Hmm, universal ethics implies a social construct, and the problem I continue to run into in that particular problem, is that if the construct is not empirical, then it is social.
That leads to a problem of what constitutes social objectivity, instead of empirical objectivity. The problem of social objectivity is that there is no such thing as perfect consent of a social construct by everyone all the time.
To make clear, I am assuming you are using universal ethics on the direct meaning of the term. There are frameworks of universal ethics that are more descriptive as 'ethics that should be universally accepted'. But in that resides the 'is-ought problem' which can only typically be resolved in the context of individual choice. (considering for a moment problems in 'confirmation holism', should a public policy ever be crafted?)
Expanding on that, the terms of justice becomes a problem in that Perfect Justice, is almost never a socially attainable thing, as it requires justice to look perfectly just by all involved. It's on this basis that I often consider justice to be a individual construct, instead of a social construct.
I deliberately avoided discussing justice, as what constitutes justice is necessarily subjective. Value is subjective, thus any measurement of what constitutes sufficient restitution for a consent violation must necessarily be subjective as well. However, I think third-party arbitration tends toward the most equitable solution for that issue.
Yeah, I probably shouldn't have included that last paragraph. What are your thoughts on the rest?
When you say social construct vs. empirical construct, could you define those terms a little more clearly? I think I see what you're saying, but I want to make sure I do before I respond at length.
I think the frame work is social objectivity and empirical objectivity.
Empirical objectivity contains empirical 'truth' that something objectively exists. Like there is 'empirical truth' in that gravity exists.
Social objectivity is supposed to contain a 'social truth' that something objectively exists. Like there is 'social truth' in that (some social thingy) exists.
Well in that case, even universal ethics are socially objective, not empirically objective, as their existence is dependent on the existence of sentient creatures who can logically deduce them. That being said, I don't think that is necessarily relevant, as without humans this whole conversation is pointless.
It's correct to state that ethics only apply among human individuals, but among human individuals, there are ethical rules that are universally applicable. That's what I mean by universal; not that they are empirically objective, but that they are socially objective. With regards to the is-ought dilemma, I don't think this is an issue with universal ethics as I've formulated them either. The only prescriptive rule I've alluded to is the final statement: don't do to others what you don't want done to you. While this does prescribe conduct, it does so in a negative way, rather than imposing a positive obligation on anyone. Put simply, it's more of an admonition of what can happen if you choose a particular course of action, rather than declaring what an individual ought to do. You can still be as violent a shitbag as you want to be, but that carries with it the consequences I described, and these consequences are logically valid and sound.
The problem I see arising from 'don't do to others what you don't want done to you', is that the action 'do' will have various measures of what may constitute 'harm'.
(I use harm here, maybe it could be another parameter)
One person may take complete offense by an action while another would take none.
If the metrics are rather internally subjective and varied it becomes difficult to say that an ethic (conduct) is definable externally.
The point of that shorthand is not restricted to harm. For example, if you act like an asshole, you are explicitly broadcasting your consent for asshole behavior against individuals. Thus, you have no leg to stand on when someone acts like an asshole to you. Reciprocity. Also, keep in mind this is a shorthand for the more specific principle I elucidated in the post. It is, by no means, a comprehensive standard, but it does accurately reflect that principle when applied to situations where one may violate the consent of another through their actions.
As far as harm, that is measured by violation of property. This includes external property, in the form of things that are owned, and internal property, such as one's physical person. Whether or not someone takes offense to something has no bearing whatsoever on whether that thing is moral. The deciding factor is whether consent has been violated. Once that is established, the second factor to take into account is whether the party being violated has violated another prior to the aforementioned violation. If yes, then the action is not immoral (though, as stated before about the subjectivity of restitution, it is possible to act immorally even when the initial reciprocity of harm is not immoral). If no, then the action is immoral.
Where in the threshold of social objectivity that defines when someone has acted like an asshole?
Does bumping into someone on a busy sidewalk constitute a harm? What should be the reciprocation?
(There is this nagging problem in social objectivity where answers may vary, I really haven't found a solution to it)
(Since we are discussing humans, offenses can lead to a 'pistols at dawn' event)