RE: A serious attempt at repairing the STEEM Economic Improvement Proposal (eip) for HF21
The n^logn curve seems quite steep in its super-linearity
The current curve being considered is (n^2+2cn) / (n + 4c) which seems to be a lot fairer as it has a subtle dent at the beginning and quickly becomes linear
The idea of having downvotes hit curation harder than author is interesting. I don't know if it's needed right now, but could be considered later.
Curation overall could definitely use an overhaul as it will play a much larger part post EIP. Curation curve, 15 min auction timer, auction curve, etc are all things we should reexamine after the initial EIP is released.
The EIP is primarily concerned with attempting to encouraging large scale honest voting behavior. That is getting people to vote based on some subjective assessment of content rather than just using them as a form of staking returns in a way that's entirely indiscriminate of content.
Not n^Log(n), n x S^Log(n), or more easy to reason n X S^Log10(n).
The main fairness component in a n x S^Log(n) curve comes from the fact that it works the same way with the same relative price for undesired behavior at every scale.
For example if we choose a 10 base for the logarithm with S=1.05, the price of braking up your stake into 100 puppet account will be a reduction of influence to 1.05^-2 or 90.7% regardless of your stake size prior to brake up.
Braking up a whale sized stake into 100 dolphin accounts will come at a 9.3% cut in single vote influence as would braking up an orca size account into 100 minnow sized accounts or a different login account into 100 red fish sized accounts.
I see.
It's similar to your other suggestions. Keep in mind that the effect we're looking for is to just deter very small votes that are trying to escape the notice of potential downvotes. We're not really trying to make it more profitable for larger stakeholders generally, even if it's just slightly.
So the idea is that because it's pretty hard to hunt down thousands of 5c posts. We're just going to make posts at the low end somewhat less profitable to the point where you might as well just curate. We're not really looking to confer a bonus to big accounts for reasons beyond this.
Also the rewards curve has an effect on a per post basis, not per account. So it doesn't serve to have people combine all their sockpuppets into a single account for an advantage, if that's what you were implying.
A 5ct post at this point requires the strength of about ten dozen brand new accounts, so it is already a full orders of magnitude above a post that gets up votes from a dozen of brand new accounts and two orders of magnitude above a new account giving an up vote on a comment on a post of his. I think it is important to keep the impact on the influence on new accounts, and the impact on small account vesting Vs dust level, in mind when looking at these curves.
But my main point, let's stick to the 5ct example. A 5ct post at this point in time could be a single post with votes from four 100% votes on it from four different 1MV accounts. These could be four out of a hundred 1MVEST accounts belonging to the same person created because 1000 votes by 100 accounts on 250 posts are less likely to be flagged as 20 up votes on 20 posts by two 50 MVEST accounts.
The same though is equally true with respect to 100 10MVEST accounts Vs two 500MVEST accounts or 100 100MVEST Vs two 5GVEST accounts. Consolidating vesting in less accounts prevents obfuscation of behaviour at all levels equally, and as the scale runs from a comment up voted at dust level by a single brand new 30KVEST account up to posts up voted by a multiple whale and bid not accounts, it would see logical the same insentive we need to create to keep our 100MVEST stake holder from breaking up his stake in an attempt to keep his (automated) false curation at least partially under the flagging radar, should apply equally at all sizes of total stake.
The goal of the n x S^Log(n) curve is to penalize the 5ct1000 Vs $2.50 * 20 scenario in the same way the EIP curve does, but without a disproportionate hit on the part of the economy between dust level and 5ct posts, and with an equal penalty for for example the 50ct1000 Vs $25.- * 20 scenario.
Hope I'm making sense with all of this.
sure, you want to spread out the superlinearity more
have you seen the actual curve? It's more or less doing this and is probably already too subtle
https://www.desmos.com/calculator/weerzfsi7b
I think it does what you want it to anyway, at least if not precisely, it's unlikely to be bad enough that you'll be too obstinate about it
I'd like a little bit of superlinearity that does this:
I'm not in charge of the curve at all mind you, just want one that vaguely gives us 1 2 while mindful of 3. If anything that curve is a little too subtle.
I don't think in practice genuine micro interactions will lose out really. If we can get the majority of rewards that's currently being drained and force them into honest voting, which is the idea, you'll likely see far more rewards overall flow towards the low end as well, despite the on paper loss
your curve would probably work with some S value that'll likely need to be a little bigger than the one you have. But I'll be a little afraid of it being uncapped later, honestly not sure why you want that.
anyway, I personally feel that the curve they're going for is better than yours because yours is probably a little insufficient at achieving 1 and has a risk of collusive pile ons at the extreme end. But if you're able to convince them to adopt it, it's likely within a range i'd find pretty acceptable.
By far the most interesting idea of yours is downvotes disproportionately hitting curators over authors (putting aside that exact implementation which probably has problems, i mean conceptually it's interesting). I don't really agree that bad curation is currently a problem (it's overall dishonest voting) but it could be a problem in the future. I agree that downing author rewards over curation is a side effect rather than an intended effect (but others would not agree on this, they find inflation going into SP holders to be an important incentive to hold SP and thereby maintain protocol security).
Nevertheless, this measure would be one of the very few that could directly decrease the 'stickiness' of an established author with a automated curation trail. It has some weird side effects like resulting in two posts of identical payouts distribute the rewards differently depending on the number of downvotes. Maybe after the EIP when a better equilibrium is reached we'll consider it if established authors are too 'sticky'
Plotted a sample of the two together for a better picture of the difference: