have considered the problem, believing it important to obtain knowledge in that domain (even if the knowledge they obtained was inadequate, or outright false, or was unfalsifiable).
The holding of facts that have small utility is better than the holding of facts that have no utility or negative utility, given the holder's willingness to discover the utility of their perceived facts, and "update/'further investigate' when necessary."