Prof. Kathryn Weathersby

The momentum propelling the United States toward creating a separate state in the South became even stronger on 19 July 1947, when a passionate young rightist assassinated the prominent leader Yeo Un-hyeong. In the fall of the previous year Yeo had cut his ties with the Korean Communist Party and joined forces with moderate right-wing nationalists to form the Coalition Committee for Cooperation between Rightist and Leftists. The purpose of this group was to cooperate with the Allies to establish a transitional government, acting under the terms of the Moscow Agreement of December 1945.

Since Yeo’s assassination effectively ended American hopes for creating a centrist government in Seoul, Washington began to urgently search for new means of resolving the stalemate with the Soviets over Korea. The US, however, still wanted to avoid all the negative consequences internationally of a complete rupture with Moscow. Consequently, the American delegation to the Joint Commission was instructed “to use all appropriate measures to ensure continuance of negotiations” while the new approach was formulated.

On July 29 the State Department completed plans for three different possibilities. First, if the Soviets broke off the negotiations in the Joint Commission before August 5, the US would ask for a special meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers at which Secretary of State Marshall would propose free elections, under the supervision of the United Nations, to create a legislature in each occupation zone. Those legislators would then choose representatives for a nation-wide provisional government. After consulting with the four major powers, the new provisional government would arrange for the withdrawal of foreign troops and the continued provision of economic aid. If Moscow refused this proposal, the US would take the issue to the United Nations while at the same time implementing the plan in its zone.

Second, if the negotiations continued beyond August 5, Marshall would suggest that the two delegations compile a report on the progress made toward self-government for Korea. At the same time, the US would carry out the two actions outlined in the first plan. Third, if the Soviets refused to accept any American proposal, the US would create a separate government in its zone and bring the issue before the UN at the meeting scheduled for September 10. It’s important to note that when the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) approved these plans, its special committee on Korea warned that without some kind of step forward politically, rising violence in the southern zone would force the US to withdraw its troops without having reached a political settlement.

As noted in many earlier posts, US policy toward Korea was always formulated in the context of the broader international struggle of the early Cold War. Thus, at this point, the SWNCC concluded that if American troops withdrew under such conditions, the Soviet Union would gain domination over the entire peninsula. This would not only impact Korea, but would also “discourage those small nations now relying on the US to support them in resisting internal or external Communist pressure.” In other words, if places like Iran or Turkey were to maintain their determination to resist Soviet expansion, the US would have to demonstrate its own determination in Korea.

In accordance with the SWNCC plans, on August 12 Secretary of State Marshall presented a letter to Foreign Minister Molotov proposing that the Joint Commission make a report on the progress toward Korean independence and convene a conference on August 21 to discuss the Joint Commission negotiations. In the next post we will examine how these new American initiatives played out in August and September 1947, as the US moved inexorably toward creating a separate state in southern Korea.

[Sources: This post relies on Andrew C. Nahm and James E. Hoare’s biography of Yeo Un-hyeong in Historical Dictionary of the Republic of Korea (RLPG Books), and James I. Matray, The Reluctant Crusade: American Foreign Policy in Korea, 1941-1950 (University of Hawaii Press).]