Coal Dust and Candy Bombers: The Berlin Airlift

The year was 1948. The United States, Great Britain, France and the Soviet Union had spent the previous three years occupying postwar Germany in their respective zones. The capital, Berlin, though located in the Soviet Zone, was divided four ways as well, like a microcosm of the rest of Germany. The Soviets had successfully imposed communism on the Soviet zone, later to be known as East Germany, and Soviet Leader Joseph Stalin wanted the Western Allies out of Berlin. Tensions between East and West had begun soon after the end of WWII, when the Red Army simply stayed in the countries that it had occupied during the war, and communist puppet regimes were installed in country after country in eastern Europe. British Prime Minister Winston Churchill had ratcheted up the rhetoric by referring to Soviet domination of these states as the "Iron Curtain".
In Germany, tensions escalated further when Great Britain and the United States combined their zones in an effort to ease trade difficulties and rebuild the German economy. Stalin, who did not want Germany rebuilt, was furious. In the spring of 1948, the Soviets began stopping trains and vehicles entering or leaving the Soviet zone, searching the cargo and harassing the passengers. The final straw came on June 21, 1948, when the Western Allies introduced a new currency, the Deutsche Mark, into West Germany and West Berlin. The old Reichsmark (which still bore the swastika) was abolished in the West, but continued to be accepted in East Germany and East Berlin. The Soviets saw the the currency reform as a threat and stopped all rail, road, and canal traffic into (and out of) West Berlin within days. They stopped providing food to West Berliners beginning on June 25. With the Soviets holding the starving Western Sectors hostage, the U.S. weighed the options.
Retreat was considered, but eventually rejected. Leaving Berlin to the Soviets would be a humiliating defeat for the Western Allies. With Eastern European countries falling like dominoes to communism, it was not hard to imagine Soviet troops marching all the way into Paris. An armed convoy running the barricades was suggested, but the U.S. wanted to avoid a provocation. The possibility of using a nuclear bomb was briefly raised, but quickly shut down by President Truman. Defense by conventional warfare was also undesirable. Western Allied troops in Berlin numbered around 22,000, while the Soviets had 1.5 million (including those in the surrounding East Germany). With the impasse approaching a crisis, the Western Allies needed to buy some time.
The access to roads, rails, and waterways were never negotiated between Allied powers during the postwar planning, but the air routes were. Three air corridors, each twenty miles wide, were guaranteed in writing to provide free access to Berlin. The Soviets could not stop aircraft without firing on them, which would violate the 1945 agreement. They could not even claim self defense against a perceived military threat, because these airplanes would be unarmed transporters filled with food and coal. An aggressive attack on this humanitarian mission could provoke a third World War, which the Soviets did not want.
General Lucius Clay, who supervised the U.S. zone of occupied Germany, consulted Air Force General Curtis LeMay on the feasibility of an Allied airlift of food and supplies to West Berlin. With LeMay's full support, he then went to the British Royal Air Force (RAF) General Sir Brian Robertson to crunch some numbers. The RAF had already begun a small scale airlift to supply the British troops in Berlin, and General Robertson was ready with some raw calculations. Based on a 1,990 calorie diet per person, 1,534 tons of food would need to be flown in every day. To keep the lights on and the houses warm, 3,475 tons of coal, gasoline, and diesel fuel would also be needed every day.
The RAF would do the lion's share of the airlift at first, since aircraft could be moved to Germany quickly from Great Britain. They were able to fly in about 750 tons per day, with the U.S. Air force bringing in about 300 tons per day with the C-47 planes already in Europe. While these loads were far short of what was necessary, the Western Allies soon increased the number of flights. Americans brought in the only planes large enough to carry the amount of cargo needed, but small enough to land at Tempelhof Airport: the C-54 Skymaster. 447 Skymasters were ordered to Germany for the task. On June 25, General Clay issued the order to begin "Operation Vittles," as it was called, and a group of C-47s began transporting cargo the next day. The British Airlift, "Operation Plainfare," began on June 28. By the second week of the airlift, the U.S. and British forces were jointly flying in 1,000 tons a day of food and supplies into Templehof and Gatow (the RAF base in Berlin).
The effort was at first disorganized, with a shortage of mechanics, understaffed ground crews, and overworked pilots. On July 28, Major General William H. Tunner took over command of the operation, and his influence was a game changer. He wasted no time implementing new policies for safety and efficiency. He first eliminated the C-47s and used the larger C-54s exclusively to maximize payload per flight. To keep the flight crew from leaving the planes, jeeps full of refreshments were driven out to them so they could eat and sign off on paperwork as the planes were unloaded. Time on the ground before turnaround was reduced to 30 minutes with these little tricks. Tunner organized arriving flights in three layers, with planes flying at different altitudes, three minutes apart. He prohibited the stacking of flights to keep the flow of traffic moving. If an arriving plane botched its landing, it was sent back without a second attempt. He also insisted on one centralized air traffic control for both British and American air forces. By the end August, more than 1,500 flights per day were delivering 5,000 tons of supplies.
Although the airlift was led by Britain and the United States, many countries contributed to the effort. Most of the food was supplied by West Germany, but Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland, and Hungary also provided flour, rice, dried potatoes and powdered milk. Pilots and crew were not just Americans and Brits, but French, Australian, Canadian, and South African. Incoming planes were offloaded by Berliners themselves. The Airlift became a truly global endeavor.
By October, diplomatic talks with the Soviets were still at a stalemate. Winter was approaching, and it was clear that the temporary Airlift would need to be expanded. More coal would be needed, and the already bad flying conditions of Berlin would only get worse. An asphalt runway was constructed at Templehof, and a concrete runway built at Gatow, replacing the old gravel runways. France built a new airport in its sector using German construction labor (mostly women). Former Luftwaffe ground crews were hired by Tunner to improve fleet maintenance. A new air traffic control system was installed to improve landings in bad weather. Despite some setbacks in November, the increases were made, and in January, over 170,000 tons were delivered.
One of the most heartwarming tales of the Airlift was the story of the Candy Bomber. Lieutenant Gail Halvorsen, an American C-54 pilot, noticed German children watching the planes land from behind the fences at Templehof. When he spoke with them, he was charmed by their desire for freedom, and touched by their poverty. He bundled up his own chocolate rations (and those of his copilots), attached the bundles to makeshift parachutes (made from handkerchiefs), and dropped them from the plane as he approached the runway on his next flight. Naturally, the crowds of children behind the fence increased, and Lieutenant Halvorsen convinced other pilots to contribute to his candy drops. He was soon called into Major General Tunner's office. Instead of a reprimand, he received praise, and Operation "Little Vittles" became official, with other pilots joining the effort, and American candy makers supplying chocolates and bubble gum. Children all across Berlin received candies. It is hard to overstate the gratitude of the children, who had been living on sparse rations of canned meat and powdered milk. Operation Little Vittles was a runaway success.
As for the adults of West Berlin, they had supported the Airlift from the start. German women, in particular, had no desire to be absorbed into the Soviet Sector. They had not forgotten their treatment by the Red Army in the final days of WWII and the ensuing occupation (an estimated two million German women were raped; 100,000 of those rapes were committed in Berlin). In general, West Berliners were astounded that the same armies that had been at war with them three short years ago were now flying dangerous missions (101 fatalities were suffered during the airlift) to ensure their freedom.
By spring of 1949, the Airlift was humming along at a rapid pace, delivering a record-breaking 234,476 tons in the month of April. At its peak, one plane was landing every 30 seconds. It became clear for the first time that the Airlift could be continued indefinitely, if necessary. The Soviets came back to the negotiating table, and at 12:01 A.M. on May 12, 1949, the blockade was lifted. Supply flights continued until September, just in case.
In hindsight, the Berlin Airlift seems like an obvious solution to break the blockade; the Soviets were trying to starve West Berlin, the Western Allies were bringing them food. In real time, though, the Airlift was a temporary stop-gap to stall for time during negotiations. Originally, it was going to last for three weeks. Later, it looked like it could not be sustained through winter. Failure seemed imminent at nearly every point during the Airlift, until April. All told, the Airlift ran for 15 months and logged 92 million flight miles, delivering an astonishing 2,334,374 tons of food, fuel, and coal. The Berlin Airlift was an early Cold War victory for the West, defending a city without firing a shot.

*Inspired by "Berlin on the Brink: The Blockade, The Airlift, and the Early Cold War" 2012, Lexington: University Press of Kentucky