48% and reward schedule issues. A thought or two. A proposal. Input Sought.

OVERVIEW

The wealth disparity within the GRC ecosystem is vast. The reward schedule most likely needs to be reworked. And at the same time, GRC is developing for scaling at an amazing pace.

These issues of wealth disparity and reward schedule are not unique to Gridcoin, however the pace of development and level of community activity is. I think this creates opportunity.

WHAT

If we wish to develop as a grassroots type community, I think it will be important that the power of investors not dominate the conversation or the community's ability to act. I think it will be equally important that active investors are acknowledged and respected for what they are: a large part of what has built Gridcoin to where it is and probably a large part of what will continue encouraging gridcoin development in leaps and bounds.

A third type of Gridcoin participant is where I see potential: The Inactive Investor. The inactive investor holds volumes of GRC, but doesn't necessarily wish to be active in the community and this is fine, however right now they do nothing but sit on their GRC and carry weight in votes. They are given interest over time and they know GRC is severely undervalued when you consider its utility, so why not? There is nothing else to do with their investment that will return equal reward. I think this is where we have an opportunity to create utility out of a fairly serious issue, while we continue tweaking the protocols of GRC to ensure equality and scale, of course.

HOW

There is currently The Gridcoin Foundation which provides bounties to agreed upon developments via the voting structure. A vote requires GRC to be initiated. Often, those who wish to propose a vote do not have the GRC required. I think this is an effective structure which has utility when it comes to core GRC development -- a core proposal must gain 100k GRC worth of support to be officially considered. I also think that once Gridcoin's decentralized nature develops, it will be entire nodes, or sub-communities, pooling their funds to initiate a vote. Before that can happen, however, we need the community to develop; we need outreach and utility proposals. Personally, I think it's time to get creative with some BOINC projects. ( @cm-steem mentioned something about a boinc project workshop on the Beyond Bitcoin show on Friday, which I very much hope turns into something ).

What if there were an organization which operates along side but independently from the foundation and functions largely as a GRC crowd sourcing/contract platform for outreach and utility projects:

1. User submits proposal with requested funding and to parameters set by the organization. These parameters are designed to encourage users to submit serious and thought out proposals.
2. Proposal gets vetted through a process that is to be defined, and is either accepted or sent back for revisions.
3. Accepted proposals are documented and listed along with other accepted proposals.
4. Should a proposal require funding, community members can donate GRC to proposals they wish to support. Perhaps specific rewards, such as temporary MAG increases, are given for donating.
   4a. If the proposal does not require funding, the organization can serve as a gathering point for people looking to start larger scale projects -- "here's what I want to do. who else wants to do this? let's do this."

These proposals must not change Gridcoin in any way. I am thinking outreach and utility proposals such as traveling to universities and schools or proposals for a new BOINC projects that need infrastructure development.

These proposals must adhere to the basic principals of Gridcoin -- no gambling site proposals, etc..

I see this potential organization as a semi-centralized smart contract platform that will help us to develop the foundation we will need to build blockchain contract structures (far, far down the road).

WHY?

This organization will provide investors opportunities to make their large quantities of GRC mobile without causing them to lose out on POS rewards, no matter how POS might be changed in the future. Perhaps the mag bonus for supporting a proposal is calculated to pay back the investment + the POS rewards it would have received were it sitting in a wallet. The bonus for the investor then, is the development of a project that will increase the value of GRC overall -- Not only do they get the POS reward for those coins, they get real value development. Further, under the current vote weight calculations, while an investor's funds are tied up in these "contracts," their vote weight will be reduced as the coins are no longer in their client -- they will have to choose between reward and weight.

Or perhaps we do away with or greatly reduce POS rewards and incentivize project development instead = ).

What do y'all think?

Edit: POS + DPoR + Proof of Investment -- eh?