EOS Amsterdam - EOS Gov Telegram Channel summary August 13 - August 14 2018/ 电报小8月13日-8月14日

(Summary from 12:00 August 13th till 12:00 August 14th)

Market 3.0
Emma quotes pieces out of the Market 3.0 article posted the previous day: “initiatives by neutral service providers lack liquidity; initiatives by liquidity providers lack neutrality. The result to date has been fragmentation into competing proprietary networks, with consequent adverse effects upon market liquidity." She states that the same can be said of the current governance quagmire. Initiatives by neutral entities (to facilitate decision-making by the community) lack the support of the current major players, while initiatives (seeking to frame decision-making for the community) by the major players and organizers lack the support of engaged users who know the difference between facilitating decision-making by the community through the creation of tools as opposed to framing decision-making for the community by creating boards. User Thomas Cox replies to this: “Spooky - I was just reading this article on Market 3.0. Very cool.”

User Emma responds to user Thomas Cox that It was quite insightful. Emma continues by saying that those investing resources (funds or efforts) should rightly expect to benefit from it. This requires that they control the levers for securing those benefits. Alternatively, if there's a fund to which we can contribute to develop resources that returns control to the community, we may see some progress. Centralizing resource development without facilitating decentralized development of resources makes even well-intentioned efforts suspect. Another alternative would have been to use the Workers Proposal fund, but since voting for distribution is determined by token holding, it would be irresponsible for the top 1.6% of token holders who control 90% of the tokens not to improve their positions with their votes. User Sun Tzu replies to Emma and says that this was written by Chris Cook in 2001. He was the director of the International Petroleum Exchange in the late 1990s, and was thinking a lot about the manipulations of big trading players in getting exchanges up in an Internet age.

Voting
Aneta says the following: “Right now the voters proved they can’t keep BPs accountable, the voters turnout is very low. This is a big risk to make them vote on organizations they don’t know anything about and that are so convoluted in their financials that we can’t keep the checks on them. Are we sure we can check their transparency and finances? They will be here to manage billions of our funds. They will need to delegate the realization of these projects to other companies? Who will be these companies we will have No control over? How can we know if this won’t be one big cartel? How can be sure these PMOs themselves won’t be one enormous cartel? Scrap the WPF and don’t give any chance for corruption to anyone. Don’t create something you can’t control.” User Khosi replies that 100m informed voters are much better than 1000m marginally informed voters. This why proxies are so important. If you scrap WPF, the result is that corruption will be concentrated on producer elections. Is that optimal? User Ben Mason says that he thinks Aneta might be right about this, mainly due to voter turnout and lack of voter forced accountability of BPs.

Other:
A new user asks general information on EOS Governance, upon which Yannick gives a long and thorough answer. User Josh Kauffman responds to one of the points made by Yannick as follows: “The part about BPs holding 15/21 for 30 days of a new constitution, was that put into effect? I thought that was only in @thomasbcox's article prelaunch. But rather its the 15% voting participation, 10% more yes than no, 30 consecutive days out of 120. I just wanna see if you're working off out of date info, or am I?”

User Martin posted the following article on blockchain governance: https://steemit.com/eos/@mjhomb/manifesto-for-a-governed-blockchain

User Guillaume posted the following article on Steemit: https://steemit.com/eos/@eostitan/ownership-disclosure-and-remarks-on-eos-governance

There is a new telegram dedicated to EOS Alliance discussion, you can join it here: https://t.me/eos_alliance

User okayplanet posted an article on Steemit regarding Worker Proposals: https://steemit.com/eos/@okayplanet/why-i-support-worker-proposals

市场3.0
Emma引用了前一天发布的Market 3.0文章中的内容：“中立服务商的主动行动缺乏流动性;流动性提供者的主动行动缺乏中立性。如今的结果是分裂为专有网络竞争，从而对市场流动性产生不利影响。“她表示目前的治理泥潭也是如此。中立实体的倡议（促进社区决策）缺乏当前主要参与者的支持，而主要参与者和组织者的倡议（寻求为社区制定决策框架）缺乏占线用户的支持，以及他们不清楚通过创建工具来促进社区决策和通过创建董事会来为社区制定决策之间的不同。用户Thomas Cox回答这个问题：“好诡异 - 我刚才在Market 3.0上阅读这篇文章。很厉害。”

用户Emma向用户Thomas Cox回应说这文章非常有见地。艾玛继续说，那些投资资源（资金或努力）应该正确地期望从中受益。这要求他们控制好杠杆以确保这些利益生成。或者，如果我们可以为我们提供资金以开发将控制权返还给社区的资源，我们可能会有一些进展。在不促进资源分散开发的情况下集中资源开发，即使怀疑善意的努力也会被怀疑。另一种选择是使用工人提案基金，但由于投票分配是由代币持有决定的，因此控制90％代币的前1.6％代币持有人不通过投票改善其地位是不负责任的。 。用户Sun Tzu回复Emma并说这是由Chris Cook在2001年撰写的。他在20世纪90年代末期担任国际石油交易所的主管，当时他考虑在网络的时代里通过操控大型交易参与者来提高交易所价值。。

投票
Aneta说：“现在选民证明他们不能继续信任节点人，选民投票率非常低。这是一个很大的风险，让他们对他们不了解的组织投票，而且他们的财务状况如此复杂，以至于我们无法按时兑现。我们确定我们可以检查他们的透明度和财务状况吗？他们将在这里管理数十亿美元的资金。他们需要将这些项目的实现委托给其他公司吗？谁将是这些公司我们将无法控制？我们怎么知道这不是一个大卡特尔（在美国属于非法）？怎么可以肯定这些项目管理本身不会是一个巨大的卡特尔？废弃WPF并且不给任何人任何腐败机会。不要创造一些你无法控制的东西。“用户Khosi回答说，1亿知情选民比1000米边缘选民要好得多。这就是代理投票如此重要的原因。如果你废弃WPF，结果是腐败将集中在生产者选举上。这是最佳的吗？用户Ben Mason说他认为Aneta可能是对的，这主要是因为选民投票率和缺乏选民对节点人的强制要求。

其他：
一位新用户询问有关EOS治理的一般信息，Yannick对此作出了全面的回答。用户Josh Kauffman对Yannick提出的观点之一做出如下回应：“关于新宪法要求15/21节点人持有，30天的部分，是否实施了？我以为那只是在@thomasbcox的文章预发布之前。并非15％的投票参与率，而是通过票要超过否定票的10%，并且在总共的120天内连续30天，我只是想知道你是否正在处理过时信息，还是我？“

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