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RE: Incentives to Vote for the Underdog
Hmm.. I never looked at it that way, thank you..
But it's only the curation of those who vote within the first 30 minutes that partially goes to the author... Dolphins vote within the first 30 minutes but whales don't unless it is somebody extremely popular like the examples I gave. So a collusive group (whale) tends to profit nearly just as much from voting for the same content. There's an incentive for dolphins to look harder since we want to get our votes in first, but not really for whales...
Whales make more by not voting oin the first 30 minutes, but not that much more.
Because the orca/big dolphin buts (like wang) front run them. Remember, its not just how many people vote after you that determine weight, its how many people vote before you.
check out what the big whales are making a week in curation rewards. Except bernie sanders (who makes more than most becuase he votes first in the curie trail probably), its not a lot.
Theres no money in curation -- everyone's solid, IMO
Thanks, I hadn't really worked out the maths. I would have thought though that the n^2 curve would somewhat counter the loss from votes getting in before you...
I actually don't know the formula precisely, but curation rewards are not distriuted on the n^2 curve.
Theyre based on the voters rshares (not vshares), the rshares that got in before and the rshares that come in after
one of the reasons that @biophil was so successful with his bot is that he doesn't seem to vote on material with even moderate support at the 30 minute mark.
The whale penalty for bandwagoning is huge, as is the penalty (because of front running bots) for voting on the same author multiple times. But its only huge as a percentage of fairly small potential curation reward.
someone like dantheman or smooth isn't going to put a huge amount of effort into increasing their curation reward from 150 steem\week (which is about where they are) to say 450 because its cheeseburger money relative to their balance.
Incidentally, BP's method is somewhat resistant to frontrunning, inasmuch as if someone cracks his algo, it would be easy to anticipate his votes and come in ahead, but he would no longer vote for those posts (because the front runner has changed the equation)
But you could argue that an aggressive front runner with his algo would be able to force him into his second and third choices.