You are viewing a single comment's thread from:
RE: On Universal Ethics
Yeah, I probably shouldn't have included that last paragraph. What are your thoughts on the rest?
Yeah, I probably shouldn't have included that last paragraph. What are your thoughts on the rest?
When you say social construct vs. empirical construct, could you define those terms a little more clearly? I think I see what you're saying, but I want to make sure I do before I respond at length.
I think the frame work is social objectivity and empirical objectivity.
Empirical objectivity contains empirical 'truth' that something objectively exists. Like there is 'empirical truth' in that gravity exists.
Social objectivity is supposed to contain a 'social truth' that something objectively exists. Like there is 'social truth' in that (some social thingy) exists.
Well in that case, even universal ethics are socially objective, not empirically objective, as their existence is dependent on the existence of sentient creatures who can logically deduce them. That being said, I don't think that is necessarily relevant, as without humans this whole conversation is pointless.
It's correct to state that ethics only apply among human individuals, but among human individuals, there are ethical rules that are universally applicable. That's what I mean by universal; not that they are empirically objective, but that they are socially objective. With regards to the is-ought dilemma, I don't think this is an issue with universal ethics as I've formulated them either. The only prescriptive rule I've alluded to is the final statement: don't do to others what you don't want done to you. While this does prescribe conduct, it does so in a negative way, rather than imposing a positive obligation on anyone. Put simply, it's more of an admonition of what can happen if you choose a particular course of action, rather than declaring what an individual ought to do. You can still be as violent a shitbag as you want to be, but that carries with it the consequences I described, and these consequences are logically valid and sound.
The problem I see arising from 'don't do to others what you don't want done to you', is that the action 'do' will have various measures of what may constitute 'harm'.
(I use harm here, maybe it could be another parameter)
One person may take complete offense by an action while another would take none.
If the metrics are rather internally subjective and varied it becomes difficult to say that an ethic (conduct) is definable externally.
The point of that shorthand is not restricted to harm. For example, if you act like an asshole, you are explicitly broadcasting your consent for asshole behavior against individuals. Thus, you have no leg to stand on when someone acts like an asshole to you. Reciprocity. Also, keep in mind this is a shorthand for the more specific principle I elucidated in the post. It is, by no means, a comprehensive standard, but it does accurately reflect that principle when applied to situations where one may violate the consent of another through their actions.
As far as harm, that is measured by violation of property. This includes external property, in the form of things that are owned, and internal property, such as one's physical person. Whether or not someone takes offense to something has no bearing whatsoever on whether that thing is moral. The deciding factor is whether consent has been violated. Once that is established, the second factor to take into account is whether the party being violated has violated another prior to the aforementioned violation. If yes, then the action is not immoral (though, as stated before about the subjectivity of restitution, it is possible to act immorally even when the initial reciprocity of harm is not immoral). If no, then the action is immoral.
Where in the threshold of social objectivity that defines when someone has acted like an asshole?
Does bumping into someone on a busy sidewalk constitute a harm? What should be the reciprocation?
(There is this nagging problem in social objectivity where answers may vary, I really haven't found a solution to it)
(Since we are discussing humans, offenses can lead to a 'pistols at dawn' event)
An asshole's an asshole. It also has no bearing on whether or not consent has been violated. Someone shouting obscenities at you does not constitute a violation of property.
As for the sidewalk example, while it could be construed as a trespass, the nature of the trespass warrants little more than asking for an apology, one which may or may not be given. Reciprocity deals with the level of violation. Bumping into someone on the street is neither intentional, nor severe, and the response for such should accord with the level of harm suffered by the person whose property was violated.
(I'd also like to note that, if two people agree to a duel with pistols at dawn, there is nothing immoral in that situation, as both parties consented freely to the duel; this is no different, essentially, than a boxing match)
Well, in determining what the 'social truth' is about assholery, we run into this question:
They are a asshole by what measure?
Is that action assholery?
Do 30 out of 30 randomly selected people see that person as a asshole or the behavior as assholery?
What if 15 out of 30 people see that person as a asshole?
We do prefer accuracy here to inaccuracy right?
The bumping could have been intentional and severe or at least perceived to be so. Harm registered by the person being bumped is somewhat subjective.
(No problem with dueling, there was just a brushing away of offense as if there would be no risk in doing so, I typically will assign some margin of risk per possible offense, not so much for risk oversion, but more for risk awareness)