65 Years Ago Today, the CIA Conspired with the UK to Overthrow Iran on Behalf of Big Oil

 Today marks the 65th anniversary that the west carried out a coup in  Iran that destabilized the county by overthrowing the country’s  democratically elected leader, Mohammad Mossadegh, and installed a CIA  groomed dictator. What was once considered a conspiracy theory is now a fact as the  government has since admitted to carrying out Operation Ajax that was  planned by the CIA in conjunction with MI6 in the UK to exploit the  Iranian people and steal their oil on behalf of the  Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC)  – the British state-owned oil company established in 1908 with this  objective in mind and the forerunner of today’s global oil conglomerate  BP. 

As TFTP reported last year,  the State Department released a trove of documents that give insight  into the CIA’s role in the 1953 coup d’état that led to the overthrow of  Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadeq. The newly declassified documents, titled “Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, Iran, 1951–1954,”  provide a notable difference from the State Department’s 1989 version  of the coup, which left out any involvement from American and British  intelligence. 

A memorandum from Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles to President Eisenhower, dated March 1, 1953, serves as a reminder that internally, “the elimination of Mossadeq by assassination or otherwise,” was used as a method in repairing ties with Iran, restoring oil negotiations, and stopping a “Communist takeover.” 

“Ever since the assassination of General Razmara in  March 1951, and the subsequent impasse and diplomatic break with Britain  over the oil negotiations, the Iranian situation has been slowly  disintegrating. The result has been a steady decrease in the power and  influence of the Western democracies and the building up of a situation where a Communist takeover is becoming more and more of a possibility. However, even the present crisis is likely to be unsatisfactorily compromised without a Communist Tudeh victory. Of course, the elimination of Mossadeq by assassination or otherwise might precipitate decisive events except in the unlikely alternative that the Shah should regain courage and decisiveness.”

Another memorandum from the CIA, dated March 3, 1953, detailed the “Capabilities of CIA clandestine services in Iran,” which could be used to “prevent the assumption of power by Tudeh,” Iran’s Communist party. The list included mass propaganda means; personal denunciations and  rumor spreading; street riots, demonstrations, and mobs; and providing  assistance in Iran “After Tudeh Take-Over.” 

“Mass propaganda means (press,  etc.): CIA controls a network with numerous press, political, and  clerical contacts which has proven itself capable of disseminating  large-scale anti-Tudeh propaganda.”

While the conversations initially supported Mossadeq as Iran’s prime  minister, the tone soon changed, and a memorandum from the CIA, dated March 18, 1953, noted that top State Department officials had begun discussing “The general subject of Mossadeq’s continuance in office.” 

“Gist of discussion was to effect that situation has  materially altered since December. While there is no obvious choice in  sight to replace Mossadeq it is felt that any assets which could be  rallied to support a replacement should, if at all possible, he  preserved for at least a few months more until the course of events may  be clarified.”

In addition to its array of “services” listed above, that were used  to control the situation in Iran, the CIA also advised the soon-to-be  leaders. In a memorandum, dated August 14, 1953, the CIA detailed a meeting with Fazlollah Zahedi, the Iranian general who would become Mossadeq’s replacement. 

“Earlier meeting with Zahedi showed him firm of  purpose but inhabiting dream world so far as his subsequent program  concerned. Spoke of free medical care for the third class citizens,  mechanizing agriculture and growing vast crops of cotton on Moghan  Steppes, equalizing wealth by income taxes, etc. Time [is] not  right for us to argue issue but we [are] warning strongly against making  impossible promises in early speeches. It [is] clear Zahedi will need  firm, realistic guidance.”

In a memorandum, dated August 17, 1953,  the CIA revealed its attempts to control public opinion after the coup,  by telling Kermit Roosevelt, the director of the operation, that the  State advised its “press relations people” to stay away from terms such  as “coup d’état” and “plot,” while working to convince the public that  if there was a coup, it was on behalf of Mossadeq—not Zahedi. Two days  later, they carried it out. 

“Roosevelt should  be advised that State has passed the word to VOA and instructed its own  press relations people to avoid any such terminology as ‘coup d’état,’  ‘plot,’ etc., and that while playing the story ‘straight’ they should  play up the fact that there is another version of the story supported by  both Zahedi and now the Shah which indicates that if there was any coup  d’état it was that of Mossadegh and not of Zahedi.”

The archive includes nearly 1,000 pages of documents, and while it is  significant in framing the stage for today’s relations between the  United States and Iran, it also important based on the fact that it is  information the U.S. has attempted to bury. 

The idea that the CIA would meddle in a sovereign nation, work to  overthrow its government, and then influence public perception, is  nothing new in 2018. And yet, despite years of revelations,  regime-change wars and failed proxy governments, there is still a  perception among the American people that the government interfering  with countries that have done nothing to the U.S., all in the name of  “freedom.”