Betting on Bitcoin: How social collectives shape cryptocurrency markets

In 2008, Satoshi Nakamoto developed Bitcoin to challenge main-stream fi nancial markets. Today, the Bitcoin market is worth $170 billion dollars (CoinMarketCap, 2019), and represents a prime example for how individual economic actors can shape the markets they operate in. Indeed, the market-shaping concept challenged established views on markets as a-priori, self-generating realities involving seller-buyer dyads (Morgan, 2012); instead proposing that markets are plastic and malleable ecosystems, which can be reconf i gured by its participants (Nenonen & Storbacka, 2018; Nenonen, Storbacka, & Windahl, 2019).
Research investigating the formation of new markets traditionally adopted a “f i rm-driven market development” perspective (Martin & Schouten, 2014, p. 867), assuming fi rms are the primary actor to lead, manage and respond to the formation of markets (Dolbec & Fischer, 2015; Slimane, Chaney, Humphreys, & Leca, 2019). For example, work to date introduced concepts like market orientation (Kohli & Jaworski, 1990), proactive market orientation (Narver, Slater, & MacLachlan, 2004), or market-driving behavior (Jaworski, Kohli, & Sahay, 2000), to investigate a fi rm’s capability to alter (Ghauri, Wang, Elg, & Rosendo- Ríos, 2016), and learn from markets (Slater & Narver, 1995); linked market orientation to fi rm performance (Matsuno & Mentzer, 2000), or investigated the means by which fi rms alter the market in which they operate (Kindstr¨ om, Ottosson, & Carlborg, 2018).
Conversely, stakeholders other than fi rms, including actual or potential customers, who may be equally involved in transformative market-shaping practices (Harrison & Kjellberg, 2016), have received signif i cantly less attention in the literature (Slimane et al., 2019). Even those studies that investigated contexts where customers support market formation (i.e., brand communities (Schau, Mu˜ niz, & Arnould, 2009), have been criticized because they either remain conceptually rooted in the proactive market orientation paradigm (Narver et al., 2004), or because they adopt a ‘black box’ approach by assuming customers are a homogenous group (Dolbec & Fischer, 2015). Consequently, we know very little about how actors other than fi rms actively shape markets (Martin & Schouten, 2014; Slimane et al., 2019). More specif i cally, their roles (i.e., ‘who?’), actions (‘how?’), and resources (‘what?’), are not well understood (Mele, Pels, & Storbacka, 2015). This is a signif i cant gap in knowledge because individual actions are the building-blocks of social phenomena (Schatzki, Knorr-Cetina, & von Savigny, 2001), with Mele et al. (2015) explaining that “individual actor’s views (and asso-ciated actions) play a central role in how markets evolve” (p. 105).
Therefore, market-shaping studies that provide “new and rich insights regarding how consumers engage with institutional demands and eventually manage to adapt or change them” Slimane et al. (2019, p.

1. are necessary to advance the discourse in the fi eld.
   Our present work addresses the aforementioned gaps in knowledge.
   To do this, we build on the precedence by Breidbach and Maglio (2016) and Anderson, Challagalla, and McFarland (1999) that any process, including market-shaping (Mele et al., 2015), can be explored through * Corresponding author at: Business School The University of Queensland, St Lucia, Brisbane, QLD 4072 Australia.
   E-mail address: [email protected] (C.F. Breidbach). Contents lists available at ScienceDirect Journal of Business Research journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/jbusres https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusres.2020.09.017 Received 30 September 2019; Received in revised form 6 September 2020; Accepted 8 September 2020

the constructs of market actor (who?), market resources (what?), and market action (how?). Specif i cally, we draw on empirical fi ndings from an exploratory, in-depth ethnographic study of Australian crypto-currency communities, which we conceptualize as social collectives or “assemblages of actors that affect and are affected by others or by a specif i c object or situation” (Slaby & von Scheve, 2019, p. 267). Our empirical study and inductive theory-building process (Miles & Huber-man, 1994) allows us to investigate the roles, actions and resources of individuals in social collectives shaping cryptocurrency markets, and the impact that their micro-level actions have on macro-level outcomes (Baker & Nenonen, 2020), thus culminating in three important contributions:
First, we offer a theoretical contribution through a typology that identif i es and characterizes four distinct roles members of social col-lectives perform to shape cryptocurrency markets (‘who?’). Typologies are a “unique form of theory building” (Doty & Glick, 1994, p. 230) because they delineate clearly identif i able constructs, specify relation-ships between them, and can be subject to further empirical testing. As such, our present work overcomes the limitations of previous ‘black boxing’ approaches that conceptualized market-shaping actors as a ho-mogenous group (Dolbec & Fischer, 2015), and provides the much- needed complementary viewpoint to studies focussing on fi rm-driven market development (Martin & Schouten, 2014). From a managerial perspective, our typology provides an important starting point for fi nancial service providers or regulators to engage with the individuals shaping cryptocurrency markets. For example, our typology can help recognize market-trends or customer-sentiment while, ultimately, responding to Slimane et al. (2019), as well as Mele et al. (2015) call to “elicit deeper understanding of various market aspects, including mar-ket actors,” involved in market-shaping.

Second, we offer a novel and inductively derived theoretical model of collective market work. The model identif i es six micro-level market actions (‘how?’) with which individual members of social collectives shape cryptocurrency markets, and delineate a set of propositions out-lining the pathways with which these impact macro-level outcomes like market size, market offerings, as well as market functioning (‘what?’).
As such, our work provides much-needed insights into how micro-level actions in social collectives affects macro-level outcomes (Kindstr¨ om et al., 2018). We thereby respond directly to calls for empirical research (i.e., Slimane et al., 2019) to “elicit deeper understanding of various market aspects, including […] market actions” (Mele et al., 2015, p.
110), extend prior conceptual contributions (i.e., Harrison & Kjellberg, 2016), and identify future research opportunities and managerial guidelines that enable practitioners attempting to engage in, and benef i t from, market-shaping in increasingly important cryptocurrency and ‘Fintech’ markets (Breidbach, Lim, & Keating, 2020).
Finally, our empirical contribution is positioned at the important and largely-unexplored intersection of market-shaping and Information Technology (IT) (Luksha, 2008; O’Connor & Rice, 2013). Importantly, cryptocurrencies have already been associated with market-shaping (Nakamoto, 2008), because they fundamentally alter the role of market-participants (i.e., banks as fi nancial intermediaries become obsolete) (Breidbach et al., 2020), but received very little attention in market-shaping research to date. Here, we offer the “contemporary perspective” into market-shaping Baker, Storbacka, and Brodie (2018, p.

1. called for.

1. Theoretical background Neoclassical economics viewed markets as an exogenous reality that cannot be controlled by fi rms or other market-participants (Marshall, 2009). However, research in economic sociology (Granovetter, 1992), B2B marketing (Mattsson & Johanson, 2006) or consumer behavior (Scaraboto & Fischer, 2012), challenged this perception. Today, markets are viewed as social structures (Araujo, 2007), represented through complex and adaptive socio-technical-material systems (Nenonen, Storbacka, & Frethey-Bentham, 2018, p. 2), and can therefore be altered by its participants. This evolution from a neoclassical static, to a tem-porary dynamic market conceptualization, broadly coincides with the emergence of four concepts that, individually, aim to explore how eco-nomic actors alter markets:
   First, studies exploring market-driven organizations assume that fi rms can actively respond to opportunities and threats in a market (Slater & Narver, 1995). This perspective is well aligned with neoclassical eco-nomics because it explicitly entails reactive behavior (Slater & Narver, 1995), typically in response to a given and exogenous market structure or context fi rms adapt to, yet without altering the market itself (Jaworski et al., 2000). For example, market-driven fi rms may focus on learning from stakeholders (Jaworski et al., 2000), or develop products for well-def i ned market segments (Kumar, Scheer, & Kotler, 2000).
   Second, proactive market-orientation studies also assume the existence of a static and exogenous market but shift their perspective away from internal fi rm-capabilities, to the actions with which fi rms respond to customers (Li, Lin, & Chu, 2008). Specif i cally, Narver et al. (2004) link proactive market-orientation to a fi rm’s ability to understand customer needs, which involves the discovery, understanding, and satisfaction of latent customer preferences (Slater & Mohr, 2006). This can take place through what Kumar et al. (2000) refer to as the ‘customer’s voice’; for example, through the use of brand communities (Schau et al., 2009).
   Third, the market-driving concept aims to explain the means with which fi rms attempt to change the structure of markets. This may, for example, take place by eliminating other market-participants (i.e., an incumbent might purchase a new market-entrant). Reshaping the mar-ket structure thereby alters customer and/or competitor roles (Jaworski et al., 2000), or their behavior (Hills & Sarin, 2003). Market-driving explicitly assumes a fi rm’s proactive role, and emphasizes its capacity to develop radical innovations (O’Connor & Rice, 2013), segment in-dustries, or impact brands and pricing (Kumar et al., 2000).

Finally, market-shaping broadens the perspective even further by exploring an economic actor’s activities when redesigning market structures, networks, and institutions (Nenonen et al., 2019), rather than responding to exogenous structures (Nenonen & Storbacka, 2018). Ul-timately, market-shaping formulates norms concerning market behav-iour, which can provide new ‘rule of the game’ (Kjellberg & Helgesson, 2006), thereby resulting in the creation of market opportunities (Sar-asvathy, 2008), including new markets (Tuominen, Rajala, & M¨ oller, 2004), or systems (Nenonen & Storbacka, 2018). Table 1 provides an overview of all four concepts.
Research investigating the roles and ability of economic actors to alter markets has made important contributions to the wider business and marketing literature to date. However, existing work typically as-sumes that fi rms are the primary actor who either adapt to or transform the markets they operate in – an assumption that is increasingly being challenged (Dolbec & Fischer, 2015; Harrison & Kjellberg, 2016; Sli-mane et al., 2019). As a case in point, the wider management literature investigated the role of regulators in developing markets (i.e., Zietsma & Lawrence, 2010), while the consumer culture literature explored con-texts where customers actively contribute to the formation of markets (i.
e., Giesler, 2008). Though valuable contributions, this body of work forms only a partial picture, as it remains conceptually rooted in the proactive market orientation paradigm (Narver et al., 2004). For example, Schau et al. (2009) investigated how brand communities act as agents in market shaping. But, brand communities are managed by fi rms to foster brand loyalty through interactions with customers (Füller, Matzler, & Hoppe, 2008), and are therefore part of fi rm’s market- development strategy (Fournier & Lee, 2009). Even those studies that explicitly investigate the role of customers as agents in market-shaping, that is without the inf l uence of, or attachment to a fi rm orchestrating their activities (i.e., France, Merrilees, and Miller (2015) work on customer brand co-creation), adopt a ‘black box’ approach by assuming customers are a single homogenous group. This resulted in a “lack [of] investigations of consumer-initiated or consumer-fuelled dynamics in shaping cryptocurrency markets is an emerging area of inquiry with limited contributions available. We therefore relied on an exploratory ethnography, as this research method allowed us to closely engage with our research context through in-depth fi eldwork (Brown, 2014), gain new insights into a previously unexplored area of inquiry (Harvey & Myers, 1995), and helped us understand market shaping, the phenomenon under investigation, as perceived by the individuals that we studied (Gobo, 2008), yet without altering the context of their reality (Baskerville & Myers, 2015). Because of these benef i ts, ethnographic research is one of the most fruitful research methods whenever inductive theory building in exploratory settings is the goal underpinning the inquiry (Myers, 1999).
For example, prior work in business and marketing used ethnographies to study knowledge workers (Schultze, 2000), community identity (Black & Veloutsou, 2017), or brand experience (Schembri, 2009).
3.2. Data collection Data collection took place at grassroots cryptocurrency events in Melbourne, Australia, including Bitcoin conferences, cryptocurrency workshops, cryptocurrency networking events, or cryptocurrency mas-terclasses – settings uniquely suitable to explore the characteristics of, as well as resources and actions by individuals shaping cryptocurrency markets. This is because the behaviour and roles of attendees was clearly observable within the activities taking place (Jaworski et al., 2000). At the time of our data collection, the then-emerging cryptocurrency market was distinct from mainstream fi nancial service markets, both within Australia and internationally. Specif i cally, cryptocurrencies represented a classic textbook-case of a disruptive innovation (Chris-tensen, 2006) or ‘alpha market’ (Lusch & Watts, 2018), that did not yet meet the demands of mainstream fi nancial services or ‘beta market’ (Lusch & Watts, 2018), but was seen to potentially create a new market and disrupt mainstream fi nancial services.
Following best practices for ethnographic research (Baskerville & Myers, 2015), and the precedence of prior ethnographic studies exploring collective action (Schwartzman, 1989), we adopted the role of an active participant (Brown, 2014), and collected data through obser-vations, on-site interviews, and secondary data sources (i.e., documents provided to us by participants). We attended 14 cryptocurrency events held between May and December 2017, with event-sizes ranging from 31 to 175 participants, after which we reached theoretical saturation (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Throughout each event, we participated in the same activities as other attendees, with one researcher taking fi eld notes using a notepad as well as mobile phone applications to describe interactions with others, as well as their actions (i.e., questions during a panel session). We also conducted 31 unstructured ethnographic in-terviews on site (Myers, 1999), ranging from 10 to 15 min, that were summarized immediately verbatim. After each event concluded, one researcher transferred handwritten note into Microsoft Excel spread-sheets and created memos, following procedures outlined by Miles and Huberman (1994). Additional data points collected include each event’s start/end time, topic discussed during each event, and key quotes.
Overall, we conducted 27.5hrs of active participant observations, with the observational data, fi eld notes, and interview summaries resulting in 11,748 words for analysis. Finally, our secondary-data included photo-graphs and presentation slides provided to us, as well as pamphlets and brochures available on-site. In addition, we gained access to the attendee-list for 11 of the 14 events, which resulted in detailed infor-mation about the professional background of 729 attendees (i.e., job titles), as well as self-written statements describing their interest and experience in cryptocurrencies (attendees submitted these when regis-tering for events).
3.3. Data analysis Data analysis followed processes outlined by Miles and Huberman (1994), and intended to inductively build theory through the creation of constructs and propositions from empirical evidence (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). First, we compiled, cleaned, and organized all data into a repository. Second, we analysed data using descriptive, inter-pretive, and pattern codes, thus disassembling and reassembling the text corpus. Descriptive coding involved data-driven codes, meaning we adopted the terminology provided by participants, thus resulting in “categories and their properties” (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p. 143) as close to the data as possible. In a subsequent stage, we relied on inter-pretive codes (Miles & Huberman, 1994), which merged descriptive codes into abstract categories. Finally, pattern codes helped us to pull interpretive codes into more parsimonious units of analysis.
Following recommendations by Jaworski et al. (2000), we aimed to identify roles and actions performed by individual members in the social collectives that we studied, as these are understood to provide early indicators for market driven and market shaping phenomena (Nenonen et al., 2018).1 We used a variable-oriented strategy (Miles & Huberman, 1994), to identify and compare the characteristics of the members of the social collectives studied, and triangulated the data that we had ob-tained through observations and participant-interviews, with the data from the publicly available attendee-lists. For example, this process highlighted that one distinct group of members actively used terms and terminology associated with cryptocurrency trading and investment when describing their motivation to attend events (“prof i t”, “invest-ment”, “ICOs”), while others did not. Finally, following recommenda-tions by Doty and Glick (1994), we created a typology to summarize our fi ndings, and to identify and distinguish the roles individual members of social collectives perform as market shapers. We furthermore followed Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007) recommendation to summarize the actions of these actors as a distinct process, with propositions explaining the relationship between constructs. Collectively, this theoretical model, displayed in Fig. 2, and the typology of roles displayed in Fig. 1, represent our unique theoretical contributions.

1. The shaping of cryptocurrency markets by social collectives 4.1. Research context This study is set in the context of grassroots cryptocurrency com-munity groups located in Melbourne, Australia. The groups that we studied met anywhere from once a week, to once a month, with indi-vidual meetings including informal gatherings, as well as formal cryp-Fig. 1. Archetypical Market Shaper Roles in Social Collectives. 1 We built on precedence by Kjellberg et al. (2012), to def i ne actions as “routine, micro-level interactions between multiple actors seeking to create value for themselves and others” (p. 219).

workshops, cryptocurrency networking evenings, or cryp-tocurrency masterclasses. All meetings took place in dedicated co- working and off i ce hubs, or communal meeting spaces. We conceptu-alize each group as a social collective, or assemblage of actors that is distinct from fi rms in that they share a common situation-specif i c un-derstanding of self, because members eventually developed an “under-standing of the self as part of a collective” (Slaby & von Scheve, 2019, p.
267). Specif i cally, individuals self-categorize as members of a collective through socio-psychological processes, eventually acting accordingly to their self-construal. In contrast, “f i rms are relational contracts [with] distinctive routines and capabilities,” (Adelstein, 2010, p. 347), with membership being contingent on formalized processes that exclude self- categorization (i.e., hiring processes) (Slaby & von Scheve, 2019). Our conceptualization thereby aligns with the discourse in wider blockchain literature, which highlighted that “bottom-up grassroots innovation” (Simos and Tan, 2019, p. 8) is the driving force behind the growth of cryptocurrency markets.
4.2. Roles of actors and their resources in shaping cryptocurrency markets Individual members of cryptocurrency communities performed four distinct roles when shaping cryptocurrency markets. We def i ne and conceptualize these as “Freshman”, “Trail-Blazer”, “Idealist”, and “For-tune Hunter”. Fig. 1 provides an overview, indicating the relative dis-tribution of roles in the cryptocurrency communities studied, while highlighting the degree to which each role either aimed to generate access to resources for others and themselves, or was concerned with facilitating resource exchange.
First, individuals performing the “Freshman” role represented the majority of individuals in the cryptocurrency communities that we studied. Freshman were members of the general public, for example, retirees or individuals without any prior knowledge about crypto-currencies. Their involvement in the community was motivated by the desire to acquire new knowledge about cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin, but also to expand their network:
“[I want to] gain deeper knowledge about blockchain, cryptocurrencies and its impact on the future. I am a freshman” [Participant 27, Event 12] Freshman highlighted their intention to acquire new knowledge about cryptocurrencies before purchasing them, or using related ser-vices. Consequently, Freshmen typically focused exclusively on, and were motivated by, accessing knowledge readily available within the community. Though their role was comparatively passive, the constant stream of incoming Freshmen increased the size of the communities overall. Importantly, we observed that Freshmen eventually transi-tioned into other roles within cryptocurrency communities, so that this role essentially represented a ‘stepping-stone’ into cryptocurrency markets.
Second, individuals performing the “Fortune-Hunter” role already had some experience with cryptocurrencies; for example, through trading, by participating in Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs), or by actively contributing to the pool of available cryptocurrencies as dedicated miners. Here, we consider it important to explain that cryptocurrency mining is a decentralized activity that, through the use of computational power and algorithms, results in the creation of new ‘coins’ (Eyal & Sirer, 2018). Unlike Freshmen, Fortune-Hunters had a sophisticated knowledge of, and interest in, cryptocurrencies beyond Bitcoin, as exemplif i ed through their language used, with technical terms like “candlesticks”, or “resistance level” frequently used. However, Fortune- Hunters were, fi rst and foremost, driven by the desire to reap monetary benef i ts for themselves:
“I am […] involved in crypto [trading]. With cryptos, you can get 50% a month even if you are bad [at trading]” [Participant 48, Event 10] Fortune-Hunters furthermore focused on expanding the impact and relevance of cryptocurrencies in society more broadly. As a case in point, a group of Fortune-Hunters that we studied actively contributed to the alteration of taxation laws, with the intention to make cryptocurrency trading and ICOs more prof i table.2 Third, the individuals that we classif i ed as “Idealist”, were not motivated by monetary gains but aimed to build, share, and extend the knowledge and skills associated with cryptocurrencies for others. As such, Idealists’ aimed to increase the availability of new resources available within their cryptocurrency group, and included academics, students, or IT-professionals (e.g., developers). They engaged in research and development of cryptocurrency applications - to explore technical feasibility and social, rather than commercial benef i t:
2 From July 1st 2017, buying and selling digital currency was no longer subject to GST in Australia. This decision was made in consultation with rele-vant interest groups, including the social collectives that we studied. The Australian Treasury since invited public submissions to cryptocurrency regu-lation (The Australian Government Treasury, 2019).
C.F. Breidbach and S. Tana

“How will blockchain and crypto inf l uence our future economies and politics? what other industries will it affect? how will it bring good to the society?” [Participant 51, Event 5] Finally, “Trail-Blazer” represented the smallest group overall, and included individuals attempting to engage in commercial crypto-currency activities. Trail-Blazers had profound expert-knowledge, and aimed to develop cryptocurrency solutions that would benef i t society, but also result in monetary gains. As such, Trail-Blazers integrated the characteristics of both, the Fortune-Hunters seeking monetary gains, with those of the altruistic Idealists, who aimed to contribute benef i ts to a peer-group:
“[We are interested in] fi nancial breakthrough and social implementation using blockchain and crypto to provide new commercial platform” [Participant 71, Event 13] 4.3. Actions used to shape cryptocurrency markets Individual members of cryptocurrency communities used six micro- level actions to shape cryptocurrency markets. We structure these by drawing on Kjellberg and Helgesson (2006), differentiating between representational, exchange, and normalizing actions.
4.3.1. Representational actions Representational actions aimed to increase market size by creating an ‘idealized’ market representation, thus encouraging others to participate in cryptocurrency markets. The fi rst representational action that we identif i ed involved indoctrination. Here, members of crypto-currency communities purposefully shaped an “image” of the crypto-currency market at large, before communicating this to others using social media. Most commonly performed by Trail-Blazers and Fortune- Hunters, indoctrination intended to build and enhance a self- conceived collective identity of what cryptocurrency markets and its participants entailed, and how they work. Specif i cally, the market was perceived as a collective representation of individuals who, through association, were able to establish mutually benef i cial relationships, networks and collaborations. The necessity to actively promote the values and intentions of the social collective to establish legitimacy of cryptocurrency markets was clearly expressed by one participant as ‘indoctrination’:
“[…I am] exploring ways of indoctrinating blockchain technologies into organizations and society.” [Participant 86, Event 4] Closely aligned with indoctrination was the representational action shaping social identity. All members, irrespective of their role (i.e., Freshman, Idealist etc.), self-selected a specif i c identity within the community; for example, by stating their technical aff i liation or exper-tise, or through their exclusive use of technical artefacts (e.g., specif i c Bitcoin ‘wallets’). The collective shaping of social identity within the cryptocurrency communities enabled members to compare themselves with others, generated a sense of belonging, but also highlighted simi-larities or the distinctiveness of members, thereby increasing status within the group. Ultimately, the shaping of social identity by members of the social collectives we studied, made cryptocurrency markets more attractive to outsiders. Developing this desirability was a key outcome of the representational market-shaping actions, with new or incoming members explicitly highlighting how the community groups had gained their interest:
“Interested in all things cryptocurrencies and blockchain technologies, so I went looking to fi nd a group or event to share the interest with like-minded individuals.” [Participant 18, Event 4] Ultimately, we propose:
Proposition 1.Indoctrination and the shaping of social identity are actions performed by social collectives to shape an idealized representation of the nature and functioning of markets, as well as a shared identity for all market-actors.
Proposition 2.The idealized representation of the nature and functioning of markets increases market size by attracting new market-actors. These are enticed by the roles, relationships and collaborations of existing participants.
4.3.2. Exchange actions Exchange Actions are instances of economic exchange that recur-sively shape the market in which they take place. In the context of our present study, exchange actions that we observed included knowledge transfer and the reconf i guration of resources. Both improved the perfor-mance of members of social collectives who participate in crypto-currency markets.
First, knowledge transfer was embedded into the ‘fabric’ of the cryp-tocurrency communities. As a case in point, gaining access to knowledge was the main motivation of Freshman, who interacted in a unique symbiotic relationship with Idealists, who aimed to develop and provide cryptocurrency-related insights and solutions for others. This exchange involved accumulating knowledge, evaluating it, and developing awareness of its ‘cost’. Consequently, members improved their cryptocurrency-related competencies and became higher-performing market-participants (i.e., when trading Bitcoin). This subsequently attracted new members, including prospective customers (in the case of Trail-Blazers), investment partners (in the case of Fortune-Hunters), or new Freshman, thus extending the size of the cryptocurrency market overall:
“Learning about cryptocurrencies as an investment strategy and seeking alternative cryptocurrencies to Bitcoin” [Participant 44, Event 7] The second exchange action shaping cryptocurrency markets involved the reconf i guration of resources, which led to new market of-ferings. Specif i cally, as the available knowledge within the community increased, Trail-Blazers and Idealists were able to recombine the then available technical, legal, and intellectual resources to create even more offerings in the form of new instruments (i.e., technical applications), or rules (e.g., new smart contracts). However, in their attempt to monetize new cryptocurrency-related offerings, Trail-Blazers realized that, unlike other fi nancial services, these offerings could not yet be sold on a dedicated and established market. It therefore became evident that they had to ‘make’ their own market:
“[I am involved in] market making in Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies” [Participant 18, Event 4] In summary, we propose:
Proposition 3.Higher levels of knowledge transfer within a social col-lective increase the collective market-performance of its members.
Proposition 4.The higher the market-performance of individual members in a social collective, the larger will subsequent increases in market size be.
Proposition 5.Social collectives will only be able to increase the number of market offerings if they can increase the amount of resources available to its members.
4.3.3. Normalizing actions Normalizing actions aim to def i ne the ‘general direction’ that a market and/or its actors should be (re)shaped into, and can include “issuing standards, codes of conduct, certif i cation criteria.” (Kjellberg & Helgesson, 2006, p. 847). The normalizing actions that we identif i ed include developing language and standards as well as promoting and enforcing social norms. Both improved the functioning of cryptocurrency markets by increasing the effectiveness and eff i ciency of market exchanges.
First, developing a common language and standards led to new 317 norms and rules within the cryptocurrency communities. For example, the general consensus that members should complete all economic transactions, both within and outside the community, using crypto-currencies. In doing so, members developed standards needed for the effective and eff i cient functioning of cryptocurrency markets at large.
Developing language and standards thus embodied a necessary pre- condition to market performance, as it increased the eff i ciency and effectiveness of economic exchange processes. Specif i cally, members developed linguistic abbreviations like ‘hodl’, meaning ‘to hold a cryp-tocurrency for some time’; ‘private key’ – referring to a ‘technical so-lution needed to ensure secure transaction’; ‘dApps’ – or ‘decentralized applications’; ‘smart contract’ – a ‘self-executing contract without in-termediaries’; or ‘solidity’ – referring to a ‘programming language for writing smart contracts’ to be more eff i cient actors in cryptocurrency markets:
“[I am] pursuing ‘dApps’ and ‘Smart Contract’ development using ‘So-lidity” [Participant 2, Event 11] The second normalizing action involved promoting and enforcing so-cial norms, and was executed using two distinct governance mechanisms.
For one, cryptocurrency communities promoted and enforced social norms through monetary incentives, specif i cally through Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs). ICOs are similar to IPO (Initial Public Offering) in share markets and, due to the highly speculative nature of cryptocurrencies, promise substantial monetary gains for those able to participate. How-ever, ICO procedures were tightly regulated, with access to ICOs being restricted to those members only who adhered to the existing social norms (i.e., use of cryptocurrencies, shared social identity, etc). It was therefore unsurprising that participants referred to their community as a higher-order social ‘movement’ or ‘revolution’ with dedicated ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’:
“[We] support the BTC [Bitcoin] movement in Australia.” [Participant 33, Event 4] Second, investors in ICOs received a ‘token’. Tokens can generate long-term fi nancial returns, for example by incorporating voting right within a dedicated cryptocurrency, or voting rights for decisions regarding new project(s) to be undertaken within the community. As such, the ability of an individual cryptocurrency community-member to access tokens is crucial, as it represents a means to promote and enforce social norms within the community and market at large. Put differently, tokens represent a consensus mechanism that is aligned with the pro-motion and enforcement of social norms. Ultimately, cryptocurrency markets are inherently democratic, self-regulating, and collective - a characteristic that is likely rooted in the basic functioning of crypto-currencies, which use so-called ‘proof of work’ consensus rules:
“[Researcher]: What interests you most about Blockchain?” “[Participant]: direct democracy - future of trust.” [Participant 20, Event 12] We conclude:
Proposition 6.Market functioning will be higher if social collectives develop, promote, and enforce social norms, language, and standards while initially shaping that market.
Table 2 provides a summary of each role identif i ed.

1. Discussion 5.1. Theoretical implications This work represents the fi rst in-depth study to empirically investi-gate the roles, actions and resources of individuals collectively shaping cryptocurrency markets, and the impact that their micro-level actions have on macro-level market outcomes. In what follows, we discuss the theoretical and empirical implications of our work.
   First, by exploring the roles (who?) that members of social collectives perform when shaping cryptocurrency markets, and their resources (what?) used, we respond to calls for empirical research to explore the characteristics of actors other than fi rms shaping markets (Mele et al., 2015; Slimane et al., 2019). Importantly, the four roles we identif i ed coexist, with patterns of resource-seeking and exchange structuring their symbiotic relationships. The role of Freshman, in particular, has sub-stantial implications for our understanding of market shaping by social 318 collectives. At the most rudimentary level, their inf l ux increased the number of market-participants. According to Burr (2014), actively increasing the number of actual or potential customers constitutes “market widening”, and represents a unique form of market shaping.
   The intention of Fortune-Hunters and Trail-Blazers to attract more Freshman can therefore be explained by their intention to reap monetary gains. For one, expanding the number of actors in a market increases the diversity of experiences, results in a greater variety of ideas and, therefore, more innovation to be monetized (Kozinets, 2008). Increasing the number of market-actors also created legitimacy because, as Dolbec and Fischer (2015, p. 1148) explain, “those who are seeking to bring into existence a new product market must […] enrol other actors in their market creation project if they are ultimately to establish the legitimacy of new offerings”.
   We summarized our fi ndings through the typology depicted in Fig. 1, which contains clearly identif i able constructs (e.g., the four roles), and specif i c relationships between them (e.g., through the dimension ‘resource access’), that can be tested empirically (Doty & Glick, 1994).
   Ultimately, our typology represents an original theoretical contribution (Corley & Gioia, 2011), a complementary viewpoint to prior empirical work focussing on market-shaping by fi rms (i.e., Finch & Acha, 2008), and a much-needed contemporary perspective through cryptocurrency markets, a setting that had been associated with market-shaping (Nakamoto, 2008), but not yet empirically explored.
   Second, our empirical inquiry and inductive theory-building process into the actions (‘how’?) with which individual members of social col-lectives shape cryptocurrency markets resulted in a novel theoretical model of collective market work. Presented in Fig. 2, our model and its propositions highlight how the six micro-level market-shaping actions that we identif i ed affect market size, market offerings, as well as market functioning as macro-level outcomes (Slimane et al., 2019).
   Collective action in social movements pointed to bottom-up pro-cesses like boycott as the sole actions non-f i rm actors (i.e., customers) take to affect institutional change in markets (Slimane et al., 2019).
   Conversely, our present work expands this viewpoint by identifying six distinct micro-level market-shaping actions. We also aimed to under-stand how these actions affect macro-level outcomes (Kindstr¨ om et al., 2018). In order to do so, we drew on Baker and Nenonen (2020), who highlight that meso-level pathways can help understand how micro- level actions translate into macro-level outcomes. The meso-level pathways that we identif i ed include the idealized external market rep-resentation, the performance of market-participants, as well as the effectiveness and eff i ciency of market exchanges. We discuss each in turn.
   Increasing the market-size for cryptocurrencies, a macro-level outcome, was a conscious objective we observed. Importantly, the so-cial collectives did not respond to an exogenous opportunity (Slater & Narver, 1995) or stakeholder perception (Jaworski et al., 2000), as would have been the case with market-driven fi rms. Instead, members of the social collectives created an idealized external market representa-tion, the meso-level pathway, to increase the attractiveness of crypto-currency markets to outsiders. In addition, improving the performance of all market participants, the second meso-level pathway, increased the number of available market offerings and, in turn, market-size as macro- level outcomes. Our fi ndings therefore extend prior work associated with market orientation, which postulated that fi rms are the primary actors to develop new market offerings (i.e., Jaworski et al., 2000), and demonstrate how, and under which conditions, individuals can collec-tively achieve this objective.
   Finally, the actions of individuals performing the role of Trail-Blazer do not resonate with, or are comparable to, fi rms engaging in market- shaping through corporate venturing, but broadly resonate with communal entrepreneurship (Boyaval & Herbert, 2018) an activity common in social collectives or grassroots organizations. Indeed, the social collective literature already highlighted “the possibility that social collectives become precursors to other, more stable social formations in that they instigate and motivate processes such as ritualization, sym-bolization, and institutionalization.” (Slaby & von Scheve, 2019, p.
   268). Therefore, the emergence of fi rms or other commercial ventures from within a cryptocurrency community through communal or con-sumer entrepreneurship is a possibility, although one we did not observe. Instead, and contrary to work by Kjellberg and Helgesson (2006), we found that normalizing actions impacted members of social collectives only when attempting to affect market functioning as a macro-level outcome. Specif i cally, the use of ICOs or tokens in social collectives affected the eff i ciency and effectiveness of exchanges, the meso-level pathway, while explicitly excluding both non-market par-ticipants, as well as those members of the social collectives who did not adhere to the norms, language, and standards that were developed, promoted, and enforced. This indicates that market-shaping by social collectives is an inherently self-regulating and collective undertaking.
   5.2. Limitations and future research We addressed substantial gaps in knowledge related to the previ-ously un-investigated roles, resources, and actions used by members of social collectives in the shaping of cryptocurrency markets. Ample future research opportunities remain:
   First, as objective and value aware individuals, we acknowledge that any reality examined is only imperfectly apprehensible, and that imperfect observations of the reality under investigation may have occurred during data collection. Therefore, the resulting fi ndings are only probably true, and not context independent. For example, actors within social collectives in other contexts may perform different roles while shaping markets, an issue that should be addressed in future studies. In addition, future longitudinal inquiries could map the evolu-tion of the four roles we identif i ed. Especially the rate and scale with which transformations from Freshman to Trail-Blazers take place, or the extent to which communal entrepreneurship (Boyaval & Herbert, 2018) lead to the development of successful commercial ventures, should be answered by future research. Such work could also help expand the boundaries of our enquiry. Like every empirical study, we necessarily had to limit its scope, drawing on, and positioning our contribution within the market-shaping literature and not the, for example, entre-preneurship literature, which could provide complementary insights (i.
   e., Santos & Eisenhardt, 2009).
   Second, the intersection of emerging technologies like Blockchain and market-shaping provides many future research avenues. For example, on June 18th 2019, Facebook announced plans to launch its own cryptocurrency ‘Libra’ with a global consortium of fi nance and technology fi rms (Libra, 2019). Such a digital payment-system could alter global trade, taxation, or avoid fi nancial regulation. Because this endeavour is unprecedented, and its wider societal and economic im-plications are not understood, future research is of vital importance. We envision future work in this area to employ theoretical lenses like Christensen (2006) disruptive innovation theory that have not yet been fully utilized to enrich our understanding of ‘Fintech’ (Breidbach et al., 2020).
   Third, complementary insights to our study could be provided through new research methods and sources of data. For example, mea-surements for market-shaping similar to what previous studies of market orientation (i.e., MKTOR by Narver and Slater (1990) or MARKOR by Kohli, Jaworski, and Kumar (1993)) did could be developed and aid managerial practice. However, and possibly more importantly, there are new sources of data available today, including sets of natural language (i.e., patents, government records, or research articles) that can only be analysed with advanced machine learning algorithms (Antons & Breidbach, 2018). Using these new sources of ‘big’ data analytics could help provide insights about market-shaping from multiple level of abstraction.
   Fourth, markets are always in the making, especially in the case “nascent or newly created industries”

Cryptocurrencies and cryptocurrency markets will continue to evolve at an increasing pace. In fact, we expect that, at the time of publication of this article, cryptocurrency markets will likely look very different compared to December 2017, when we fi nalized data collection for our present study. The evolution of cryptocurrency markets therefore rep-resents a unique opportunity to understand the intersection of digital transformation and market shaping more broadly, but also to investigate how entrepreneurship and innovation in society are fostered. This would require to broaden the focus on actors other than the social collectives we investigated. For one, we suggest that future research to investigate new business models applied by fi rms like ‘Bitmain’, a commercial cryptocurrency mine located in Texas, including the ethical implications of such data-driven ventures (Breidbach & Maglio, 2020). In addition, the role of regulators and governments needs to be taken into consid-eration – even though cryptocurrency markets today are largely self- regulated, as evidenced by our work. Indeed, we did not explore the role, practices and resources employed by regulators, thus providing another unique research opportunity (Zietsma & Lawrence, 2010).
5.3. Managerial implications Several important managerial implications emerge from our study:
First, a precondition for any organization attempting to survive in a market dominated by new technologies like cryptocurrencies is to recognize the importance of a viable market shaping strategy. Managers need to acknowledge that markets are malleable (Nenonen & Storbacka, 2018), deliberately design market shaping strategies, and proactively anticipate emerging market systems (e.g., actor-to-actor, distributed and decentralized). Any market shaping strategy should therefore be ambi-dextrous, in that it identif i es and operationalizes ways to grow a fi rm’s current markets, while simultaneously stimulating the initiation of new markets.
Second, in order to operationalize market-shaping, especially in the context of cryptocurrency markets, we suggest that fi rms collaborate with, and embed themselves in, the contexts of social collectives active in cryptocurrencies. These market-actors represent a valuable source of new knowledge (i.e., Idealists) to help advance novel value propositions.
At the same time, as new market-entrants, they are potential competitors (i.e., Trail-Blazer), or even sources of venture-capital (i.e., Fortune- Hunters). Ultimately, by learning with the market, fi rms can develop new market-shaping capabilities (Nenonen et al., 2019), a process that can be supported by implementing and emphasizing open, diffusive, and collaborative innovation processes (Nambisan, Lyytinen, Majchrzak, & Song, 2017).
Third, banks and other incumbents (i.e., credit unions) are likely to be the most affected by cryptocurrencies and new fi nancial technology.
It is therefore important to recognize the importance of emerging norms and structures (e.g., new funding opportunities through ICOs). Unless banks or other incumbents adopt the social identity and norms that dominate cryptocurrency markets, it will be diff i cult, if not impossible, to collaborate with cryptocurrency communities.
Finally, our fi ndings provide guidance for policy makers or regula-tors who are tasked with governing an increasingly complex and dy-namic environment. We suggest regulators do not follow the common practice of being inf l uenced by industry-incumbents, but collaborate closely with social collectives in the form of cryptocurrency commu-nities to access much-needed tacit knowledge. This could lead to much- needed policies that foster a fair and healthy innovation ecosystem and, as such, a true democratization of fi nancial service – as initially intended by Nakamoto (2008).