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RE: What are the Nash Equilibria in the curation game?
I studied this some while ago, there should not be an equilibrium. If your opponents are playing optimally it is always better to self-vote. The time to self-vote depends if a minimum reward of 0.001 in curation can reached by anyone voting before you. So given your sp we can compute when you should self-vote to make maximum profit and such that your strategy cannot be attacked.
I'm looking at just the case for voting on a post not authored by any of the players. This is unrealistic in other ways, for example, it ignores opportunity cost of voting on something else instead.
Optimal time in the 2 player game may not be an integer number of minutes, but working with countably or uncountably many strategies was something I hoped to avoid.
in that case there will be an equilibrium as long as you can squeeze all the votes before the 15 minutes I guess