한나 아렌트 [인간의 조건상태(인간의 조건)] 1부 1장. 비타 악티바 및 인간의 조건상태
I. 인간의 조건상태The Human Condition
- 비타 악티바 및 인간의 조건상태vita activa and the Human Condition
비타 악티바라는 용어로 나는 세 개의 근본기초적인 인간활동들을 지시하려고 한다(73)With the term vita activa, I propose to designate three fundamental human activities: labor, work, and action. They are fundamental because each corresponds to one of the basic conditions under which life on earth has been given to man.
노동은 인간몸체의 생물학적인 과정에 상응하는 활동이다... 노동의 인간조건상태는 생명삶 그자체이다(73)labor is the activity which corresponds to the biological process of the human body, whose spontaneous growth, metabolism, and eventual decay are bound to the vital necessities produced and fed into the life process by labor. The human condition of labor is life itself.
작업은 인간실존의 비자연적임에 상응하는 활동이다... 작업은 거시기들의 인공적인 어떤 세계를 제공한다... 작업의 인간조건상태는 세계있음이다(73)work is the activity which corresponds to the unnaturalness of human existence, which is not imbedded in, and whose mortality is not compensated by, the species' ever-recurring life cycle. work provides an "artificial" world of things, distinctly different from all natural surroundings. Within its borders each individual life is housed, while this world itself is meant to outlast and transcend them all. The human condition of work is worldliness.
행동은 거시기나 문제꺼리들의 매개없이 사람들 사이에서 직접으로 이루어지는 유일한 활동이다. 행동은 여럿됨이라는 인간조건상태, 곧 대문자 사람이 아니라 소문자 사람들이 지구 상에 살고, 세계에 거주한다는 사실에 상응한다... 이러한 여럿됨은 모든 정치적인 생명삶의 조건상태이다(73)action, the only activity that goes on directly between men without the intermediary of things or matter, corresponds to the human condition of plurality, to the fact that men, not Man, live on the earth and inhabit the world. While all aspects of the human condition are somehow related to politics, this plurality is specifically the condition-— not only the conditio sine qua non, but the conditio per quam— of all political life.
모든 3개의 활동들은 테어남과 죽음, 그것들의 사응하는 조건상태들은, 태어남과 죽음 그리고 나탈리티 및 죽어야함이라는, 인간실존의 가장 일반적인 조건상태과더불어써 친밀하게 연결되어 있다. <노동>은 인디비두얼의 생존 뿐만 아니라 종의 생명삶까지도 확증한다. <작업>과 그것의 생산물인 인간의 인공체들은 인간시간의 죽어야하는 생명삶의 쓸더없음 쪽위로 그리고 인간시간의 떠가는 성격 쪽 위로 영속성의 척도 및 내구성의 척도를 부여한다. <행동>은, 그것이 정치적인 몸체들을 건립하기 및 보존하기에 참여하는 하는 한, 기억됨 곧 역사를 위한 조건상태를 창조한다. 노동, 작업과 마찬가지로 행동 또한 나툼 안에 뿌리내려져 있다... 행동이 3가지 가운데에서 나탈리티의 인간조건상태와 가장 가까운 연결을 갖는다; 탄생 안에 대물림된 새로운 시작은, 오직 새내기가 새로워진 일부거시기를 시작하기의 역량 곧 행동하기를 소유하기 때문에, 그것스스로를 세계 안에서 느끼게 만들 수 있다. 이니시에이티브의 이러한 감각 안에서, 행동의 어떤 요소, 그리고 따라서 나탈리티의 어떤 요소는 모든 인간활동들 안에 대물림된다. 더욱이, 행동이 가장 빼어난 정치적인 행동임으로부터, 나탈리티은, 죽어야함이 아니라, 형이상학적인 생각으로부터 구별되어, 정치적인 생각의 중심적인 범주가 된다(75)All three activities and their corresponding conditions are intimately connected with the most general condition of human existence: birth and death, natality and mortality. Labor assures not only individual survival, but the life of the species. Work and its product, the human artifact, bestow a measure of permanence and durability upon the futility of mortal life and the fleeting character of human time. Action, in so far as it engages in founding and preserving political bodies, creates the condition for remembrance, that is, for history. Labor and work, as well as action, are also rooted in natality in so far as they have the task to provide and preserve the world for, to foresee and reckon with, the constant influx of newcomers who are born into the world as strangers. However, of the three, action has the closest connection with the human condition of natality; the new beginning inherent in birth can make itself felt in the world only because the newcomer possesses the capacity of beginning something anew, that is, of acting. In this sense of initiative, an element of action, and therefore of natality, is inherent in all human activities. Moreover, since action is the political activity par excellence, natality, and not mortality, may be the central category of political, as distinguished from metaphysical, thought.
사람들은 조건상태화된 존재들이다(76)Men are conditioned beings
사람들은 조건상태화된 존재들이다... 저절로 들어왔든 인간노력에 의해서 들어왔든 상관없이 인간의 세계 안을 향해 들어온 것은 무엇이나 인간조건상태의 어떤 부분이 된다... 인간실존은 조건상태화된 실존이기 때문에, 거시기들없이 인간실존은 불가능하다. 그리고 그것들이 인간실존의 조건상태자들이 아니라면, 거시기들은 사람과는 아무런 관계없는 아티클들의 어떤 덩어리, 곧 어떤 무-세계일 것이다(76)This is why men, no matter what they do, are always conditioned beings. Whatever enters the human world of its own accord or is drawn into it by human effort becomes part of the human condition. The impact of the world's reality upon human existence is felt and received as a conditioning force. The objectivity of the world— its objector thing-character— and the human condition supplement each other; because human existence is conditioned existence, it would be impossible without things, and things would be a heap of unrelated articles, a non-world, if they were not the conditioners of human existence.
오해를 피하기위해서 덧붙이자면: 인간조건상태는 인간본성자연과 동일하지 않다, 그리고 인간조건상태에 상응하는 인간활동들과 캐퍼빌리티들의 전체합계는 인간본성자연과 같은 어떠한거시기도 컨스티튜트하지 않는다(76)To avoid misunderstanding: the human condition is not the same as human nature, and the sum total of human activities and capabilities which correspond to the human condition does not constitute anything like human nature.
인간본성자연의 문제는 이제 답변불가능한 듯이 여겨진다... 사람이 다른 거시기들처럼 동일한 어떤 본성자연 또는 어떤 본질을 가졌다고 할 수 없다. 다시말해 우리가 어떤 본성자연 또는 본질을 가졌다면, 오직 하나님만이 그것을 알 수 있고 규정할 수 있을 것이다... 인간의 인지양식은... 우리는 누구인가라는 물음 앞에 실패한다. 바로 그 때문에 인간의 본성자연을 규정하려는 모든 철학의 시도는 결국 어떤 신격의 일부의 구성, 곧 철학자들의 하나님으로 끝목표되어졌다... "초인간"이나 신성과 동일정체시하는 어떤 이념들로 쉽게 이끌리는, 사람의 본성자연을 규정하려는 시도들은 더욱더 인간본성자연에 대한 혐의를 가지게끔 만든다(77~ 78)The problem of human nature, the Augustinian quaestio mihi factus sum("a question have I become for myself), seems unanswerable in both its individual psychological sense and its general philosophical sense. It is highly unlikely that we, who can know, determine, and define the natural essences of all things surrounding us, which we are not, should ever be able to do the same for ourselves— this would be like jumping over our own shadows. Moreover, nothing entitles us to assume that man has a nature or essence in the same sense as other things. In other words, if we have a nature or essence, then surely only a god could know and define it, and the first prerequisite would be that he be able to speak about a "who" as though it were a "what."원주2 The perplexity is that the modes of human cognition applicable to things with "natural" qualities, including ourselves to the limited extent that we are specimens of the most highly developed species of organic life, fail us when we raise the question: And who are we? This is why attempts to define human nature almost invariably end with some construction of a deity, that is, with the god of the philosophers, who, since Plato, has revealed himself upon closer inspection to be a kind of Platonic idea of man. Of course, to demask such philosophic concepts of the divine as conceptualizations of human capabilities and qualities is not a demonstration of, "not even an argument for, the non-existence of God; but the fact that attempts to define the nature of man lead so easily into an idea which definitely strikes us as "superhuman" and therefore is identified with the divine may cast suspicion upon the very concept of "human nature."
원주2. 아우구스티누스는 "나는 누구인가"라는 물음과 "나는 무엇인가"라는 물음을 구별한다... 첫 번째 물음은 스스로에게 사람이 묻는 것으로 그 답변은 "사람이다"라는 것이다... 두번째 물음은 하나님을 향해 사람이 묻는 것으로써, 그 답변은 하나님만이 해 줄수 있다(77~78)Augustine, who is usually credited with having been the first to raise the so-called anthropological question in philosophy, knew this quite well. He distinguishes between the questions of "Who am I?" and "What am I?" the first being directed by man at himself("And I directed myself at myself and said to me: You, who are you? And I answered: A man"— tu, quis es? [Confessiones x. 6]) and the second being addressed to God("What then am I, my God? What is my nature?"— Quid ergo sum, Deus meus? Quae natura mm? [x. 17]). For in the "great mystery," the grandeprofundum, which man is(iv. 14), there is "something of man [aliquid hominis] which the spirit of man which is in him itself knoweth not. But Thou, Lord, who has made him [fecisti mm] knowest everything of him [eius omnia]"(x. 5). Thus, the most familiar of these phrases which I quoted in the text, the quaestw mihi factus sum, is a question raised in the presence of God, "in whose eyes I have become a question for myself"(x. 33). In brief, the answer to the question "Who am I?" is simply: "You are a man— whatever that may be"; and the answer to the question "What am I?" can be given only by God who made man. The question about the nature of man is no less a theological question than the question about the jnature of God; both can be settled only within the framework of a divinely revealed answer.
다른 한편, 생명삶 그자체, 나탈리티, 죽어야함, 세게있음, 여럿됨 그리고 지구와 같은 인간실존의 조건상태들은 전혀결코 우리가 무엇인지(본성자연)를 설명할 수 없다, 또는 우리가 누구인가(실존)에 답변할 수 없다, 왜냐하면 그것들은 전혀결코 우리를 절대적으로 조건상태화하지 않기 때문이다.(78)On the other hand, the conditions of human existence— life itself, natality and mortality, worldliness, plurality, and the earth— can never "explain" what we are or answer the question of who we are for the simple reason that they never condition us absolutely. This has always been the opinion of philosophy, in distinction from the sciences— anthropology, psychology, biology, etc.— which also concern themselves with man. But today we may almost say that we have demonstrated even scientifically that, though we live now, and probably always will, under the earth's conditions, we are not mere earth-bound creatures. Modern natural science owes its great triumphs to having looked upon and treated earth-bound nature from a truly universal viewpoint, that is, from an Archimedean standpoint taken, wilfully and explicitly, outside the earth.