Vladimir Putin's most difficult presidential term
The Russian media
Russia, in fact, is half out of the Washington consensus, leaving there formal bindings such as membership in the IMF and WTO, which every year mean less. The WTO has become a formality, the IMF retains its influence on Russia because it is able to bring down its investment rating, but in the conditions of Russia's sanctions cut off from capital markets, and it turns into a non-working tool. Why should Russia fight for an investment rating when investments are cut off?
Kudrin and Nabiullina announced the pace of development of the Russian economy at 1-1. 5% per year for the period up to 2035 – this is not so much a sentence of Russia as the entire liberal economic concept. Staying within the framework of this concept is explained only by the fact that going beyond it means political upheavals unacceptable for the state. As M. Hazin perfectly described it: the change of model is a civil war.
In Russia there is a situation where the change of model kills Russia quickly, and its preservation – slowly. What is the way to choose the leadership of the country? To change model or still wait? As traders are taught in training on neurolinguistic programming, it is a choice without a choice: how to send you our catalog, by mail or courier? Do you prefer to pay by card or by Bank account? You send our details by mail or Fax? Any response means defeat the choosing.
Russia has external and internal amplifiers, which it uses very carefully – simply because it is not yet time to actively use them. Internal amplifiers include the lack of promotion of the need to change the model. We are often reproached that, they say, the people themselves are not ready for change and therefore the power of change avoids. And they set an example of perestroika, when the people themselves wanted the restoration of capitalism and even the miners were the main driving force of capitalist reforms. And the intelligentsia through the media formed in the public a positive perception of capitalism.
This is true, but it should be noted that without a propaganda initiative, neither in the USSR would the people come to support the abolition of socialism, nor now in Russia will the people come to an agreement to replace the liberal model, although it is claimed that 80-90% of the population are ready for this. But neither in the USSR nor in Russia this ratio is not considered suitable for the start of reforms. We need consensus. And the government always begins to form it on its own initiative.
In the Annex, people in stages of five years was brought to thoughts about the necessity of abandoning socialism. The people themselves will not come to this. Just now in Ukraine, the people will not come to Russophobia, if it is not systematically to push this idea. Similarly, even now in Russia, the people will not come to a consensus on the dismantling of the liberal model, if it is not subjected to concentrated and long-term propaganda processing.
Before offering a girl to get married, she is actively and purposefully treated to give consent. Without this, she will not agree, no matter how long you wait. Rather, on the contrary, disappointed and leave. Now in Russia without the propaganda there is no consensus of the population itself will not arise. The absence of such propaganda suggests that not the people are not ready to change the model, and the government itself is not ready for this change. There is no consensus, not among the people. The USSR fell despite the fact that half of society was against its fall. In Russia now 90% of the population against the current model. But she did not fall. Why? Because they don't drop it. Not the people aren't ready – the power isn't ready.
The course of the conflict with the West is increasingly pushing the power of Russia to the Soviet economic instruments. At least just to protect the economic and financial system from destruction from the outside. This means that we need to introduce a large block of economic instruments isolated from the market. We need targeted comprehensive programmes based on long-term plans. These programmes require targeted financing at low interest rates, and we need to create products at fixed prices and set volumes and deadlines. For this to work and there is no conflict between the two isolated systems – spontaneous market and planned-will have to fix the ruble.
This will have to do, simply in more critical situation, to which all quickly is moving. But economic reforms will require political support. Here and start all that the current government is so keen to avoid. In medicine, any process is treated with therapy until it is time for surgery. Otherwise the body is in danger of dying. Often it happens-the operation has to be done against the background of acute sepsis from lost time.
The past elections in Primorye and the far East showed with all the evidence: the political system built in the past years in Russia is dying. Systemic parties are no longer means of preventing a political crisis – they have become means of generating it. The political system in Russia needs to be changed. So change old tanks and planes on new, though old while it is possible to be at war somehow. Possible. But their change. Because want not "as-that to be at war", and surely to win.
"United Russia" is no longer able to provide consensus, although it can still win local elections on the wave of passivity of the electorate or with the help of administrative resources. But the population of the whole of Russia does not consider such results legitimate. In the motivation of the electorate irrational motives began to prevail over the rational. This is a very vicious trend, and the only way to prevent the collapse of statehood in this situation is to suppress this process by administrative force.
But suppressing is only half the battle. The suppression need to take the initiative. Without this interception, the suppression loses, because it looks like a reaction to the revolution. No reaction in history has been able to prevent a revolution in the long term, even if it was prevented in a short period of time. For any 1905 year always comes the year 1917. The one who forgets it-loses both the power, and the country, and life.
In addition to internal triggers of inevitable political transformations, there are external ones. It is a struggle between Russia and the United States of Europe. The most interesting thing in this struggle is Germany's open foreign policy hostility towards Russia for the first time. Aware of the chance for a neo-Imperial perspective, Germany has entered into an acute geopolitical conflict with Russia on the issue of native Russian territories. Germany is not just actively, but very actively fighting to prevent the return of Crimea, Ukraine, Belarus and Transcaucasia to any form of integrative unity with Moscow. For the first time after world war II, Germany considers these territories as zones of its vital interests in the East. Fuhrers have come and gone, and the geopolitical dominant left.
No conflicts of interests between Germany and the United States over gas prevent the coincidence of their interests in preventing the restoration of the territorial integrity of a Large Russia. Once achieved, the territorial division of Russia should be recorded and possibly expanded. Germany and the United States can compete to take positions in this territory, but they are United in the fact that it should not go to Russia. That Russia, which did not interfere, and even contributed to the unification of Germany. There's no gratitude in politics.
However, Russia calmly looks at the activity of Germany in the post-Soviet space. And not because it underestimates this danger. First of all, Russia understands that any activity of Germany in Eastern Europe means the ousting of the USA and Britain. Competition between these German and Anglo-Saxon projects is carefully encouraged by Russia.
Thus, within the country, the struggle for a change in the model of economic and political existence, and outside – for influence on Germany and the displacement of the German hands of the Anglo – Saxon side of Europe-these are the main tasks of the last, the most difficult of all, the presidential term of Vladimir Putin. Each of these tasks pulls a fan of other tasks, like a tree of goals, decomposing into levels and sublevels. But all of them serve one purpose – to carry out the most important reforms in the acute period of the crisis, on which there is no consensus, without the collapse of the existing statehood.
Everything else is derived from this super-task. It is this criterion that should be borne in mind when developing assessments of possible actions of the authorities in the face of a huge number of internal and external challenges and threats. You cannot throw out baby with the bathwater – solving state the problem, to undermine the state. Hurry without haste-that's the right slogan of the moment.
news source: Александр Халдей
