CBR Proposal: Update 2 - Only Three Weeks To Go!
Full Proposal
CBR Update 1 - Addressing some Concerns
What is CBR
CBR is a protocol change that intends to do three main things:
Protocol produced rewards will no longer be given for non-participation in the network. In order to be rewarded with GRC, a participant must help secure the network by staking blocks, crunch whitelisted BOINC projects, or both.
Secure the network. It is expected that this shift in reward mechanisms will incentivize more competition for block creation, which in turn will provide greater stability and security to the Gridcoin blockchain.
To create an intentional economic model to expand on in the future.
For more information, it is encouraged that you read the full proposal linked both above and below.
Quoted Introduction from the Proposal
The current percent interest mechanism does not incentivize Gridcoin participants to maintain an active GRC balance on the network. This is a combination of minimal transactions performed on the blockchain and the lack of a demurrage system to encourage active participation. It is imperative that we develop and implement a reward mechanism that ensures the security and integrity of the Gridcoin ledger. We propose the following block reward mechanism defined as Constant Block Reward (CBR).
The Poll
The poll runs until June 6th.
At the time of posting, 240 votes have been cast producing the following results:
| Option | Votes | Share % |
|---|---|---|
| 75/25 With A 10 Grc Block Reward | 131 | 69.25% |
| 65/35 With A 16 Grc Block Reward | 22 | 12.03% |
| 85/15 With A 5 Grc Block Reward | 50 | 9.11% |
| Reject Proposal | 11 | 3.7% |
| 80/20 With A 7 Grc Block Reward | 28 | 3.58% |
| Abstain | 9 | 1.33% |
| 70/30 With A 13 Grc Block Reward | 9 | 1.01% |
Discussions on CBR
Linked at the start of this post and directly below you will find the first update that answers some questions the community has been asking.
CBR Update 1 - Addressing some Concerns
There have also been two live discussions on CBR so far, one on The Fireside Chat and one during Hangout #55.
The Fireside Chat Episode 03 - CBR
(I will update this post with a link to Hangout #55 when I have one)
There will be another Fireside Chat dedicated to a discussion on CBR and Manual Reward Claims (MRC) this Thursday at 8:00pm Eastern, Midnight UTC, on the Gridcoin discord server. Feel free to post any questions you have here and we will try to answer them during the chat (or join us live!).
New Questions/Developments
The main question that has been asked over the past few weeks has been:
"What will happen to unclaimed interest after CBR is implemented?"
In the simplest and most practical of terms, any unclaimed interest after the implementation of CBR will be lost.
CBR is going to be a hard fork, meaning the update will be mandatory. Any owed interest on the old chain will be left behind.
The poll runs until June 6th, and then CBR must be tested and its implementation timed to cause the least disruption to the network overall -- if there are other nearly completed updates that will also be mandatory updates, CBR might be held until those are ready as well. The timing of implementation will ultimately be decided by the core devs, but rest assured, there will be ample notification.
Nevertheless, it might be wise for large balances with interest owed to them to begin the process of staking that interest.
Active Vote-Weight Estimation
A unique aspect of the CBR proposal is how it determines its validity. To smooth out the poll validation process, we designed something called Active Vote-Weight, or AV-W. Essentially, AV-W attempts to account for the vote-weight which is not active during the length of the poll. For a detailed explanation of AV-W, have a look at the Validation section of the main proposal.
@sc-steemit has already added a dynamic AV-W estimator for the CBR poll. You can follow the results as the poll reaches its conclusion on the Gridcoinstats block explorer linked below. Do keep in mind that the final AV-W cannot be determined until the poll is completed and all the averages calculated.
Thank you startail!
That's it for this CBR update. Keep asking questions and, of course, don't forget to vote by June 6th!
A potential downside I have seen with CBR is a recent rise in PoS Pools, these pools have no attraction with a % based system, because you always get a fair share no matter your staking frequency. But with a CBR we may see coinholders pooling coins to try and get stakes, In my view this is unhealthy.
I think this should be monitored and plans should be in place ahead of time. What would we do if a pool overtakes the staking of Gridcoin? This is clearly worse than a few whales who are long term invested in the coin doing the same.
I think you bring up a good issue regarding PoS staking pools. This is likely something that will be developed even more moving forward. Even DPoS is very similar in some instances. I think how this might be used should be monitored, but ultimately I think PoS pools are meant for people who cannot stake on their own, and will be incentivized as such -- you will receive more reward as a whale staking by yourself than as a staking pool participant.
Encouraging more participation in block creation by allowing small balances to combine forces may be a good thing. It would distribute GRC among even more people while also distributing block production responsibilities among more than just high balance participants: increased competition. We will be sure to discuss it during this week's fireside chat.
As a side note, buying or PoW mining several million GRC for a few hundred dollars in 2013/14 (a unique time of a unique mindset in cryptoland) does not make someone a long term investor. Time, work, or using those GRC to literally invest in a product would make someone a long term investor. Even buying ~150,000 GRC for 10,000USD today could arguably make someone more of a long term investor than someone buying/mining loads in 2013/14.
Early adopter does not equal long term investor.
Consider, BTC bought/mined in 2011 was sold in 2013/14. Many bought/mined early, but were not invested long term and sold as soon as they achieved a nice profit. Those early adopters who were also long term investors used their young BTC to fund organizations and technologies that are very well known today.
Agreed a pool seems like a nice way for small-holders to get a chance at staking, crossed my mind too.
Its the snowball effect Im concerned about; crypto-pools always seem to end up the same way, they become centralised and the only way anyone has a chance of participating is to join those few pools that dominate. For PoW its bad, for PoS you actualy have to hand your coins to the pool owner, thats a disaster waiting to happen.
Yup. Solutions are on the way thanks to other blockchains.
IOHK is leading the charge. Some info in the video linked below.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=1304&v=MeNJoJOgMHU
Thanks thats interesting. I guess a system with the k delegates as the target state, where if the same delegate authors a block withing k - n blocks of the last one the reward is diminished.
The closer together 2 blocks by the same delegate are authored, below a desired target, the less the block reward should be for the second block. This should be inversely proportional so staking consecutive blocks earns less than waiting for the target number of blocks to pass before trying again.
Reward % = (current block staked - last block staked)^2
So if delegate authors block 1 he gets 100% for that, but if he also authors block 2 he gets only 1%. If he authors blocks 1 & 3 he gets 100% for block 1 and 4% for block 3. Authoring block 1 & block 10 gives him 100% for block 1 and 81% for block 10. He must author blocks with a gap of at least 10 blocks between them to earn the maximum amount.
So the delagate and the pool members are incentivised to make more delegates, but not just 10 more because randomness will still present blocks below the threshold quite often, so there will be an incentive to make enough delegates of roughly equal weight to ensure rewards are as close to 100% as possible, but not to dilute the delegate count excessively. With 13 delegates in this scheme assuming they all staked at roughly 13 block intervals, each would earn 84% if the maximum reward, which is still better than the 81% they would earn by having just 9 delegates.
Just a rough idea that popped into my head, it must be harder than that though, surely...
If we ever move to a delegate system, I think this would work with proper verification
Right, delegates should be 'approved' in some way
I haven't voted because I don't understand the implications of each of the different reward allocations. I think it would have been better to do a two-stage poll: CBR, Yes/No; then the allocations.
We've actually had 2 previous polls on whether we should have CBR. See here and here.
You're right. The current poll's option to reject is misleading because the voters have already approved CBR.
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The reject option is there for people who don't like any of the other options. They might want a different split or don't like a certain part of the proposal.
I'd imagine if the proposal is rejected it will be revised based on community feedback and reposted.
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