Book Review: The Anti-Federalist Papers and the Constitutional Convention Debates

The Anti-Federalist Papers and the Constitutional Convention Debates is a book about the formation of the United States government and the arguments against its foundational document by Ralph Ketcham. Ketcham wrote the introduction, but the book proper consists of materials from 1787–88 that were written and published during and immediately after the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia.

The introduction explains the context in which the Constitution (printed in Appendix II, except for the 27th Amendment, which was adopted after this book's printing) was developed, beginning with the period between the Stamp Act and the Declaration of Independence (1765–76). The rejection of almost all of the old forms of authority and tradition, already weak in the New World, required a period of synthesis of new thought, and the decade after independence provided much empirical data on what seemed to work. Ketcham describes some of these experiments in the former colonies, then explains what the Founders meant by monarchy, republicanism, and democracy, whose usages have changed somewhat since the 1780s. He then discusses the difficulties faced by the Founders in not being able to work with the checks and balances that existed in traditional feudal institutions like lords and bishops. Differences between regions of the United States are then discussed, as they would shape many of the internal conflicts during the first century of the nation. Ketcham notes that the political community of the time was restricted to landowning white men and certainly did not include slaves, which would remain a point of contention until it was resolved by war in 1865. The Articles of Confederation (printed in Appendix I) are discussed next, and it was their perceived shortcomings that led to calls for a convention to modify them.

With the stage set for the Constitutional Convention, Ketcham previews the content of the book; first the Constitutional Convention debates, then the efforts to ratify the Constitution. The Federalist Papers were written as part of this effort, and the Anti-Federalist Papers, the subject of the book, were written in response and rebuttal to them. Ketcham concludes the main part of his introduction by summarizing federalist and anti-federalist thought. A few short sections following this explain the arrangement, use, and editing of the documents, the chronology of events from when the Articles of Confederation became effective (Mar. 1, 1781) to when the Bill of Rights became effective (Nov. 3, 1791), and a table that matches each issue with the best-regarded Federalist and Anti-Federalist writings that address them.

The Constitutional Convention Debates

The first half of the book takes the reader through the Constitutional Convention debates from May to September 1787, although it begins with a letter sent from James Madison to George Washington in April. Here, one encounters a wide range of ideas and proposals for the federal government, some of which were regrettably rejected and others of which would be unthinkable today. The reader sees from the beginning that the delegation from Virginia subverted the proceedings from the beginning, choosing to go beyond their charge of amending the Articles of Confederation by forming an entirely new constitution. Indeed, there were some who sought to eliminate the state governments in favor of a strong national government, and others who would grant Congress the power to nullify state laws.

In the debates on representation, one finds a more classically republican and aristocratic attitude than may be found in contemporary politics, with open hostility to the idea of involving the masses in affairs of state expressed by many delegates. Others found it necessary to have at least the lower house of the legislature elected by the people, but more for a sense of identification with the government than for attempting to empower the masses. The enormous effort put into determining a proper number of representatives stands out. The cynicism of some of the delegates concerning what politicians will do with power and which interests will be pursued is admirable and sadly lacking today. One finds that concern that monied interests would hold sway over affairs of state was as common then as it is now. The need for good people to constitute a good government was also well-recognized, but the Founders were wearing rose-colored Enlightenment glasses on this subject.

The discussions on the executive branch led to a wide range of proposals, as the recent experiences of the Founders had given them pause about creating a strong executive and there was no clear historical precedent. Had another course been taken, there might now be three or more Presidents of the United States serving at one time. Perhaps the President(s) might receive no salary, or might have no duties other than appointing officers and enforcing laws. Term limits for the President (later codified in the 22nd Amendment) were seriously considered. Choosing the President out of the Congress, as is done in most other democratic and republican systems, was almost adopted and only changed toward the end of the Convention, which would have produced vastly different results than have occurred. Interestingly, a term limit was viewed by some as a check on the legislature if it should appoint the President. Once again, antipathy toward mass democracy among the delegates is evident, but so is support for majority rule in some less direct sense. The Electoral College system was finally devised as an attempt to reconcile the various positions on the election of the executive.

The consideration of the judiciary, which led into a broader discussion on separation of powers, is perhaps the most interesting part of the Constitutional Convention, for no one there seemed to understand how this branch might become the most powerful, as it undoubtedly has. Such concerns were frequently voiced of the legislative and executive branches. Instead, consideration was given to making judges part of the executive veto power. Though the judges were ultimately not given such power, they granted it to themselves in Marbury v. Madison (1803), and this discussion may help one understand why there was so little resistance to this. The debate over how they might be appointed is one of the most balanced in the book.

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