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RE: Quantum Resistant Error Correcting Code Based Blind Signatures Can Enhance Voter Privacy On Steemit
Did you read and understand the paper? Quantum resistant crypto schemes using error correcting codes cannot ever be broken by any kind of quantum computer.
@dana-edwards All due respect, but that's false.
When we say quantum resistant, we mean that it uses methods which are not susceptible to Shor's algorithm. However there are encryption methods which are not susceptible to Shors algorithm but can still be broken without a brute force search even now. For example any form of lattice based encryption. Also Shor's is probably not the only attack vector that quantum computing will bring us.
Also we don't quite yet know what is meant by "any" in the context of a quantum computer because at the moment all known quantum computers are extremely "special purpose". The field is too young to be making any sort of claims on yet.
My personal preference for quantum resistance is NTRU, but like all known Quantum Algos it leaks a little bit of the private key with each signature and so you have to change keys frequently. It may be that this is some fundamental thing with nature. Or it may be we just don't yet have the math to do encryption that deals in realms of physics we barely have any understanding in at all.
You should make a post on this and edify us on the benefits of NTRU.
@dana-edwards First off allow me to apologize, the comment you were responding to was hidden on my tiny little phone screen. So all I saw was you saying Did you read and understand the paper? Quantum resistant crypto schemes using error correcting codes cannot ever be broken by any kind of quantum computer.
I didn't realize until I logged in at home you were replying to someone.
So please forgive me, I responded because it looked like you were just coming out of the blue and saying that, which seemed totally out of character.
As for NTRU I know enough about it to know that there is a fairly high risk key leakage issue on signing operations and also that things encrypted with NTRU don't always decrypt.
The best way not to leak keys is to change them every hundred or so operations (current best attack is 1,000 signing operations, so 10% of that should give a good margin for safety). But it doesn't look like there is any way to ensure that what is encrypted with this method always decrypts properly.
Once I read that, I sort of stopped following it for a bit. I'm a bit of a standards monkey. Right now there is no NIST or other standard quantum crypto scheme.
Frankly we are in a pretty scary place, in that there are lots of ways to break existing crypto schemes and not much in the pipeline that could replace it yet.
Glad to see this paper, I'm going to read it thoroughly tonite and give you my thoughts in the morning.
@dana-edwards Have you read about the encryption method called "A new hope"? Looks like google is testing it in chrome right now.
I read it and might not understand it fully. Am sorry for that. It's just people find always a way. There nothing more I wish than to be fully secure
Theoretically secure would be 100% true. Practical implementation on the other hand is much more difficult. So I would never say any encryption is 100% secure in practice even if it's unbreakable theoretically.