USA Psychological & Information Operations - Doctrine & Practice

Information operations (IO) is defined as, “the integrated employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own” (Paul, 2008). The term itself developed in the 1990s, as a build on for information warfare and command and control warfare. This term can also be coined as influence operations, because all information is for a pursuit of gaining a competitive advantage over an opponent, and was even utilized during U.S. Military efforts in Afghanistan (Munoz & Dick, 2015).

Information operations is a combination of soft and hard power, in which Joseph Nye defines as smart power. Soft power is having the ability to get others to want the same outcomes that you want through attraction and persuasion rather than coercion, which is considered more of psychological operations in information operations. Hard power is the ability to get others to go against their preferences or way of thinking by using threats or inducements, which can be utilized through capabilities such as electronic warfare (Gomichon, 2013). Soft power is preferred in international politics because not only is it cost effective, it can result in a change in behavior without any conflict.

Within warfare, there are many different principles that have to be considered. These can include the objective, unity of command, offensive, security, and economy of force. All principles of war have to include the information doctrine. This drives the decisions to be made, as well as the technology utilized. Without the information doctrine, this usually leads to disaster. Successful navigation of warfare requires both a stable information doctrine and flexibility (Leonhard, 2000).

One of the most widely recognized examples of the use of intelligence operations is the U.S. Military efforts in Afghanistan that occurred between 2001 and 2010. Information operations were not used effectively due to a disconnect between the IO doctrine and practice which made it counterproductive to effective and efficient operations. From the beginning, U.S. military leaders recognized the importance of winning the support of the Afghan population, which would prove beneficial in fighting opposing forces, in addition to ridding the antipathy that the population has had previously towards foreign armies. The biggest psychological operations success in Afghanistan has been the face to face communication and the new emphasis on meetings with the local councils of elders, key leader engagements, and establishing individual relationships with members of the Afghan media (Munoz, 2012). The effectiveness of IO in Afghanistan could have been improved by including the need for a cohesive strategy better integrating IO with psychological operations and public affairs as well as having measures of effectiveness defined. The most notable shortcoming in Afghanistan was the inability to effectively counter the Taliban propaganda campaign against U.S. and NATO forces on the theme of civilian casualties (Munoz, 2012).

In order to have an effective military campaign, the five core components of information operations must be integrated and utilized. War and conflict are never concrete, and information is necessary for strategic advantage. Those that have the ability to gain information can have the ability to gain the trust of the local populace, to make effective decisions, to further technology development, and can ultimately be successful in winning military conflicts.

References:

Gomichon, M. (2013). Joseph Nye on Soft Power. University of the West of England, Bristol.

Leonhard, R. (2000). The Principles of War for the Information Age. Novato, Calif.: Novato Press. Chapter 1.

Munoz, A. (2012). U.S. Military Information Operations in Afghanistan – Effectiveness of Psychological Operations 20012010.
RAND Corporation.

Munoz, A. & Dick, E. (2012). Information Operations – The Imperative of Doctrine Harmonization and Measures of Effectiveness. RAND Corporation.

Paul, C. (2008). Information Operations: Doctrine and Practice. Westport, CT: Praeger.