Plantinga Is No Longer Responsible for SEP's "Religion and Science"
I have just discovered that Alvin Plantinga's entry on the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Religion and Science, has been replaced by a new official version, by a different author:
I haven't read the new version, yet, but the old one has a very interesting argument proposed by Plantinga (and a few others) against naturalism/Darwinism. The argument basically says that if naturalism and Darwinism are true, then epistemological realism is false and knowledge/science is nothing more than an adaptive trait. He makes a more detailed exposition of this in his book, Where the Conflict Really Lies: Science, Religion, and Naturalism.
Curiously, even though he is a naturalist, Thomas Nagel thinks the argument is sound, so, for being committed to a realist worldview, he rejects Darwinism in his now infamous Mind & Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature is Almost Certainly False.
Whether or not one agrees with these authors, the argument is very powerful and philosophically fruitful, so I hope it's still fairly portrayed in the new version. The old version is still up, so here is Plantinga's entry brief exposition of the argument.
Anyway, besides the fact that Plantinga is no longer in control of the the Religion and Science entry, what seems really strange to me is to see such an impolite and en passant editor's note mentioning this shift:
[Editor's Note: The following new entry by Helen De Cruz replaces the former entry on this topic by the previous author.]
Maybe my English is just too lame, but the writing doesn't even sound that polished to me. I'm not trying to accuse anyone without having any further information, but that really caught my eye and is puzzling me. I hope I can find more information about this.
I do not understand - Darwin's theory was based on observations which he felt were objectively correct, otherwise there would be no agreement that these observations were evidence. Epistemological realism states that objects ..anything observable, has the perceived characteristics, irregardless of the mind which observes it ..I see no conflict in that regard.