While I agree with Chase's premise (net taxpayers and victims of government aggression, where government is the real people claiming to be the state), I disagree with his conclusion that this is how the property should then be managed. Instead, I'd argue that, once stakes are established, these partial owners should then be able to trade their stake between each other however they please, or manage them in common if they so choose. Absent that, the next best method would be to auction off the capital assets of the state to private parties and remunerate the victims of government aggression from the proceeds. While this would require an unprecedented scope of arbitration, this is not only possible right now but happens when corporations are sued to the point of insolvency. Without money to pay the claims, corporate assets are then auctioned off and used to pay restitution claims. While not exactly analogous given that corporations are voluntary, this process provides a fairly straight-forward model that could work on government-controlled property. The only issue I have with it is that it divests the property away from those most likely to use it (the people in a given jurisdiction who were taxed to pay for said government property).