Why Ross Ulbricht is innocent of all charges and must be released from prison
The reason Ross Ulbricht is innocent of all charges will be ignored by many—not because it is untrue, but because the effects of this seemingly simple discrepancy are so far-reaching that they would rather deny their own knowledge of the situation than confront it.
However, it may not matter: It took the participation in the American Revolution of only about one percent of the people in America to defeat the British—and this author posits that a similar percentage is all that is needed today to rectify things.
As shown herein below, the reason Ross Ulbricht is innocent of all charges is the same reason behind the steady erosion of the unalienable and constitutional rights to life, liberty, and property of everyone and disintegration of the fabric of life in America.
“Uno absurdo dato, infinita sequuntur. One absurdity being allowed, an infinity follow.” John Bouvier, Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, 3rd rev., 8th ed., rev. by Francis Rawle (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1914) (hereinafter “Bouvier’s Law Dictionary”), p. 2166).
A datum is as valuable as it can be used to align other data—and the working problem of this monograph is to present the reader with the initial absurdity installed in the Republic by Congress, so as to be able to navigate without excess distraction the literal ocean of absurdities following in its wake, unravel (in less than 10,000 words / 60,000 characters) the essential aspects of 228 years of congressional fraud and treason, and thereby identify the ultimate situation and how it can be handled.
Christopher Tarbell, a Special Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and officer of the United States Department of Justice, on September 7, 2013, presents a sealed criminal complaint (hereinafter the “Sealed Criminal Complaint”) calling for a warrant for the arrest and imprisonment of Mr. Ulbricht, alleging violation of Title 21 of the United States Code (“U.S.C.”) Food and Drugs, § 856 Maintaining drug-involved premises, and 18 U.S.C. Crimes and Criminal Procedure §§ 1030 Fraud and related activity in connection with computers, and 1956 Laundering of monetary instruments, which instrument is sworn to by Special Agent Tarbell before United States Magistrate Judge Frank Maas, thus establishing an apparent basis for the prosecution of Mr. Ulbricht.
This monograph demonstrates with indisputable law, facts, and evidence that Special Agent Tarbell and United States Magistrate Judge Frank Maas took (usurped) jurisdiction in New York County, New York, and the judicial district known as the Southern District of New York and acted against Mr. Ulbricht, without the capacity, as given by the Constitution, to do so, rendering said alleged Sealed Criminal Complaint void on its face and erasing any basis for the arrest, prosecution, or imprisonment of Mr. Ulbricht and calling for his immediate release.
Those who feel that the above statement is too preposterous to be believed will have no use for this monograph; those who are looking for answers to the situation in which Mr. Ulbricht finds himself and looms over the rest of us until resolved, will be rewarded with knowledge of its verity.
No Member of Congress nor, with the exception of the president, any executive or judicial officer can or will cite any provision of the Constitution that gives him the authority to do anything he does—because none is an officer or elected official of the national / federal government established by the Constitution March 4, 1789, but of said government’s bastard-spawn and doppelganger: the local / municipal government of the District of Columbia, a municipal corporation, created by Congress February 21, 1871.
We once had a federal per se government, albeit an inchoate one (consisting only of the president and Members of Congress), for 88 days, between April 30 and July 27, 1789, when Congress introduced the initial absurdity and everyone else allowed it. This monograph pinpoints and reveals the significance of that absurdity and those immediately following it and why Bitcoin is a major part of the remedy.
“Cujusque rei potissima pars principium est. The principal part of everything is the beginning” (Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, p. 2130)—and the beginning of the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the general government of the United States is the oath or affirmation to be taken by prospective holders of an office or public trust thereunder.
Except for President George Washington, who on April 30, 1789, takes, for the first time, his oath of office (Constitution, Article II, Section 1, Clause 8), prior to July 27, 1789, no other executive or judicial officer of the new government has been sworn in; only Members of Congress, beginning June 1, 1789 (1 Stat. 23).
The Constitution at Article VI, Section 3 (hereinafter “Article VI, § 3”) provides (Bold emphasis added.):
“The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution; but no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States.”
The religious-test prohibition of Article VI, § 3 is the organic enshrinement in American law of the principle of separation of church and state; to wit:
“When our Constitution was adopted, the desire to put the people ‘securely beyond the reach’ of religious test oaths brought about the inclusion in Article VI of that document of a provision that ‘no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States.’ Article VI supports the accuracy of our observation in Girouard v. United States, 328 U. S. 61, 69, that ‘[t]he test oath is abhorrent to our tradition.’” Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 491 (1961).
It is immaterial whether their intended purpose be benign or sinister, religious test oaths are “notorious tools of tyranny” and “an abomination to the founders of this nation”; to wit:
“All that was forbidden [in Article VI, § 3] was a ‘religious Test.’ . . .
“As we recently stated in United States v. Ballard, 322 U. S. 78, 322 U. S. 86, ‘Freedom of thought, which includes freedom of religious belief, is basic in a society of free men. Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624.’ The test oath is abhorrent to our tradition. . . .” Girouard v. United States, 328 U. S. 61, 68-69 (1946).
“Painful awareness of the evils of thought espionage made such oaths [test oaths] ‘an abomination to the founders of this nation,’ In re Summers, 325 U. S. 561, 576, dissenting opinion. Whether religious, political, or both, test oaths are implacable foes of free thought. . . .” American Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 447 (1950). (Black, J., dissenting.)
“It cannot be denied, for example, that the religious test oath or the restrictions upon assembly then prevalent in England would have been regarded as measures which the Constitution prohibited the American Congress from passing. . . .” Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 265 (1941).
“I concur in all the Court says in condemnation of Oklahoma's test oath. I agree that the State Act prescribing that test oath is fatally offensive to the due process guarantee of the United States Constitution. “Test oaths are notorious tools of tyranny. . . .” Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 192-193 (1952). (Black, J. concurring.)
The key is whether a religious test is required, i.e., mandated by Congress, as a qualification to an office or public trust under the United States or is optional / discretionary.
Wherefore, no prospective officer or elected official of the United States may enter on the execution of his office unless and until (1) he takes an oath or affirmation that conforms to both the mandate and express-prohibition provisions of Article VI, § 3.
In conformance with both the mandate and express-prohibition provisions of Article VI, § 3, Article II, Section 1, Clause 8 of the Constitution (hereinafter constitutional citations are presented in the following article-section-clause format, without the use of the word “Constitution”: “Article II, § 1(8)”) provides the following oath of office for the president:
“‘I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the office of President of the United States and will to the best of my ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States.’”
In conformance with both the mandate and express-prohibition provisions of Article VI, § 3, in the first statute ever enacted, Congress on June 1, 1789, in “An Act to regulate the time and manner of administering certain oaths,” Chapter 1, Section 1 (1 Stat. 23) (Note: “Stat.” is an abbreviation of “United States Statutes at Large”), provide the oath of office for all Members of Congress; to wit:
“‘I, A.B., do solemnly swear or affirm (as the case may be) that I will support the Constitution of the United States.’”
OATH / AFFIRMATION FOR PROSPECTIVE EXECUTIVE OFFICERS
“The contest, for ages, has been to rescue Liberty from the grasp of executive power.” Daniel Webster (American statesman and senator, 1782-1852), speech in the U.S. Senate, May 27, 1834, The Works of Daniel Webster, 10th ed., vol. 4, p. 133.
Whereas, the Founding Fathers, American participants in the Revolutionary War, Framers of the Constitution, and “We the People of the United States” (Constitution, Preamble) manage to rescue Liberty from the grasp of the executive power of King George III—debtor-slave of the world’s first state-sanctioned fractional-reserve lending institution,[1] the Rothschild-run private Bank of England (parent bank[2] of the future Rothschild-run[3] private Federal Reserve[4])—the First Congress on July 27, 1789, quietly begin the process of surrendering it back, ultimately to control of the same banking family.
The vehicle for the first absurdity is “An Act for establishing an Executive Department, to be denominated the Department of Foreign Affairs,” ch. 4, 1 Stat. 28, July 27, 1789, which provides, in pertinent part:
“Sec. 3. And be it further enacted, That the said principal officer [the Secretary for the Department of Foreign Affairs], and every other person to be appointed or employed in the said department, shall, before he enter on the execution of his office or employment, take an oath or affirmation, well and faithfully to execute the trust committed to him.”
Section 3 of the Act of July 27, 1789, purports to provide for an oath or affirmation that allows prospective executive officers to accede to office under the United States, but fails to require that they bind themselves to support the Constitution—only “well and faithfully to execute the trust committed to him”—an absurdity in respect of the mandate provision of Article VI, § 3.
Further, anyone holding an executive office to which he was not elected (everyone but the president), such as “Secretary for the Department of Foreign Affairs,” is holding not a public trust but an office—so any purported “trust committed to him” is not by the American People via the electoral process but rather his immediate superiors by way of personal appointment, a clue of more absurdities to come.
“In questions of power, then, let no more be heard of confidence in man, but bind him down from mischief by the chains of the Constitution.” Thomas Jefferson, quoted in “Thomas Jefferson, Resolutions Relative to the Alien and Sedition Acts,” 10 Nov. 1798, Writings 17:379-80, 385-91, The Founders’ Constitution, ch. 8, doc. 41, Philip B. Kurland and Ralph Lerner, eds. (University of Chicago Press and the Liberty Fund), http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch8s41.html (accessed October 29, 2017).
The absurdity of allowing individuals to enter on the execution of an executive office without requiring that they bind themselves to support the Constitution allows for the Executive Power to evade “the chains of the Constitution” and eviscerate the unalienable Right of Liberty with impunity—and also explains many other things, such as why United States Department of Justice prosecutors always escape punishment for all manner of crimes they commit against defendants: They have no duty of fidelity to the Constitution.
Congress will provide no explicit oath of office for any prospective executive officer for the next 72 years (till August 6, 1861, 12 Stat. 326, infra).
OATH / AFFIRMATION FOR PROSPECTIVE JUDICIAL OFFICERS
Congress on September 24, 1789, pass “An Act to establish the Judicial Courts of the United States, 1 Stat. 73, and provide the first oath of office for all judicial officers, as follows below (Bold and ALL-CAPS emphasis added in each citation.):
● Clerks (1 Stat. 76):
“‘I, A.B., being appointed clerk of_____, do solemnly swear, or affirm, that I will truly and faithfully enter and record all the orders, decrees, judgments and proceedings of the said court, and that I will faithfully and impartially discharge and perform all the duties of my said office, according to the best of my abilities and understanding. SO HELP ME GOD. Which words, so help me God, shall be omitted in all cases where an affirmation is admitted instead of an oath. . . .”
● Justices and judges (1 Stat. 76):
“‘I, A.B., do solemnly swear or affirm, that I will administer justice without respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the rich, and that I will faithfully and impartially discharge and perform all the duties incumbent upon me as_____, according to the best of my abilities and understanding, agreeably to the Constitution and laws of the United States. SO HELP ME GOD.’. . .”
● Marshals and deputy marshals (1 Stat. 87):
“‘I, A.B., do solemnly swear or affirm (as the case may be) that I will faithfully execute all lawful precepts directed to the marshal of the district of_____under the authority of the United States, and true returns make, and in all things well and truly, and without malice or partiality, perform the duties of the office of marshal (or marshal’s deputy, as the case may be) of the district of_____, during my continuance in said office, and take only my lawful fees. SO HELP ME GOD.’. . .”
The words “So help me God” in the above oaths of office, required and exacted by Congress as a qualification to the respective office sought, are religious in nature; to wit:
“The fact that religious words are common to many faiths — or are used repeatedly — does not diminish their religious meaning. Neither the numbing effect of repetition nor the brevity of a prayer extinguishes the religious nature of words such as ‘help me God.’” Newdow v. Roberts, 603 F. 3d 1002 (D.C. Cir. 2010). (Kavanaugh, Cir. J., concurring.)
Unless a prospective judicial officer take the oath mandated for him by Congress, however, there is no chance of him acceding to public office; to wit:
“Clearly the Constitution permits the requirement of oaths by officeholders to uphold the Constitution itself. The obvious implication is that those unwilling to take such an oath are to be barred from public office.” American Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 414-415 (1950).
With the sole exception being an unknown number of clerks (if any) who take the above affirmation instead of the oath (as authorized therein), no prospective justice, judge, marshal, or deputy marshal has such a choice and must, along with the remaining clerks, take an oath / affirmation that requires a religious test as a qualification to the respective office sought—a requirement expressly prohibited at Article VI, § 3 and therefore a fatal defect in each such oath of office.
The above respective oath or affirmation for prospective clerks, marshals, and deputy marshals is devoid of provision that binds the taker to support the Constitution, as expressly mandated at Article VI, § 3.
Whereas: Every prospective clerk taking the oath, and every justice, judge, marshal, and deputy marshal taking the respective oath of office provided in the Act of September 24, 1789, is ineligible to enter on the execution of any office under the United States for failure to take an oath or affirmation that conforms to the express-prohibition provision of Article VI, § 3; and
Whereas: Every prospective clerk, marshal, and deputy marshal taking the respective oath of office provided in the Act of September 24, 1789, is ineligible to enter on the execution of any office under the United States for failure to take an oath or affirmation that binds him to support the Constitution,
Wherefore: No prospective clerk, justice, judge, marshal, or deputy marshal taking the respective oath of office provided in the Judiciary Act of September 24, 1789, is eligible to hold any office under the United States or exercise “The judicial Power of the United States,”, Article III, § 1, for failure to take an oath or affirmation that conforms to the mandate provision of Article VI, § 3 or the express-prohibition provision thereof or both.
Five (5) days after enacting the Judiciary Act of September 24, 1789, Congress on September 29, 1789, in “An Act to recognize and adapt to the Constitution of the United States the establishment of the Troops raised under the Resolves of the United States in Congress assembled,” ch. 25, sec. 3, 1 Stat. 96, revert back to a constitutional oath or affirmation (with a requirement that the taker bind himself to support the Constitution and which is free of a religious test) for commissioned officers in service of the of the United States in the Army or Navy; to wit:
“‘I, A.B., do solemnly swear or affirm (as the case may be) that I will support the Constitution of the United States.’”
Because the above-referenced Act of September 29, 1789, whose oath or affirmation conforms to both the mandate and express-prohibition provisions of Article VI, § 3 and whose enactment is subsequent to the Act of September 24, 1789, it is conclusive that the First Congress have personal knowledge of the difference between constitutional and unconstitutional oaths and affirmations and deliberately exclude by way of oath of office, every prospective judicial officer from holding office under the United States and, more significantly in the case of prospective justices or judges, acceding to “The judicial Power of the United States,” Article III, § 1.
Whereas: It is Congress’ job to support the Constitution and follow its provisions; and
Whereas: The First Congress demonstrate competence to legislate an oath or affirmation that conforms to both the mandate and express-prohibition provisions of Article VI, § 3, as provided for Members of Congress at 1 Stat. 23, June 1, 1789, supra, and commissioned officers of the uniformed services at 1 Stat. 96, September 29, 1789, supra; and
Whereas: Following implementation of the Constitution, the First Congress require no prospective (a) executive officer to take an oath or affirmation that binds him to support the Constitution, or (b) judicial officer with an oath or affirmation that conforms to both the mandate and express-prohibition provisions of Article VI, § 3; and
Whereas: During George Washington’s first term of office the only members of the general government who take an oath or affirmation that conforms to both the mandate and express-prohibition provisions of Article VI, § 3 are President Washington and Members of Congress; and
Whereas: During President Washington’s first administration it appears that there are subordinate officers in the executive branch and judicial officers in the judicial branch of the general government, but every such individual is barred from holding office under the United States for failure to take an oath or affirmation that conforms to both the mandate and express-prohibition provisions of Article VI, § 3; and
Whereas: All putative executive- and judicial-branch officers of President Washington’s first administration are culpable for personating an officer of the United States, usurping exercise of either “The executive Power,” Article II, § 1, or “The judicial Power of the United States,” Article III, § 1; and
Whereas: During President Washington’s first term of office, every purported government officer participating in every civil or criminal proceeding in any putative court of the United States, usurps exercise of jurisdiction and the judgment in every such civil or criminal proceeding is void, coram non judice (Latin “not before a judge”); and
Wherefore: The First Congress are culpable for, among other felonies and high crimes, fraud and treason to the Constitution, and every putative executive or judicial officer taking his oath of office during the first administration of President Washington is in connivance with the First Congress and culpable for, among other things, the same felonies and high crimes.
Prior to the Act of August 6, 1861, infra, Members of Congress and the president hold a public trust and commissioned officers of the uniformed services hold office under the United States; no putative executive or judicial officer, however, holds office under the United States because none has taken an oath or affirmation that conforms to both the mandate and express-prohibition provisions of Article VI, § 3.
Under pretext of the need to ensure loyalty to the Government of the United States based on the then-current political climate, Congress on August 6, 1861, in “An Act requiring an Oath of Allegiance, and to Support the Constitution of the United States, to be administered to certain Persons in the Service of the United States,” Chapter 64, 12 Stat. 326, require of themselves and officers of the uniformed services and everyone else apparently in government an unconstitutional religious test oath to support the Constitution which supplants any previous oath or affirmation to support the Constitution and disqualifies each taker thereof from holding an office or public trust under the United States by reason of violation of the express-prohibition provision of Article VI, § 3 against religious tests as a qualification thereto; to wit (Bold and ALL-CAPS emphasis added):
“Be it enacted in the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That it shall be the duty of the heads of the several departments, to cause to be administered to each and every officer, clerk, or employé, now in their respective departments, or in any way connected therewith, or who shall hereafter in any way become connected therewith, the following oath, viz: ‘I do solemnly swear (or affirm, as the case may be) that I will support, protect, and defend the Constitution and Government of the United States against all enemies, whether domestic or foreign, and that I will bear true faith, allegiance, and loyalty to the same, any ordinance, resolution, or law of any State Convention or Legislature to the contrary notwithstanding ; and, further, that I do this with a full determination, pledge, and purpose, without any mental reservation or evasion whatsoever ; and, further, that I will well and faithfully perform all the duties which may be required of me by law. SO HELP ME GOD.’ And that each and every such civil officer and employé, in the departments aforesaid, or in any way connected therewith, in the service or employment of the United States, who shall refuse to take the oath or affirmation herein provided, shall be immediately dismissed and discharged from such service or employment.”
The net effect of said Act is that the national government established by the Constitution, having been forsaken by Congress, is moribund, all offices and public trusts except the president depopulated as required by Article VI, § 3, and the three great departments (legislative, executive, and judicial), are now consolidated in the putative legislative branch under the de facto exclusive control of Congress—i.e., those individuals masquerading as Senators or Members of the House of Representatives of the Congress of the United States of America—and there is no separation of powers in the new bastard government.
“The Congress as the instrumentality of sovereignty [i.e., “We the People of the United States,” Constitution, Preamble] is endowed with certain powers to be exerted on behalf of the people in the manner and with the effect the Constitution ordains. The Congress cannot invoke the sovereign power of the people to override their will as thus declared. . . .” Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330, 353 (1935).
[Note: As shown herein above and below, your author cites certain Supreme Court opinions to bolster his points. This may seem to contradict the essence of this monograph in that no justice or judge in the history of this country has held office “under the United States,” Article VI, § 3, for failure to take an oath or affirmation that is free of a religious test. Irrespective this seeming incongruity, in this author’s opinion there are certain things from such putative justices that always can be trusted, namely confessions or admissions that work against the interests or can be used to expose the fraud or treason of the alleged government. Other than these things, this author has no use for such opinions.]
Notwithstanding literally dozens of material Supreme Court opinions and legal principles to the contrary, using only three of the eight simple but semi-secret rules of statutory construction (from the word “construe,” not “construct”; for said rules see this author’s “Why the proposed ‘Combating Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Counterfeiting Act of 2017’ applies to only a tiny percentage of Americans”) to craft certain stealth legislation, Congress effectively turn the provisions of the Constitution on their head by (a) defining the common noun “state” / “State” and proper noun “United States” to mean their constitutional opposites, i.e., the bodies politic and geographic area over whom and which the Constitution authorizes Congress to exercise absolute exclusive legislative power—i.e., either the District of Columbia only, the District of Columbia or one of the territories, or the collective of the District of Columbia and the territories—deliberately excluding from the meaning of said definitions every member of the Union, and (b), purporting to incorporate the District of Columbia as a municipal corporation, 16 Stat. 419,[5] under alleged authority of Article I, § 8(17), and pattern for themselves (at the behest of their masters at the private Bank of England in the City of London), but without fanfare, a new purported sovereign state (like the City of London), which will have its own flag, law, police, borders, postal service, government, military, currency, and people, but conceal generally these stratagems and their import from the American People; to wit (Bold emphasis added.):
“Sec. 182. And be it further enacted, That wherever the word state is used in this act it shall be construed to include the territories and the District of Columbia, where such construction is necessary to carry out the provisions of this act.” “An Act to provide Internal Revenue to support the Government, to pay Interest on the Public Debt, and for other Purposes,” ch. 173, 13 Stat. 223, 306, June 30, 1864.
“TITLE XXXV.
“INTERNAL REVENUE. “. . . Sec. 3140. The word ‘State,’ when used in this Title, shall be construed to include the Territories and the District of Columbia where such construction is necessary to carry out its provisions.” Revised Statutes of the United States, Passed at the First Session of the Forty-third Congress, 1873–’74, p. 601, approved retroactively as of the Act of March 2, 1877, amended and approved as of the Act of March 9, 1878 (retroactive to December 1, 1873).
“TITLE I.—INCOME TAX.
“. . . SEC. 15. That the word ‘State’ or ‘United States’ when used in this title shall be construed to include any Territory, the District of Columbia, Porto Rico, and the Philippine Islands, when such construction is necessary to carry out its provisions. “An Act To increase the revenue, and for other purposes,” ch. 463, 39 Stat. 756, 773, September 8, 1916.
(Click here for incorporation of the District of Columbia, 16 Stat. 419.)
Following the Act of June 30, 1864, the appearance of “state” / “State” or “United States” in every putative law or amendment to the Constitution enacted by Congress means either the District of Columbia alone, the District of Columbia or one of the territories, or the collective of the District of Columbia and the territories—and excludes every member of the Union.
The primary contact point between the American People and the putative federal (municipal) government of the “United States” (District of Columbia, a municipal corporation), as Ross Ulbricht knows, is the so-called United States District Court.
Every civil or criminal proceeding in every so-called United States District Court is administered in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. Judiciary and Judicial Procedure, Chapter 176 Federal Debt Collection Procedure, which provides, in pertinent part (Bold emphasis added):
Ҥ 3002. Definitions
As used in this chapter [Chapter 176]:
. . . (15) ‘United States’ means—
(A) a Federal corporation;
(B) an agency, department, commission, board, or other entity of [a Federal corporation] the United States; or
(C) an instrumentality of [a Federal corporation] the United States.”
The only alleged Federal corporation with its own agencies, departments, commissions, boards, instrumentalities, or other entities is the District of Columbia, a municipal corporation.
In every civil or criminal proceeding in every so-called United States District Court, the definition of the statutory term “United States” is a Federal corporation, the ultimate object of which definition is the District of Columbia, a municipal corporation.
The American People are the collective sovereign authority in that certain constitutional republic known as the United States of America; to wit:
“The same feudal ideas run through all their [European countries’, particularly England’s] jurisprudence, and constantly remind us of the distinction between the Prince and the subject. No such ideas obtain here; at the Revolution, the sovereignty devolved on the people, and they are truly the sovereigns of the country, but they are sovereigns without subjects . . . and have none to govern but themselves; the citizens of America are equal as fellow citizens, and as joint tenants in the sovereignty.” Chisholm v Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 471–472 (1793).
“Sovereignty itself is, of course, not subject to law, for it is the author and source of law; but, in our system, while sovereign powers are delegated to the agencies of government, sovereignty itself remains with the people, by whom and for whom all government exists and acts. . . .” Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).
Following the Act of June 30, 1864, supra, re each respective member of the Union: (a) the constitution thereof is revised and expanded so as to include extravagant use of the new statutory term “State” (District of Columbia) within its provisions, and (b) the laws thereof are revised using “state” (lower-case “s”), which is defined therein as a statutory term to mean the District of Columbia only or the District of Columbia or one of the territories (or, in some instances, Indian country or even Canada, a Canadian province, or a Mexican state).
Using but three of the aforementioned rules of statutory construction, all the new legislation is crafted so as to ensure uniformity; thereby, following enactment thereof, supplanting and replacing by definition the republican form of government guaranteed each member of the Union at Article IV, § 4, with a municipal form of government. Every former sovereign “state” (i.e., body politic, not geographic area) of the Union is construed / deemed to be a political subdivision of the District of Columbia, subject to the municipal rule thereunder.
The Constitution makes no mention of municipal law or municipal corporations, which are created by government for political purposes; to wit:
“MUNICIPAL CORPORATION. A public corporation, created by government for political purposes, and having subordinate and local powers of legislation ; e. g., a county, town, city, etc.” Henry Campbell Black, A Dictionary of Law (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co,, 1891), p. 794.)
Under a municipal form of government, citizens are political subjects with civil rights conferred by Congress, whose conduct is governed by statutory rules and who must pay a fee / tax for the privilege of pursuing their respective profession or calling (e.g., nurse, accountant, contractor, locksmith, dental assistant, cosmetologist, doctor, architect, etc.) and earning a living, pursuit of which professions or callings is unlawful without a valid license, technically a certificate, therefor; to wit:
“Municipal law, thus understood, is properly defined to be ‘a rule of civil conduct prescribed by the supreme power in a state,’ commanding what right and prohibiting what is wrong.” William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England: Book the First, A Reprint of the First Edition with Supplement (London: Dawsons of Pall Mall, 1966), p. 44.
“LICENSE (Lat. licere, to permit).
“. . . When the power is exercised by municipal corporations, a license is the requirement, by the municipality, of the payment of a certain sum by a person for the privilege of pursuing his profession or calling, whether harmful or innocent, for the general purpose of producing a reliable source of revenue.” Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, p. 1976.
[A note on the driver’s license: In America, every so-called driver’s license is a permission granted by a “state,” i.e., the District of Columbia, a municipal corporation, to pursue one’s profession or calling as a driver and operate for commercial purposes on the highways in the transportation of passengers, passengers and property, or property or cargo a so-called motor vehicle (18 U.S.C. § 31(a)(6)). Those who use the public highways for commercial purposes (all licensed drivers) are a menace to public safety and must be licensed and regulated by the police power. Creation of a so-called motor vehicle occurs at the moment of lodgment, by way of registration, in a record at a local department of motor vehicles (DMV) or department of public safety (DPS) of the serial number of a new automobile, motorcycle, trailer, etc., called a Vehicle Identification Number, or VIN, (Please be advised: “Once a motor vehicle, always a motor vehicle.”). New automobiles, motorcycles, trailers, etc., however, that are paid for in full at first purchase and never registered with a DMV or DPS are not motor vehicles per se but mere consumer goods and require no license or insurance to use. Possession of a driver’s license, however (even if suspended or revoked), can subject one to liability should he use a new automobile, motorcycle, trailer, etc. which has never been registered with a DMV or DPS. To use such consumer good without liability, one must surrender, i.e., officially cancel, his driver’s license. (Should this author receive a substantial number of requests for a comprehensive exposé on the subject of the driver’s license, such will be provided.)
Under a republican form of government as intended by the Framers, the People are “joint tenants in the sovereignty,” Chisholm, supra, exercise supreme political authority, and are endowed with “certain unalienable Rights,” Declaration of Independence, Preamble, among which are “Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness,” id. (“Rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness are equivalent to the rights of life, liberty, and property. . . .”, Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 116 (1872))—and the right to sell one’s labor (e.g., that of a nurse, accountant, contractor, locksmith, dental assistant, cosmetologist, doctor, architect, etc.) or purchase, as an employer, the labor of another by way of private contract, is incidental to and inseparable from the unalienable and constitutional right to life, liberty, and property.
Under the Constitution—which now, except for token displays of fidelity thereto by actors in government, is essentially defunct—Congress have the legislative power “To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes” (Article I, § 8(3)). Unless one’s profession or calling involves one of these three species of commerce, there is no provision of the Constitution that justifies requirement of a license (certificate) therefor.
The respective oath of office, or suggestion thereof, for all concerned putative executive or judicial officers of the “United States” (District of Columbia, a municipal corporation) on September 27, 2013, the date FBI Special Agent Christopher Tarbell of the putative United States Department of Justice swears to the alleged Sealed Criminal Complaint before United States Magistrate Judge Frank Maas, follow below (Bold and ALL-CAPS emphasis added in each citation):
● Congressmen, executive officers, and commissioned officers of the uniformed services:
“United States Code: Title 5—Government Organization and Employees
. . . § 3331. Oath of office
An individual, except the President, elected or appointed to an office of honor or profit in the civil service or uniformed services, shall take the following oath: ‘I, AB, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter. SO HELP ME GOD.’ This section does not affect other oaths required by law.
(Pub. L. 89–554, Sept. 6, 1966, 80 Stat. 424.)”
● Justices and judges; director of marshals service, marshals, and deputy marshals; and clerks and deputy clerks:
“United States Code: Title 28—Judiciary and Judicial Procedure
. . . § 453. Oaths of justices and judges
Each justice or judge of the United States shall take the following oath or affirmation before performing the duties of his office: ‘I, ___ ___, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will administer justice without respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the rich, and that I will faithfully and impartially discharge and perform all the duties incumbent upon me as ___ under the Constitution and laws of the United States. SO HELP ME GOD.’
(June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 907; Pub. L. 101–650, title IV, § 404, Dec. 1, 1990, 104 Stat. 5124.)
“. . . § 563. Oath of office
The Director and each United States marshal and law enforcement officer of the Service, before taking office, shall take an oath or affirmation to faithfully execute the duties of that office.
(Added Pub. L. 100–690, title VII, § 7608(a)(1), Nov. 18, 1988, 102 Stat. 4513.)”
“. . . § 951. Oath of office of clerks and deputies
Each clerk of court and his deputies shall take the following oath or affirmation before entering upon their duties: ‘‘I, _____ _____, having been appointed _____, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will truly and faithfully enter and record all orders, decrees, judgments and proceedings of such court, and will faithfully and impartially discharge all other duties of my office according to the best of my abilities and understanding. SO HELP ME GOD.’’
(June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 925.)”
Firstly, the oath of office for all officers of the so-called United States Marshals Service (28 U.S.C. § 563, supra) lacks language that would bind any taker thereof to support the Constitution, and therefore is unconstitutional and invalid on its face.
Secondly, the religious test “So help me God” in the 5 U.S.C. § 3331 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 453 and 951 oaths of office not only violates the express-prohibition against religious tests at Article VI, § 3 but other things as well; to wit:
“And MR. JUSTICE BLACK for the Court in Torcaso [Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961)], without dissent but with Justices Frankfurter and HARLAN concurring in the result, used this language:
“‘We repeat and again reaffirm that neither a State nor the Federal Government can constitutionally force a person ‘to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion.’ Neither can constitutionally pass laws or impose requirements which aid all religions as against non-believers, and neither can aid those religions based on a belief in the existence of God as against those religions founded on different beliefs.’ 367 U.S., at 495 .” [sic] [Bold emphasis added.] Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 220 (1963).
It neither comports with the First Article of Amendment to the Constitution nor is it in keeping with the principle of separation of church and state to (a) dictate over individuals who do not believe in God that such must swear an oath invoking the help of God in order to hold public office, or (b) make any law in respect of certain establishments of religion that profess a belief in God vis-à-vis other establishments of religion which are founded on different beliefs; to wit:
“The place of religion in our society is an exalted one, achieved through a long tradition of reliance on the home, the church and the inviolable citadel of the individual heart and mind. We have come to recognize through bitter experience that it is not within the power of government to invade that citadel, whether its purpose or effect be to aid or oppose, to advance or retard. In the relationship between man and religion, the State is firmly committed to a position of neutrality. . . .” Id. at 226.
Whereas: It is clear that regarding the relationship between man and religion, Congress is not committed to a position of neutrality but rather one of feigned bias—with the words “So help me God” serving as a specious, superficial tool to ensure that no taker of any oath or affirmation in which said religious test appears shall have any duty of fidelity to the Constitution or accede to any office or public trust “under the United States,” Article VI, § 3, only the contrived “United States,” 28 U.S.C. § 3002(15) (the District of Columbia, a municipal corporation), of the so-called United States Code; and
Whereas: “The executive Power,” Article II, § 1, and “The judicial Power of the United States,” Article III, § 1, are co-extensive with the “legislative Powers,” Article I, § 1, conferred on the “Congress of the United States,” id.—i.e., officers of the executive and judicial branches have jurisdiction to the same extent that Congress have legislative power; to wit:
“It [the judicial power] is indeed commensurate with the ordinary legislative and executive powers of the General Government . . .”, Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 435 (1793); and
“[I]t is an obvious maxim, ‘that the judicial power should be competent to give efficacy to the constitutional laws of the Legislature.’ The judicial authority, therefore, must be co-extensive with the legislative power. . . .”, Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. 738, 808 (1824); and
Whereas: The Constitution confers upon those Members of Congress who have taken an oath or affirmation that conforms to both the mandate and express-prohibition provisions of Article VI, §3, limited legislative power throughout the Union; to wit:
“It is clear that Congress, as a legislative body, exercise two species of legislative power: the one, limited as to its objects, but extending all over the Union: the other, an absolute, exclusive legislative power over the District of Columbia. . . .”, Cohens v Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 434 (1821); and
Whereas: Executive and judicial officers who have taken an oath or affirmation that conforms to both the mandate and express-prohibition provisions of Article VI, §3, are officers “under the United States,” Article VI, § 3, and have limited jurisdiction throughout the Union; to wit:
“As we have repeatedly said: ‘Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. . . .’ Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (citations omitted) . . .”, Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 489 (2004); and
Whereas: No putative Member of Congress who has failed to take an oath or affirmation that conforms to both the mandate and express-prohibition provisions of Article VI, § 3 holds a public trust “under the United States,” Article VI, § 3, or is authorized to exercise any of the “legislative Powers,” Article I, § 1, conferred on the “Congress of the United States,” id., anywhere in the Union; and
Whereas: No putative executive or judicial officer who has failed to take an oath or affirmation that conforms to both the mandate and express-prohibition provisions of Article VI, § 3 holds an office “under the United States,” Article VI, § 3, or is authorized to exercise “The executive Power,” Article II, § 1, or “The judicial Power of the United States,” Article III, § 1, anywhere in the Union; and
Whereas: At the time of the alleged Sealed Criminal Complaint, neither Christopher Tarbell nor Frank Maas has taken an oath or affirmation that conforms to both the mandate and express-prohibition provisions of Article VI, § 3; and
Whereas: At the time of the alleged Sealed Criminal Complaint, neither Christopher Tarbell nor Frank Maas holds an office “under the United States,” Article VI, § 3; and
Whereas: At the time of the alleged Sealed Criminal Complaint, neither Christopher Tarbell nor Frank Maas is authorized to exercise “The executive Power,” Article II, § 1, or “The judicial Power of the United States,” Article III, § 1, or take jurisdiction anywhere in the Union; and
Whereas: New York County and the Southern District of New York are situate in that certain commonwealth united by and under authority of the Constitution and admitted into the Union July 26, 1788, i.e., New York; and
Whereas: Upon presentment of the alleged Sealed Criminal Complaint, Christopher Tarbell usurped exercise of “The executive Power,” Article II, § 1, and jurisdiction in New York County, New York, and the Southern District of New York under color of office and authority; and
Whereas: Upon purporting to administer an oath or affirmation to Christopher Tarbell in respect of the alleged Sealed Criminal Complaint, Frank Maas usurped exercise of “The judicial Power of the United States,” Article III, § 1, and jurisdiction in New York County, New York, and the Southern District of New York under color of office and authority; and
Whereas: There being no constitutional authority for Christopher Tarbell to present the alleged Sealed Criminal Complaint to Frank Maas or for Frank Maas to administer an oath or affirmation to Christopher Tarbell in respect thereof, the alleged Sealed Criminal Complaint is unconstitutional, bogus on its face, a nullity, and of no force or effect; and
Whereas: There is no evidence of a crime committed by Ross Ulbricht; and
Whereas: There is no probable cause for the issuance of a warrant for the arrest or imprisonment of Ross Ulbricht; and
Whereas: Ross Ulbricht has been denied due process of law, as guaranteed by the Fifth Article of Amendment to the Constitution; and
Whereas: Any and all measures taken against Mr. Ulbricht based on the alleged Sealed Criminal Complaint are void ab initio (Lat. From the beginning; from the first act) and of no force or effect,
Wherefore: There is no basis in law for the imprisonment of Ross Ulbricht and he must be released immediately.
However Mr. Ulbricht may have brought his current predicament on himself is irrelevant to this author; those who have acted and are acting against Ross Ulbricht are bereft of constitutional authority to do so.
The same thing that has happened to Mr. Ulbricht could befall anyone else in America, whether there is substance to any purported allegations / charges or not.
As demonstrated in this author’s monograph “Casualties of cryptocurrency: Income tax and the Federal Reserve,” cryptocurrency, particularly Bitcoin, operates to revive the right to contract privately, without the participation / intervention of the “state” / “State” or “United States”—all of which statutory terms equate, ultimately, to the District of Columbia, a municipal corporation.
The Constitution at Article I, § 10(1) protects the sanctity of the right to contract privately; to wit:
This means that Americans who neither (a) take up housekeeping (actual residence) within the exterior limits of the District of Columbia, nor (b) realize earnings directly from a source (whether governmental or private) nor own real property or a business located within the exterior limits of the District of Columbia (legal residence), are free to sell their labor to another or purchase the labor of others privately as they choose; to wit:
“‘The right to make contracts about one's affairs is a part of the liberty protected by the due process clause. Within this liberty are provisions of contracts between employer and employee fixing the wages to be paid. In making contracts of employment, generally speaking, the parties have equal right to obtain from each other the best terms they can by private bargaining. . . .’” Morehead v. New York ex. Rel. Tipoldo, 298 U.S. 587, 610 (1936), quoting Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, at pages 545, 546, 43 S.Ct. 394, 24 A.L.R. 1238.
“The individual may stand upon his constitutional rights as a citizen. He is entitled to carry on his private business in his own way. His power to contract is unlimited. He owes no duty to the state or to his neighbors to divulge his business, or to open his doors to an investigation, so far as it may tend to criminate him. He owes no such duty to the state, since he receives nothing therefrom, beyond the protection of his life and property. His rights are such as existed by the law of the land long antecedent to the organization of the state, and can only be taken from him by due process of law, and in accordance with the Constitution. . . .” Hale v. Hinkel, 201 U.S. 43, 74-75.
The problem is that in order to get along today we have been forced to use the private property of the private Federal Reserve known as Federal Reserve Notes, the legal tender of the District of Columbia, a municipal corporation, and pay in-kind for the privilege a commercial penalty called “income tax,” which is collected from us under color of law, office, and authority by private-sector workers of the private Federal Reserve in the so-called Department of the Treasury and Internal Revenue service or enforced by actors of the District of Columbia, a municipal corporation, a.k.a. “United States,” masquerading as officers of the national government established by the Constitution; e.g.:
“Resistance to additional income taxes would be even more widespread if people were aware that . . . 100 percent of what is collected [in income tax] is absorbed solely by interest on the Federal debt [paid to the Federal Reserve] . . . . In other words, all individual income tax revenues are gone before one nickel is spent on the services which taxpayers expect from their Government.” J. Peter Grace, “President’s Private Sector Survey on Cost Control: A Report to the President” (Reagan), dated and approved January 12 and 15, 1984, p. 3.
Bitcoin represents the first unstoppable remedy to that situation by eliminating the ability of any third party to intervene in such private contracts; the faster its spread the sooner the demise of income tax and the private Federal Reserve and—ultimately—extortion and abuse of the American People at the hands of usurpers ensconced in the District of Columbia working in behalf of the private Federal Reserve.
Meanwhile, it is time for Ross Ulbricht to be released from prison.
~ Lockesmith.
Donations: BTC: 3HLhj7wq9dbYTLNHE2Vq7yJW9xgYD88xZF
[Footnote 1]
“Thus the loan from [private] Bank [of England] was the first permanent loan . . . in theory, since the Government reserved the right to pay it off . . . in fact, since everyone foresaw that the Government would never want to destroy an institution so useful to itself and to the public.
“The capital of the Bank was thus in the hands of the Government.
“In what way, then, could it make any profit?
“. . . [T]he Bank had the power to issue [i.e., create from thin-air in exchange for a promise-to-pay from the Government, and loan into circulation as currency, its own promissory] notes.
“It issued these [promissory notes] to an amount equal to the sum [of gold] advanced [“loaned”] to the Government [thereby doubling its wealth as to the value of the loan—which would never be repaid (only payments of interest)—every time it made a loan of gold to the government]. . . .”
A. Andréadès, History of the Bank of England 1640 to 1903, 4th ed. (reprint), Christabel Meredith, trans. (London: Frank Cass & Co., Ltd., 1966), pp. 84-85.
“But let us coolly consider the principle involved in this plan of issuing notes upon the security of the public debts. Stated in simple language, it is this: That the way to CREATE money is for the Government to BORROW money. . . . [A]s a general principle, what can be more palpably absurd ? . . .”
H. D. Macleod (economist, author), Theory and Practice of Banking, 6th ed., 1855, pp. 416-417, quoted in Andréadès, supra, p. 124. “[E]very loan made to the government was attended by an equivalent increase in the paper currency.” Macleod, cited id.
“It [the Bank of England] coined, in short, its own credit into paper money.” Thorold Rogers, The First Nine Years of the Bank of England (Oxford, 1887), p. 9, quoted in Andréadès, supra, p. 82.
[Footnote 2]
Eustace Mullins, The World Order: Our Secret Rulers, 2nd ed., 1992 election ed. (Staunton, Va.: Ezra Pound Institute of Civilization, 1992), p. 102.
[Footnote 3]
An extremely rare public disclosure (Rothschild proxies own / control 96% of all media worldwide) reveals unilateral Rothschild control of the American economy via controlling interest in each of the private Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s nominal-stockholder banks, which, collectively, own controlling interest in the stock of the remaining 11 regional private Federal Reserve Banks; thereby securing Rothschild control of the entire private Federal Reserve System and documenting the reality of unilateral, alien domination of the Fed’s primary borrower-servant, Congress, and Congress’ employer, the government of the “United States,” a.k.a. the District of Columbia, a municipal corporation, and, by virtue of the Fed’s private ownership of the currency, Federal Reserve Notes, the American economy; to wit, in pertinent part:
“This said Rothschild [i.e., the Rothschild Dubai office, institutional proxy of Sir Evelyn Robert Adrian de Rothschild] is not getting directly involved but will act through commercial banks in which it has equity or has connections with, like JP Morgan and other ones. Moreover, through the same commercial banks, Rothschild has a say, and a powerful one, over the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY).
“By law the latter plays a key role in the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) and thus has a crucial role in making key decisions about interest rates and the US money supply.
“Through the FRBNY Rothschild is in a privileged position to influence US monetary policy and shaping US monetary supply, crucially important since the US dollar remains the main reserve currency in the world.”
AsiaNews, “Signs of a new financial storm for September coming from Dubai and Saudi Arabia,” June 1, 2009, http://www.asianews.it/index.php?l=en&art=15402&size=A (accessed June 3, 2009).
[Footnote 4]
“The Federal Reserve is not an agency of government. It is a private banking monopoly.”
Rep. John R. Rarick, “Deficit Financing,” Congressional Record (House of Representatives), 92nd Congress, First Session, Vol. 117—Part 1, February 1, 1971, p. 1260.
“Federal Reserve Banks . . . are not federal instrumentalities . . . but are independent, privately owned and locally controlled corporations.”
Lewis v. United States, 680 F.2d 1239 (9th Cir. 1982).
[Footnote 5]
“An Act to provide a Government for the District of Columbia,” Ch. 62, Sec. 18, 16 Stat. 419, February 21, 1871; later legislated in “An Act Providing a Permanent Form of Government for the District of Columbia,” Ch. 180, Sec. 1, 20 Stat. 102, June 11, 1878, to remain and continue as a municipal corporation (brought forward from the Act of 1871, as provided in the Act of March 2, 1877, amended and approved March 9, 1878 (retroactive to December 1, 1873).