Case Study #9 - Boko Haram and US Information Operations

This is my ninth installment regarding fictitious geopolitical scenarios involving contemporary (IO) Information Warfare using modern nation states or non-state actors and available technology driven by military doctrine and conflict.

Last month, Nigerien security officials thwarted plans by Boko Haram members to attack the U.S. and British embassies in Abuja, Nigeria (CBS/AP, 2017). These plans highlight the continued efforts of Abubakar Shekau and Boko Haram to inflict damage to the U.S. A full­scale, U.S.­led force tasked with capturing Shekau is not an option due to priorities and resource constraints (among other considerations). Through the use of deception and propaganda, the U.S. aims to "flush out" Shekau and other Boko Haram leaders by making them question their safety in the northern part of the state.

Through the use of military deception (MILDEC), US officials would intend to improve the success of any potential friendly offensive action (JP 3­13.4, 2006). Via official communique, US policy makers and military officials would request that military elements from Nigeria, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon gather and convene near Lake Chad for a training exercise. Via word­ of mouth, dissemination of false information claiming this was a cover for action on Boko Haram occupied territory. The US would expect this information to reach Boko Haram leadership.

Concurrently, US officials would continue openly engaging with the local populace (in person, online, in schools, radio, and television) to promote joint Nigerien and American interests. Through these conduits, the US would aim to take advantage of the Nigerien people's affinity based on Cialdini principles of influence -­ "people prefer to say yes to individuals they know and like" (Cialdini, 2010). Conduits, in this sense, are information or intelligence gateways to the deception target. They may be used to control flows of information to a deception target (JP 3­13.4, 2006). But to effectively promote US propaganda, officails must consider the commonalities Boko Haram members have with their fellow Nigerians, such as motivations, feelings, or myths. To be effective, it must give the impression of being personal, for one must never forget that the mass is composed of individuals, and is in fact nothing but assembled individuals (Ellul, 2005). Their fellow countrymen are in the best position to wittingly (or unwittingly) lead this task.

Similarly, US Information Operations will attempt to make use of Cialdini's reciprocity rule by "giving back" to local Nigerien communities near Boko Haram locations. By contributing to the local economy and building good will with the community, the US would, ideally, benefit from the local population's desire to "repay" with information/intelligence.

It is important to note that all of the depicted IO theories and methodologies are equally applicable to the US, it's citizens and the general mass of unwashed, as evident by the impact of mass media in perpetuating single minded collectivism which prevails in all facets of US culture. All of the following techniques have been and are considered as adaptable and useful to controlling dissent and manufacturing consent with US domestic spheres, including among it's foreign vassals.

References:

CBS/AP. "Boko Haram Plan To Attack U.S., U.K. Embassies Thwarted, Nigeria Says." CBS News. April 12, 2017.

Cialdini, Robert B. Influence: Science and Practice. Boston, MA: Pearson, 2010.

Ellul, Jacques, Konrad Kellen, and Jean Lerner. Propaganda: The Formation of Mens Attitudes. New York, NY: Vintage Books, 2005.

United States. Joint Chiefs of Staff. JP 3­13.4: Military Deception. Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2006.