Gridcoin Research 4.0-2018 Roadmap Progress Report

in gridcoin •  13 days ago

Original Article:
Gridcoin Research 4.0 Proposals and Preliminary Polls

Discussion Recording Part 1 of 2:
Gridcoin 4.0 Roadmap Discussion, November 4th. Part 1 of 2

Discussion Recording Part 2 of 2:
Gridcoin 4.0 Roadmap Discussion, November 4th. Part 2 of 2

Discussion Summary:
Summary of Discussion - Gridcoin Proposals & Preliminary Polls


Hello again, Gridcoin Community!

The response to the 4.0-2018 Roadmap has been overwhelming! Thank you all for participating, asking question, expressing concerns, and suggesting improvements on, or alternatives to proposed developments!

This is the first progress report for the Gridcoin Research 4.0-2018 Roadmap. Below you will find brief summaries of each topic discussed in the main article. The intent here is to help facilitate the conversation's overall progression. Be sure to join the live discussion at the Gridcoin hangout this Saturday, November 11th, hosted on the BeyondBitcoin mumble. (Thank you @officialfuzzy and the BeyondBitcoin community!)

November 11th will be a standard hangout hosted by our very own @peppernrino and the floor is open to discussions regarding any aspect of Gridcoin, not just the 2018 Roadmap. Be sure to get your topics in by commenting on the hangout thread found here:

https://steemit.com/gridcoin/@peppernrino/gridcoin-community-hangout-043-repost

Otherwise, join us for the live hangout at 7pm UTC! The discussion regarding this article will be recorded and uploaded within 24 hours of the end of the hangout.

Mumble Information
Label: BeyondBitcoin - Gridcoin
Address: mumble.grcnode.co.uk or mumble.beyondboinc.net (IP = 149.210.187.155)
Port: 64738
Username: Enter your username
Password: w0rldCh@NG3rsUN!t3

For Science! For Medicine! For Everyone!


GRCHorizontal_Black_Transparent.png

Constant Block Reward

The Roadmap segment tomorrow will touch briefly on several of the proposals from the article, but will be focusing on the economy of Gridcoin through a discussion on the CBR proposal.

As it stands, investors are not encouraged to keep their GRC online. Without their help, the Gridcoin network is not as secure as it could be. In fact, the lack of participation of so many GRC is a large part of what causes all the annoying little forks in the network. Additionally, without active GRC, the network is more open to malicious actors. CBR is proposed to provide an incentive for investors to keep a balance online, to keep a true stake in the Gridcoin network. An investor with something at stake will take action to secure that investment. This rings true throughout the financial world, so why don't we encourage investors to put something at stake in order to receive rewards?

There are many things to consider when deciding whether or not to implement CBR, and when defining the parameters of that CBR implementation. First, will this switch cause an economic crash?! Not likely. We're not trying to fight whales with CBR. We're trying to secure and stabilize the Gridcoin network. That is good for everyone, even whales! It is more than likely that whales understand this and will gladly participate in the network for reward. If, for some reason, whales decide to dump because yes, we would remove idle interest earned from the Gridcoin protocol, well... honestly, that means more cheap coins for future investors (of which there are plenty). Never underestimate the utility presented by the Gridcoin blockchain, incentive structure, and network.

To implement CBR, we are going to need to explore how the Gridcoin economy works. The way I see it:

There are two ways to mint GRC from the blockchain.

  1. Participation in securing the blockchain through Proof of Stake
  2. Participation in research by contributing computing power to BOINC

What are the priorities we want written into Gridcoin network's protocols?

Who will receive the majority of rewards from securing the blockchain through CBR-PoS? Will the people earning the CBR-PoS mint be receiving more reward than those with large volumes of processing researching with BOINC? How much GRC do we want to mint a year? What if we split the mint of GRC into 25% from securing the blockchain and 75% from research? What about 50/50? What about 33/66?

What will be the differences between an interest economy and a CBR economy? Should CBR be static, defined change -- reduce or increase reward in a predictable manner over time (like PoW block reward halving), or should it be dynamic -- based on the direct needs of the Gridcoin network at a given time?

Is it possible to combine interest with CBR?

Are there alternatives to CBR which will increase network weight?

How many worst case scenarios can we think of? Can we prevent them? Could we solve them?

These are just a few questions to get the conversation going. Let's discuss!


MRC, BM, SBD

Manual Rewards Claim, Beacon Mint, and Super Block Distribution are proposed as ways to deliver a researcher's earned rewards to their wallet in a timely manner without the use of a pool. A pool's intent, under these upgrades, would be to simplify the UX of Gridcoin. For example, I'm not going to explain to my grandma how to set up everything with BOINC and the GRC client. Rather, I'm going to install the software on her cell phone, smart fridge, or whatever, and tell her to join a pool. Otherwise, we want anyone with the inclination to be able to utilize the full scope of the Gridcoin and BOINC clients, including voting and receiving BOINC stats.

MRC involves a user requesting their rewards delivered in a coming block and for security measures, might involve claim fees, time, and beacons.

Beacon Mint increases the researchers likelihood to stake (thereby receiving their earned research rewards) as the amount owed to them but not delivered increases. Beacon Mint also brings back what v8 took from the Gridcoin network: using research to secure the blockchain (PoR).

Super Block Distribution distributes owed research rewards when a superblock is staked.

Each of these proposals has benefits and flaws and actually all 3 can seemingly synergize with one another. For more information, listen to the recordings or read the discussion summary. This will be a topic discussed in depth during another meeting. If you want to discuss it now, make a thread.


Sharedropping

Sharedropping is intended to update the Gridcoin codebase, which is fairly dated -- ask a dev. During this process we will remove the non-critical personal information held in the current blockchain. There are several paths to take with the sharedropping update. We will discuss sharedropping at length in another meeting. If you want to discuss it now, make a thread.


TCD, DWP

Total Credit Delta intends to more directly connect earning Gridcoin and computing for research on BOINC. It will make it easier to create earnings calculators while greatly reducing the need for researchers to charge their RAC before earning rewards. It also might present the opportunity to fix a problem where a project runs out of WU to distribute while some researchers are still crunching a few bunkered or time intensive WU. With TCD, we might not need to remove a project immediately after it runs out of WU, allowing those with remaining WU to earn rewards upon their completion. We will talk more about TCD in another meeting. If you want to discuss it now, make a thread.

Dynamic Witness Participation seeks to implement a more stable and secure superblock creation process. DWP is a major change to the Gridcoin codebase and we will have an entire meeting dedicated to its discussion. If you want to discuss it now, make a thread.


Again, thank you for taking the time to involve yourself with the growth and development of Gridcoin. This stuff is not easy. Luckily, we have a community filled with people with an insane array of talents and knowledge. Let's teach each other. Let's learn from each other.

If we don't see you tomorrow, have a good weekend and keep an eye out for discussion recordings, summaries, threads, and next weeks progress report.

-j

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CBR

Fully support, the stake weight participation in the Gridcoin network has been dangerously low in the last few months, those who do not stake should not earn any offline rewards.

MRC

If this can be done securely, without enabling a 'click to dos' button (forcing POR legitimacy check on network peers) then it sounds somewhat reasonable to me, however it will potentially unbalance the economic policy of gridcoin - users will no longer have to buy GRC to stake, thus users may be more inclined to dump their coins.

Alternatively, it can be viewed that the pool solves the 'nothing to invest' new user problem, so why change when there's an open-source solution currently in place?

BM

Sounds close to the old system, but i'm apprehensive given the previous system's vulnerability to which tomas brod's weaponized exploit was capable of generating blocks at will - this could have destroyed gridcoin had any script kiddle felt like it.

Superblock payments

Thousands of users payments needing verified in a single block would potentially require greater compute time than a traditional block which only verifies a single user's POR rewards right?

Likewise, I'm not confident in such an approach given the recent superblock insecurity/instability, you're able to force superblocks in testnet & production neural network participation is low (similar to the stake weight participation). If someone forced a superblock in prod in such a situation, the consequences would be drastic.


Sharedropping onto a new codebase

If we're considering a snapshot/sharedrop onto a new code base (to remove plain-text email (and bloated scrypt block) data from blockchain, to shortcut to many requested features, and to improve stability of the network) my choice would have to be graphene.

I do not like the idea of forking Dash, masternodes would entrench power to the wealthy, as you'd have to pay a large sum of GRC to run a masternode where as with graphene you could have no investment required to get voted in as a witness/committee-member.

Grapehene Links:

https://cryptocurrencytalk.com/topic/24622-dposbitshares-tool-kit/
http://www.digiter.io/btsdocs/index.html (WIP Updated docs wiki)
http://docs.bitshares.org/
https://github.com/cryptonomex/graphene
https://github.com/bitshares/bitshares-core
https://github.com/steemit/steem
https://github.com/PBSA/peerplays

Disadvantages of graphene

  • New codebase thus potentially large developer learning curve.
  • A large amount of current code wouldn't be compatible & would require being ported to c++.
    • This is a mutual disadvantage when rebasing to any codebase & we're already talking about rearchitecting most of Gridcoin & snapshot/sharedropping.
  • This proposal is not a short term development undergoing, it's highly plausible that the porting of the GRC features to c++ will prove difficult & time consuming. This disadvantage applies to all codebase change proposals.

Advantages of graphene

Security

  • Uplift to a maintained codebase (though that applies to any new codebase we switch to)
  • Low stake weight concern would be gone - only elected witnesses would produce blocks & if unreliable they can be voted out by the network. Block producers would be trusted community members, not every token holder on the network.
  • Witnesses could implement their own external BOINC statistics gathering scripts (with any preferred language), rather than a single solution being built into the client.
    • A single solution built into the client is a disaster waiting to happen - what if a single whitelisted project is compromised and a malicious xml file is placed to crash nodes on the network, or worse?

Performance

  • 10k+ transactions per second (TPS) proven on Bitshares, compared to our TPS in the single/double digit range.
    • We don't need 10k TPS (given our small tx volume), we can easily tweak graphene's settings to be less intensive (larger block times, smaller witness node specs required, etc).
  • Reduced quantity of users downloading the stats files each day (as opposed to hundreds to potentially thousands currently) eliminating DDOS concern without needing central proxy server.
  • Witnesses could publish BOINC statistics at will, similar to the current BTS price feed mechanism, negating the need for a daily superblock if we were to average the credit published by each witness when issuing rewards (perhaps at a scheduled time, or more frequent for users with more GRC).

Development shortcuts

  • No need to continue development on current GRC issues such as :
    • POS Staking mechanisms : Replaced by DPOS
    • Hardening/decentralizing voting : Secure voting implemented, we'd need to implement POR weight though.
    • Beacon deletion : Replace with CM/Brod's beacon proposals.
    • Decentralizing whitelist maintenance responsibilities : The elected committee can vote to change network parameters (such as the whitelist).
    • Witness/Delegates : Graphene uses DPOS, which brings elected witnesses/committee
  • Manual reward claiming
    • If we were to implement a similar distribution mechanism to steem (issuing additional tokens to users based on mag instead of votes) the distribution mechanism would be similar to the older cryptolottery system without the risk of manipulation.
    • No initial investment requirement would ease recruitment of new users, potentially enabling automated BOINC + GRC client wizard setups.
  • The longer we wait, the more features BTS/Steem have which we can inherit.

Existing tech

  • Graphene has an easily configurable UI & web wallet interfaces (which anyone can host). We could have BOINC project/team wallet themes to improve community engagement & many web wallet mirrors.
  • Open source block explorer
  • Python, C#, Java, (etc...) graphene libraries exist.
  • If a fork of BTS: User issued assets, market pegged assets, inbuilt exchange. Imagine projects launching their own tokens on top of our network? We could scale this back, removing MPAs for example so as to not step on BTS' feet.

CM-SSA Beacon proposal

I received no reply from jringo in the past thread & felt that my proposal was misrepresented, so here's the reply I posted in the other thread.

CM-SAA alternative proposal involves a special page on the BOINC project website where the user must copy a string from their wallet and then copy the response back to the wallet to complete the registration.

Involves storing zero user data for any time period on the BOINC servers, verifies against their public key which we could import directly into the client.

Creating that custom page does involve modification to core BOINC software.

It doesn't require changes to core BOINC software, only the web server. So we don't need to worry about the BOINC userbase having to upgrade their BOINC clients (there's certainly a lot of users running older versions), nor projects recompiling their servers.

The web server change is simply adding two files to the web server folder alongside the other php files.

Required web server modification:

  • Optional hyperlink to new php page (anywhere on their site).
  • Upgrading to the latest openssl version (using workaround to upgrade) - this will be a massively beneficial change.
  • Creating a new openssl keypair, and making the public key available for download.

Overall, it's a minimal change and doesn't store user data for any period of time on their servers - one of the major reasons the 'project-rain' pull request got rejected.

BOINC maintainers are against any crypto-currency related modifications

Indeed, my proposal does detail this in depth. However, this proposal is a general purpose openssl based userid ownership proof, it's not solely for gridcoin nor cryptocurrency.

Example alternative uses:

  • Verifying ownership of a BOINC account on a forum to get BOINC milestone badges in your profile/signature.
  • Idle RPG based on your BOINC score/magnitude instead of time.
  • Place clone, where ink is distributed based on BOINC RAC/Magnitude. Think of the many teams creating murals/art.
  • Anything that requires proof of BOINC account ownership.

Even if it isn't accepted into the BOINC official repo, you can install the modification in your BOINC web server without impacting any other file/operation (bar perhaps downtime during openssl upgrade).

Projects may decide they don't want to support such a feature, to which we would retort with removing them from the whitelist? Lol..

... plus there are projects running outdated software versions, it will take years for them all to upgrade.

It doesn't take years to download 2 php files, generate a new openssl keypair & update openssl.

Projects not capable of basic server maintainance should perhaps not be on the whitelist? It could be a minimum requirement of sorts.

On the other hand these registrations are much faster to verify.

Idd, since the gridcoin client would have the project server's public key cached in memory there would be no need for tx verifiers to contact BOINC project servers for beacon ownership confirmation.

We could remove the team requirement instantly with this, as it's absolute proof of account ownership.

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I think we're all looking at it the wrong way. The feature is not a bug. Graphene is a move towards database and away from blockchain. There are plenty of more disadvantages that I think could be mentioned. We do not want to exchange our problems for the ones that the platforms using Graphene evidently have. Simply, removing blockchain and censorship resistance means gutting the community. Furthermore, there is nothing decentralized about adding people ("witness" nodes) to the process of the codified reward mechanism. Not only that, we have not been honest to the community about what this all really means. The technology behind Bitshares, Graphene, could easily just be regulated as illegal because of the way it issues value upon itself from a centralized distribution. Not to mention I am certain that Bittrex has similar reasons as to why they recently removed it from their exchange. The whole fast-track I have been seeing here towards using Graphene is very concerning to me because of how convoluted Graphene is in comparison to the working protocol that we already have for Gridcoin. This whole process is not actually a roadmap but a contentious hardfork issue, I feel like I have been lied to.

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Graphene is a move towards database and away from blockchain.

This is simply false, it's not an RDBMS, it has a blockchain.

There are plenty of more disadvantages that I think could be mentioned.

If you believe there are more disadvantages, please provide them.

If we forked BTS & had all of their extensions, then the witnesses would need large spec servers, however if we didn't use their extensions/features (cut back graphene to base grc upon) we could reduce the spec required.

We do not want to exchange our problems for the ones that the platforms using Graphene evidently have.

Such as?

Simply, removing blockchain and censorship resistance means gutting the community.

Graphene has a blockchain, and it improves voting functionality thus more censorship resistant & given that not everyone would need to stake it would enable a faster on-ramp for new users to begin earning GRC (If manual reward claim was implemented).

Furthermore, there is nothing decentralized about adding people ("witness" nodes) to the process of the codified reward mechanism.

We're already talking about master-nodes/witnesses/delegates for neural network & superblock production, this isn't the only proposal introducing such functionality.

Graphene, could easily just be regulated as illegal because of the way it issues value upon itself from a centralized distribution.

Bitshares, Steem and Gridcoin issues their coins via an initial POW phase before moving towards POS/DPOS, not a centralized distribution.

If you mean that rather than everyone staking on their own behalf vs reduced quantity of users rewarding others, then surely you're against superblock rewards and pools too?

Not to mention I am certain that Bittrex has similar reasons as to why they recently removed it from their exchange.

It's on hold (not removed) because there was a network problem which they didn't reach out to Bitshares to resolve, that plus as a centralized exchange based in the US they're being hounded by financial regulators & required BTS representatives to resolve some securities concerns. Decentralized exchanges are far superior to centralized exchanges.

The whole fast-track I have been seeing here towards using Graphene is very concerning to me because of how convoluted Graphene is in comparison to the working protocol that we already have for Gridcoin.

I agree that the pace jringo is setting for the development roadmap is inappropriate, it should be a 2-3 month process at least.

This whole process is not actually a roadmap but a contentious hardfork issue.

Many of the roadmap proposals require hardfork/mandatory upgrades, yeah. If we're talking about such substantial changes, then we should throw all our cards on the table and evaluate them equally.

I feel like I have been lied to.

You feel like I'm lying to you?

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I can argue that Bitshares is, by definition, not the same way Bitcoin is a blockchain because of immutability and decentralization that Bitcoin has as a network protocol. Whereas Bitshares is a company among others of the same technology that also are companies that issue value from a centralized origin. The sharedropping process involves Bitshares at origin and that means taking value from that platform in order to get started. Please tell me if I am wrong about this.

The initial distribution phase of Gridcoin when the network was using PoW does not compare to the history that Bitshares/Protoshares has had prior. Gridcoins were mined and then split during the period when PoW was ditched for Proof of Stake. Bitshares never used the same technology or methods of distribution so should not be compared. Apples to oranges.

Bittrex has had Bitshares on "hold" for almost a month when they have had the market listed at "deleted." So whatever they and Bitshares tells the public is something just to keep them busy in order not to avoid realizing how easily it is to lose coins. These are the kinds of problems you are going to be having if you want to use the same technology that Bitshares has. Remember when we discussed how we actually don't want to become a non-profit and have a company? That means changing the software license for Gridcoin, too, I believe.

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I can argue that Bitshares is, by definition, not the same way Bitcoin is a blockchain because of immutability and decentralization that Bitcoin has as a network protocol.

Can you elaborate?

I understand that there are fundamental differences between Bitcoin's POW and Graphene's DPOS algorithms, both have their advantages/disadvantages.

I believe that DPOS > POS, why should everyone have to stake? People don't want to & stake weight has been threateningly low the past couple months. We can control the level of centralization (quantity of witnesses) on genesis.

Whereas Bitshares is a company among others of the same technology that also are companies that issue value from a centralized origin.

Bitshares isn't a company, it and the Graphene toolkit are MIT licenced.

Can you elaborate on the issuing value from a centralized origin? Won't such concerns also apply to the proposed superblock payments & manual reward claims?

If you think we shouldn't have user issued assets nor market pegged asset functionality like BTS, then propose disabling the functionality until the system is stable?

The sharedropping process involves Bitshares at origin and that means taking value from that platform in order to get started.

Launching a new Graphene chain does not involve the Bitshares network nor Cryptonomex, there are several new Graphene chains that operate outwith the Bitshares network.

I worked on BSIP-0023 "Sharedropping an UIA against an external cryptocurrency distribution snapshot" whilst investigating potential disaster recovery routes for Gridcoin (last known state recovery) back in August/September.

BSIP-0023 is not related to this Gridcoin Graphene proposal, it's relatively simple to launch a new Graphene chain once you've generated the genesis.json file.

Producing the snapshot data (genesis.json) is quite tough and poorly documented, however it'd be a verifiable decentralized sharedrop and wouldn't demand the destruction/burn of Gridcoin research coins, so both systems may (most likely will) continue operating.

The initial distribution phase of Gridcoin when the network was using PoW does not compare to the history that Bitshares/Protoshares has had prior.

Protoshares was POW mined at genesis, there were angelshares which were sharedropped onto, several side projects, a merger into btsx then to bts2.0.

Gridcoins were mined and then split during the period when PoW was ditched for Proof of Stake. Bitshares never used the same technology or methods of distribution so should not be compared. Apples to oranges.

I'd argue that their snapshot & sharedrop from Protoshares to BTSX was far more successful/secure/verifiable than the Gridcoin classic to Gridcoin research which involved a middleman burning issuance service (Centralized issuance) instead of a private key import process.

Bittrex has had Bitshares on "hold" for almost a month when they have had the market listed at "deleted." So whatever they and Bitshares tells the public is something just to keep them busy in order not to avoid realizing how easily it is to lose coins.

Bitshares isn't a centralized company, thus it isn't capable of informing the public of centralized exchange woes.

There is a worker proposal for resolving centralized exchange problems, so interaction between the decentralized entity 'BTS' and IRL entities is streamlined in the west.

There's also a Chinese representative worker proposal which is active.

Regardless, Bitshares isn't in the picture, the use of the MIT licensed Graphene toolkit does not involve the Bitshares network at all.

You're right that it's easy to lose coins on centralized exchanges, I've held coins on at least 3 exchanges which exit scammed or were hacked. Holding coins off centralized exchanges & using decentralized exchanges is the future.

These are the kinds of problems you are going to be having if you want to use the same technology that Bitshares has.

This instance, yes. A glitch was identified, and implemented in the Bitshares network & the Graphene toolkit.

We've got our own exchange problems, plus Graphene chains are on more centralized exchanges than we are.

Remember when we discussed how we actually don't want to become a non-profit and have a company?

We don't need to, even if we use Graphene. This may be a thing in the future if someone creates a 'foundation'. When did we discuss this?

That means changing the software license for Gridcoin, too, I believe.

MIT license -> MIT license ?


infographic

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Awesome writeup on graphene. Could you please make your sharedrop post its own thread? We will be discussing CBR today. Not sharedropping or graphene.

As for the concerns from before your graphene writing. Most/all were addressed in the discussion last week. Did you listen to them or read the summary? =)

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"If this can be done securely, without enabling a 'click to dos' button (forcing POR legitimacy check on network peers) then it sounds somewhat reasonable to me, however it will potentially unbalance the economic policy of gridcoin - users will no longer have to buy GRC to stake, thus users may be more inclined to dump their coins.

Alternatively, it can be viewed that the pool solves the 'nothing to invest' new user problem, so why change when there's an open-source solution currently in place?" - CM

Agree with this. If the pool solves the new user problem, we do not need an incentive for GRC holders to dump their coins. If miners can have all of the advantages with a perpetually low GRC balance then there is less reason to hold onto GRC. Pool mining is a small price to pay initially before building up a large enough balance to stake. While nice, boinc stats and voting are not an absolute requirement initially. I think rather some type of new user wizard/interactive setup guide would be a better use of resources since a pool already exists.

I have a formatting suggestion. Instead of pasting the link directly in the article like this:

Original Article:
https://steemit.com/gridcoin/@jringo/gridcoin-research-4-0-proposals-and-preliminary-polls

Use the title of the linked content instead:

Original Article:
Gridcoin Research 4.0 Proposals and Preliminary Polls

Original Article:
[Gridcoin Research 4.0 Proposals and Preliminary Polls](https://steemit.com/gridcoin/@jringo/gridcoin-research-4-0-proposals-and-preliminary-polls)
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-Will change.

--Changed. = )

I have been thinking about CBR. I am nervous that CBR may actually end up being a disincentive for large balance holders and could have adverse economic implications. (Right now the current reward PoS reward mechanism encourages large balances but does not encourage keeping the wallet online. We have to be careful not to exchange one problem for a worse one economically, which would be to unwittingly create a disencentive for large balance holders to keep large balances of gridcoin.)

I think a good compromise would be a PoS reward that is linearly related to the average gridcoin balance at the time of staking, but NOT a function of the time since last staking (other than the indirect impact of staking frequency). This appropriately rewards large balance holders, but also encourages everyone to keep their wallets online for staking, since staking more often with this method will lead to greater rewards. Keeping the wallet offline will prevent staking and result in no reward during the offline period. Since the staking weight would still be essentially proportional to the balance compared to the total gridcoin in circulation, the staking frequency (and reward) would still be proportional to the average balance maintained, which would further encourage whales to stay online which puts forth large staking reserves.

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Could you explain how you see CBR as a possible disincentive? Also, what are the adverse economic implications that make you nervous?

I am a bit confused to the solution you propose as well. Could you rephrase or give an example?

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See my reply below, my idea of scaling both the reward and frequency results in essentially a quadratic reward curve. That may tilt things too much towards large balance holders. What I think by disencentives is for whales is that we have to understand WHY they are holding large balances. Is it the interest? I am not sure the whales really would have such a problem keeping the clients online to stake as much as their concern about the amount of interest they are collecting. The CBR needs to be carefully calibrated to provide the equivalent of the same interest they are getting now, but with the requirement that they keep their clients online to get it. The CBR value that has been discussed seems an arbitrary number though. Maybe it was picked through a calibration analysis like that and it just came out at that even number. The frequency calculation based on relative magnitude seems pretty set, so the only way to calibrate the CBR would be to create a scale factor which adjusts CBR periodically to match the desired system-wide stake payout with the previous total interest payments. This should cause participants to get almost the same payment as the interest they did before, as long as they keep their clients online.

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I like to hope that investors invest because of the blockchain. If they invest for interest without faith in the blockchain, they would be investing in something for more of that thing which they see 0 value in.

There have been no CBR values proposed. Those in the article are place holders.

I agree, that we need to calibrate CBR value based on our intent -- what that intent is still needs to be defined.

The frequency to stake is currently and for the immediately future based on balance, not magnitude.

Low balance users not staking is a problem across the board with PoS blockchains. Our problem is that research rewards are distributed when a user stakes. For this, we propose MRC, BM, and SBD. CBR is not intended to fix the low balance user problem with regards to staking.

I am still uncertain about how you see CBR as a possible disincentive and what the possible adverse economic effects would be under certain scenarios. Could you clarify more please = ). Break down your proposed quadratic curve and give a few scenarios, perhaps.

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I will when I get a chance to detail my thoughts! I am at a major fencing tournament today in Kansas City, so it may be later on today/this evening. I am not sure I even agree with my own suggestion. It may be TOO sensitive. Is there a good way to determine the addresses and balances that are NOT staking? What I would like to do is build a detailed model literally address by address from the top down and run some scenarios system wide. This would be far more valuable than just anecdotal examples.

As a related point, the system is currently underpaying interest. (I think the latest figure was something around 0.98% per annum system wide based on the interest paid in GRC divided by the GRC supply), which if I understand things correctly is a symptom of extreme non-participation by some clients (because the interest, while accrued, doesn’t actually get paid until staking occurs). So am I right to say that there are many wallets with accrued interest and high balances that haven’t staked in months/years - that literally amounts to the difference between the actual interest actually paid out and the 1.5% per annum target?

If so, does the network actually owe all this interest to the investors? My guess is that if that is true, some attention has to be paid to the disposition of accrued, but not realized interest during the transition, otherwise people could get upset.

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I think the transition period will have to be widely advertised, but in the end if someone is not paying attention of the course of say, 6-12 months, that is their loss. Similar to how the PoW->PoS switch worked, there will be some disappointed parties, but what can you do?

At the same time, perhaps there's a way to snapshot interest owed so when the person does bring coins online they can receive that back interest in their first staked block.

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There are potential economic repercussions to implementing MRC/BM/SBD, ie, without the buying pressure from new users purchasing GRC on exchanges for staking purposes would our volume be so low that we would end up getting removed from the exchanges?

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"I think a good compromise would be a PoS reward that is linearly related to the average gridcoin balance at the time of staking, but NOT a function of the time since last staking (other than the indirect impact of staking frequency). This appropriately rewards large balance holders, but also encourages everyone to keep their wallets online for staking, since staking more often with this method will lead to greater rewards. "

This is exactly what is being proposed in CBR. You've independently come up with the exact manner in which CBR is intended to work! More coins = higher probability to stake. Thus whales will stake with higher frequency - still earning de facto interest.

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Not quite. My suggestion provides essentially a quadratic curve, because you get the effect of both frequency and balance, whereas CBR, you get only frequency. Maybe quadratic is too much though. The problem with this is to balance all of the incentives/disencentives for the whales, medium, and small balance holders so as not to upend the gridcoin economy in the transition.

Unless I am misunderstanding something, we also still have the problem of long staking periods (low frequency) for really small balance holders, which remains a discouragement for new participants that are not using a significant initial investment.

really interesting and useful topic,good luck friend