Recap Of @ned And @dan Article Sometime Ago...

Good Governance and Steem
Steem has excellent security on accounts, but very poor governance. The community reward pool is the preverbal wallet on the park bench. Those who are voting for themselves and hiding behind pseudo-anonymous accounts are thieves stealing from the community. Those censoring posts on EOS through use of down votes of posts that decline rewards are not held accountable to community standards of behavior.

With proper governance the Steem reward pool would not be pilfered for private gain. Achieving this requires much stronger transparency with identity verification and dispute resolution systems combined with incentive structures that disincentives self-voting (like n2 curve).
source:@dan

Freedom of Expression
Some people worry that absent anonymity, people would self-censor out of fear of community reprisal. There is a legitimate need for anonymous publishing, but it has no place in a community that is distributing financial rewards from the public purse. Steem is an exercise in massively decentralized community governance over community funds. Transparency and accountability is the only disinfectant that can prevent abuse.

There is no reward curve or solution to abuse of community funds until a proper dispute resolution system and identity system is put in place.
source:@dan

The Future of Crypto Governance
I will be moving toward transparent blockchains with strong identity, good governance, and a commitment to protect property rights while disempowering those who would launder profits from digital kidnapping. We must take responsibility and hold others accountable for indirect acts of aggression. Hiring someone else to steal for you (knowingly buying stolen goods) is just as bad as stealing yourself.
source:@dan

Replying to some comment with all “your” suggestions. made to @dan post

Ability to negate voting power -> if implemented in the form described in your GitHub issue, this provides opportunity cost on individual bases. Because of the opportunity costs, this proposal if implemented would resultingly be flatly obtuse from a game theory perspective. There are merits for additional controls over rewards distributions but this specific negating control mechanism is inconsiderate of second order effects and overall obtuse compared to its stated purpose. Instead, new rewards pool controls are best experimented on in new token ecosystems. Thats why SMTs, naturally. Which you laughably told me were a bad idea, “because there can only be one global currency”, twice.
n^2 -> talk about “stealing”. n^2 can only seem “fair” when you’re sitting on top of the STEEM rich list, like you are. Now that STEEM rewards are linear there is no more stealing, finally. But keep in mind, STEEM is only one form of a distribution game, and truelly it is an opt in system, which is itself another premise from which to argue around these topics.
Identity as a consensus for distributions is my idea (page 53 Smart Media Token Whitepaper). It will be implemented in SMTs via Oracles.
You told me twice, in 2016 and 2017, SMTs were a bad idea, “because there can only be one global currency”, before going off to market multi currencies in your new project. Now you’re back to propose microscopic changes to the STEEM rewards contract. There is no need for forcing these proposals in the face of SMTs.

source:@ned

So my Question is who was right at that time? And are those suggestion hunting us now or what?

Let me know what is on your mind...