RE: RAC versus TCD: Case study 1
I see what you're saying now. I've posted a couple of times about this from the perspective of incentive structures. I agree that there's this problem regarding a decentralized approach and a centralized approach. I just posted today a possible way to address the issue of getting the same amount of GRC for any given piece of hardware on any project. In those earlier posts there was also a lot of discussion regarding ranking projects. I plan to analyze that separately, and I think I'll address what you mentioned here.
Regarding the consistent amount of FLOPS, yes that's a good point. I didn't think about that in my most recent proposal, but I think it might be taken care of as a side-effect. If you can receive the same amount of GRC by running any project, you're more likely to pick a single project and stick with it, so changes to your total computational power should mostly come from new users coming in.
Yeah, a consistent amount of FLOPS will probably come as a side-effect of other measures. But worth thinking about and checking anyways.
Right on about the post! I will go through it in depth soon. In the short term there are things like the greylist and TCD I want to see implemented (so we're not just talk), but beyond that I def want us to come up with additional proposals for improving the reward mechanism (like you've already started on, then also things like ranking projects).
Agreed.
I think TCD is a good step in the right direction. My proposal is more long term, I think there are more important things to be actively developed right now.
I agree that it's a contentious issue, but it's still worth being looked into.
Also, to your point about the distribution of power ("interest of the network"), I also think that should be looked into. Do you have an ideal distribution in mind?
Probably the main factor is to get the right ratio of 'balance' to 'magnitude' as far as voting weight is concerned. We don't want all balance because then a few really rich people could totally dominate voting. This would be much more difficult to achieve if magnitude has significant weight, since a huge mining infrastructure would be required (especially once the Gridcoin network grows to rival the largest national supercomputers, which it probably will). We also don't want all magnitude because large investors should get at least some say in the future of Gridcoin, even if they don't mine.
Currently, the ratio is 70:30 balance to magnitude. This seems to work OK for now. Maybe there's a better answer though if we did more analysis...
I completely agree. Do you have some ideas about how we could analyze it, i.e. variables, etc.?
I've wanted to look into it myself but I decided to focus on other topics for now. Some solution to that problem could be implemented by a specific way for ranking projects (still don't know about that myself though), or maybe some other way, but I'm not sure what all the variables are.
On my to-do list! I have some ideas, but still need to flesh them out.