Reviewing what I wrote in a private Gist on June 19, I see that Craig Wright’s plan is entirely unworkable without centralizing to a 51% oligarchy, because proof-of-work is not stable when the minted (aka coinbase) block reward goes to zero and only transaction fees remain:

I (as @the_end_is_near, @iamnotback, or various other usernames) have proven in extensive discussions at Bitcointalk.org (aka BCT) about the Bitcoin Scalepocalypse that no possible formulation of proof-of-work can have a fee market in the absence of both a protocol constrained block size and a 51% colluding hashrate oligarchy of miners to constrain it. Also due to transaction fees being incentives incompatible with proof-of-work without a perpetual minted block reward:

“…we are able to prove that an equilibrium exists. However, it is one where miners include only a fraction of available transactions into their blocks. This results in a backlog of transactions whose size grows indefinitely with time. We confirm this result using simulation.”

Thus even with a protocol constrained block size a 51% oligarchy of colluding miners must form in the absence of an inflationary perpetual minted block reward. And the cooperative game theory of proof-of-work is designed to create conflicting vested interests which due to crab bucket Schelling point prevent political consensus for periodic protocol block size increases^*; thus, proof-of-work can not scale without an unlimited protocol block size and a 51% oligarchy of miners to constrain it (_{and tangential to the point here, Bitcoin will never scale transaction volume but it will scale economically as the reserve cryptocurrency with whales in control of the ultimately winner-take-all power vacuum}). The absence of a fee market would destroy scaling with transaction spam. Additionally the absence of a fee market without perpetual minting of new tokens for block rewards would be a tragedy-of-the-commons in that transaction fees and thus security against double-spends would both trend towards 0. Even a perpetual tail reward such as Monero’s can not remove the opportunity cost (i.e. power vacuum) of not forming an oligarchy of mining to extract more revenue with a fee market (as well as the incentive to enable the undetectable hypothetical Sybil attack on the anonymity sets posited by this section). And thus Bitcoin’s insoluble-by-design protocol constrained block size and Monero’s automatic block size scaling algorithm are impotent against the formation and control of a 51% oligarchy of miners due to both this opportunity cost (power vacuum) reason and the fact that proof-of-work naturally centralizes due to economies-of-scale in (finance and) mining that accrue disproportionately more profit to those with greater hashrate, such as for example less hashrate wasted on mining old blocks due to propagation delays. The full details of this was discussed in great detail between @dinofelis, (the now banned) @iamnotback (aka myself), and others at BCT. The likely surreptitious leap from 51% to ~100% is accelerated by the control attained with 51% which starves the minority hashrate of income.