‘The most important reason for Napoleon’s downfall was the ‘Spanish Ulcer’’. How valid is this view?

‘The most important reason for Napoleon’s downfall was the ‘Spanish Ulcer’’. How valid is this view?
fatboyjames (54) in history • 6 months ago

How did Napoleon go from being at the height of his rule, in 1806/ 1807, to his downfall in 1815? This downfall arguably began with the implementation of the Continental System in 1807, in which Napoleon tried to economically blockade Britain from Europe. Napoleon’s aim with the Continental System was “bringing the ‘nation of shopkeepers’ to their knees through economic strangulation, rather than by direct, military confrontation”. Portugal was not a part of the Continental System, and European merchants smuggled goods to Britain, thus leading to Napoleon’s invasion of Portugal and the start of the Peninsular war, which Napoleon called the ‘Spanish Ulcer’ when looking back at his downfall, “Spain was an open wound that refused to go away”. It cannot be denied that Napoleon’s decision to invade Spain was a big mistake; David Gates says that “Napoleon’s interference in the Iberian Peninsula has been seen as straightforward evidence of his greed and ambition” and that Napoleon failed “to grasp the political and military complexities involved”. The Peninsular war became an increasingly big problem with the involvement of Britain, “Britain had a new “moral legitimacy” for involving itself in international affairs in the name of liberty”. Britain was not known for being as militarily strong as France at this time but partnered with the Spanish guerrillas and the regular Spanish army, Anglo-Spanish forces were able to cause great problems to the French. The “cruel and sinister figure of the Spanish guerrilla” were a huge frustration for the French army and Napoleon seemingly came out of nowhere. The ‘Spanish Ulcer’ turned the tables and meant France had their military strength greatly sapped over the period of 1808 to 1814.
Even though the ‘Spanish Ulcer’ played a very big part in the downfall of Napoleon, removing the idea of French invincibility that had been built up from all the previous victories such as Austerlitz and Jena, many do not agree that it was the most important reason for Napoleon’s downfall. There were other events that weaken the view of Spain being the most important aspect of Napoleon’s downfall, such as the Continental System, the defiant role of Britain and the developing weaknesses of the French Army, along with the improvements of Napoleon’s enemies. Historian Philip Haythornthwaite states that Britain got involved in spain because it gave the “British government a degree of authority in negotiations with its allies”. However, Napoleon’s decision to invade Russia in 1812 was a huge mistake, leading to his military forces being largely destroyed and unable to defend France from the allied forces between 1812 and 1814, “the Grand Army lost a third of its effectives and 8,000 horses through disease, desertion and shortage of food or fodder”. With a different view to Gates, Charles Esdaile sees Russia as the most important reason for Napoleon’s down fall and wrote that “the Grand Armée that had invaded Russia had ceased to exist” leaving France unable to resist against the allied forces. Traditional views, similar to Gates’, romanticise the role of the guerilla’s because they were on the side of the British, Ignacio Paz says that correspondence betweens soldiers and people back home would “humanise their mission in Spain, as Britons felt closer to the soldiers”, making many accounts in history favourable of the Spanish guerillas.
The ‘Spanish Ulcer’ did play a huge role in Napoleon’s downfall, and this was a big mistake on Napoleon’s part after all of his previous successes, especially Austerlitz in 1805, a great reason for his failure was him underestimating the Spanish. “The tide began to turn in 1808 when Napoleon created a new enemy by usurping the Spanish throne in favour of his brother Joseph… The ensuing war was to play a major part in Napoleon's downfall.” The Peninsular war proved to allied forces that Napoleon and the French army could be defeated. By planning to bring in new, liberal reforms, Napoleon had expected the Spanish to welcome French control. Napoleon had been correct to some extent because a small number of the urban middle-class did support Napoleon’s reforms, however, most Spaniards did not, and remained loyal to the Bourbons who the French had deposed. “The reaction in Madrid to this open aggression was chaotic.” By deposing the Bourbons, and awakening Spanish national feeling, Napoleon caused deep opposition to his plans, which would later lead to his defeat in Spain. Napoleon underestimated Spain because he thought the country was still in a weak state due to their decline in the 17th and 18th centuries from their ‘golden age’. Spain had been at war through most of the 17th century which threw them into economic recession. Geoffrey treasure says that “there was something sick about a society in which, in the words of a minister of 1641, ‘each in his own sphere and station desires honour and estimation above everything else’; or about an intellectual life that was largely untouched by the new mathematics or the scientific discoveries of the time.”; Spain was seen as the ‘Sick Man of Europe’ from the 17th century up until Napoleon decided to invade. In his proclamation to the Spaniards on the forced abdication of Charles IV in 1808, Napoleon said "Spaniards: After a long agony your nation was on the point of perishing. I saw your miseries and hastened to apply a remedy. Your grandeur, your power, form an integral part of my own”. Napoleon was obviously trying to convince the Spanish that his reforms were for their benefit but many Spaniards disagreed, seeing the invasion on their country as a way for Napoleon to expand his empire. This speech did not perhaps reflect his actual opinions as he said himself that he wanted to “make all the peoples of Europe one people and Paris the capital of the world”; his primary motive for invading Spain was to expand his empire, not to benefit the Spanish. What he said in private is much more likely to be true as opposed to what he said in his speech because in private he would have no reason to lie. He was known for his use of propaganda but was unable to convince the Spanish that he was invading them for the benefit of their country.
When Napoleon’s brother, Joseph, entered the country, French troops had to be used to maintain order. This became known as the ‘Days of May’ in 1808 and acted as a signal for all the Spanish provinces to rebel against the French Army. Many Spanish peasants decided to join the guerrilla bands now attacking the French. “It is very difficult to know what to say about the guerrillas... They obliged the French to fortify themselves in every village and town in the country; … they murdered all stragglers … they rendered the communications of the enemy very difficult and hazardous, and often cut them off for weeks together” Goya’s paintings of the ‘Days of May’ famously showed Spanish attitudes and feelings towards the French; “Even though Goya had shown French sympathies in the past, the slaughter of his countrymen and the horrors of war made a profound impression on the artist.”. The fact that Goya had sympathised with the French in the past highlights his strong attitudes to the French after the Days of May and similar to the example of Beethoven, the ‘Days of May’ paintings show an enlightened thinker who had liked the French and Napoleon, now turn against them. Beethoven had “dedicated his third symphony to Napoleon Bonaparte… until Napoleon declared himself emperor. Beethoven then sprung into a rage, ripped the front page from his manuscript and scrubbed out Napoleon’s name.”
It was now felt possible to defeat Napoleon, particularly by Britain which led to them joining the Peninsular war on the side of the Spanish and Portuguese. French soldiers were left demoralised since they “had no effective military response to this genuine 'people's war'”, the army had to use a military strategy and tactics against warfare that they had never encountered before but after the initial victory in Spain “Napoleon left the affairs of Spain to his Marshals and he was never to return” proving that Napoleon had underestimated the Spanish and thought it would be an easy victory. Napoleon had failed to understand how bad the issue was in Spain and would just give “orders to the marshals which included the usual talk of 'flying columns', making examples', 'utilising the Spanish authorities' and so on” which did not help because this was a type of warfare that Napoleon had never seen before, his usual tactics were not going to win in Spain. The tactics used by the guerillas were unpredictable and a huge frustration to Napoleon and the French; “On a daily basis, French detachments experienced ambushes, ammunition dumps were blown up, supply trains suffered from raids, efforts to collect food and taxes endured harassment, water and victuals were poisoned, and solitary soldiers succumbed to sniper fire or knife attacks”. Esdaile says that the role of the guerilla’s was not that important because even their “best efforts were not enough to halt the march of French occupation”. Even though the guerilla’s were able to slow down the French army, it had not been possible for them to be more than an annoyance without the involvement of the British. Out of the 650,000 French soldiers in Spain, 300,000 became casualties. Even though this seems like a huge number, it was less than half of the number who become casualties during Napoleon’s invasion of Russia in 1812 where he lost close to 650,000 men. However, other historians say that the role of the guerillas was very important, clearly “the drain of occupying and garrisoning their conquests was weakening the French and their offensive capabilities.”
In 1808 the Peninsular War had caught the attention of the British, meaning that France had to fight a war against a combined force, of Spanish regular and irregular forces, and now the British. It was the slowness of the French in defeating the guerilla’s that created a ‘knock-on’ effect, causing the British to join, making the problem even worse for the French. On Wellington’s way to an expedition in Venezuela “the decision was taken to switch it to the Peninsula”. Being on the side of the guerrilla’s and Spanish-Portuguese regulars gave Wellington and the British a huge advantage against the French; Wellington realised this himself and said “The French armies have no communications and one army has no knowledge of the position or of the circumstances in which the others are placed”, he even “owed his salvation to the intelligence role of the guerrillas”. Wellington’s comment is crucial in understanding the role of the guerilla’s because “so severely harassed were the French lines of communication that scores of vital messages failed to get through”. This played a major part in the French defeat in the Peninsular War; an example of this can be seen in 1812 where hardly any of the communication between King Joseph and Marshal Marmont made it to each other; “the marshal was quite unaware that Joseph’s ‘Army of the Centre’ was en route to join him and, consequently, went ahead and fought the Battle of Salamanca with 14,000 men less than he might have had”. The crucial role of communication, intelligence and mobility that Napoleon had taken advantage of in his previous victories was no longer possible. The French cavalry were not as effective in Spain as they had been in other battles, “the cavalry regiments left on the secondary theaters of war (Italy, Spain, and elsewhere) were of lower quality.” One of the most crucial aspects of Napoleonic warfare had been the speed of manoeuvre which had been a key part in his victories between 1796 and 1807, evident through his use of the corps system. Also the fact that Napoleon himself wasn’t always in Spain and would leave it for his Marshals was a huge mistake because it had been him who had built up the image of invincibility not his marshals and the Guerilla fighters would attack when Napoleon was not there. When he left the “province undefended guerilla bands multiplied in the absence of French troops” increasing the strength of the Spanish forces. The combination of all this factors are what led to the defeat of the French in Spain. Not only was Wellington a problem from the British but so was Sir John Moore was briefly in 1808 and 1809. According to Charles Esdaile Moore was, “convinced he had been cheated of his rightful victory” painting Moore out to be slightly delusional of his ability. He was defeated by the French at the battle of Elvina in January 1809 and suffered injuries that led to his death hours later. This easy defeat of Moore by the French army shows that Britain was not as strong as Wellington’s army made them appear to be, proving Wellington to be a strong general and a rival for Napoleon.
The Peninsular war became a much bigger problem for France in 1812 with the increasing involvement of Wellington. Even though Wellington’s involvement is not solely responsible for the defeat of France, it is a significant reason for their defeat. “Wellington's ability to push on eastwards in the face of an enemy that was numerically far superior was made possible by Spanish regular and guerrilla forces pinning down French armies elsewhere in Spain”. In 1813, Wellington was eventually able to invade France “On 7th October Wellington crossed the Bidassoa into France; on 10th November the French defences along the line of the Nivelle were broken”. Wellington had proven himself to be a great general during the Peninsular war, maybe even one to rival Napoleon himself, playing a huge part in Napoleon’s downfall. He had studied Napoleon’s warfare, knew his strategies and tactics intimately, and was known for his incredible ability to remember landscapes and geographical details of battle fields. “Wellington had managed to put and keep British forces on the European continent for six years, something no other English general had been able to accomplish”. It could be argued that without the intervention of Britain and Wellington, France would not have had to fight a war on two-fronts. Britain hadn’t been able to make a significant difference on the European mainland until the Peninsular war, partly responsible for hNapoleon’s abdication in April 1814. However, there were many other reasons for Napoleon’s downfall and his abdication, such as the huge failure of his invasion of Russia in 1812.
Napoleon’s invasion of Russia in 1812 played a big part in his downfall, nearly depleting his entire army. Esdaile wrote that Napoleon’s decision to invade Russia was because he was “ frustrated by the long war in Spain and Portugal,... Napoleon was simply bent on flexing his military muscle and winning fresh glory”. Napoleon publicly says why he wanted to invade Russia in his address to the troops at the beginning of the Russian campaign in May 1812 where he says “At Tilsit, Russia swore eternal alliance with France, and war with England. She has openly violated her oath, and refuses to offer any explanation of her strange conduct” but he obviously wanted to repair the demoralisation of the ‘Spanish Ulcer’. Napoleon thought it best to live off the land allowing the army to move faster, but given the season, there was not much food and they either starved or had to find other sources of food; “the men could at least find horse-flesh to ease their own hunger”. The lack of food and conditions of the season made it hard for the army to move deeper into Russia; “The Grand Army moved with ominous slowness”. Napoleon, did manage to make his way into Moscow on September 14th. “Napoleon hoped that the occupation of Moscow would force Alexander to respond to his peace overtures”. Napoleon’s plan to make Alexander accept peace had failed, making the whole invasion, and the death of his troops, pointless. Napoleon was returning in the Russian winter, all while still attempting to live off the land, making it even harder. When Napoleon left Moscow he “was down to some 100,000 troops, the rest having died, deserted or been wounded” from the 650,000 men that Napoleon had first set off with. Napoleon had originally decided to go back a different way, but faced the Russian army at Maloyaroslavets, forcing him to go back the way he had come. “All forage along that route had already been consumed, and when the army arrived at Smolensk it found that stragglers had eaten the food left there”. The Russian partisans had obviously taken some inspiration from Spain, using guerilla tactics and retreating whenever the French army got close to attacking. Hearing rumours of a coup attempt in Paris, Napoleon left. Soon after this massive depletion of his army in Russia, he had to fend off an attack from the Sixth Coalition; “the French emperor was able to raise another massive army”. On his return he was left with an inexperienced army. If Napoleon never set foot in Russia, he would have had a much more experienced army that would have been able to defend France from the Sixth Coalition; maybe the Coalition would not even have attacked in the first place from fear that his army was too strong. This makes the invasion of Russia a huge part in Napoleon’s downfall because it left him defenceless and resulted in his abdication in 1814.
The lead up to Napoleon’s invasion of Spain was his decision to create the Continental System, influencing factors that caused him to be defeated in Spain, such as the involvement of Britain. Many European countries were not happy with the Continental System because it meant less trade for them; even Russia was not keen. “The suspension of trade with Britain was hurting Russian exports and economy, and Tsar Alexander issued a decree taking Russia out of the Napoleon's Continental System.”The Continental System wasn’t popular with the rest of Europe since they were losing out on trade from Britain, making them worse off, using Portugal as a way to smuggle goods and trade with Britain Even though the Continental System had negative effects in Europe, it did achieve its goal in hitting Britain financially; “In Britain in 1810, five companies went bankrupt and there was a spate of business failures and strikes throughout the country.”The Continental System was also made less effective by the fact that Britain was able to find trade elsewhere, not having as big an effect as Napoleon would have liked. In a British note to the neutral powers on May 16th 1806, the note states that “His Majesty is pleased to declare that such blockade shall not extend to prevent neutral ships and vessels laden with goods not being the property of His Majesty's enemies”, stating that trade will still be possible with other countries such as America.
Up until 1807 Napoleon had shown no sign of losing his power, winning many battles like Ulm and Austerlitz. However, this turning point of Napoleon’s rise in power becoming his downfall started with the Spanish Ulcer. Even though it is the Spanish Ulcer that could be argued as the beginning of the events leading up to his downfall, this is not necessarily the main reason for Napoleon abdicating as Emperor of France on the 11th April 1814. Napoleon’s decision to invade Spain was a big mistake; but it was nowhere near as big as the grave mistake of Napoleon’s decision to invade Russia, which almost wiped out his entire army as big as 650,000 men. Napoleon did have many men become casualties during the Peninsular war, but this was less than half of the number of men that he lost in Russia, and was over a much larger period of time than in Russia. Collectively, the losses from both played a huge impact in the downfall of Napoleon, with nearly 1,000,000 becoming casualties across the two events, the losses from Russia having the biggest impact. Traditional historians, such as Gates, see Spain and the role of the guerillas as the most important aspect of Napoleon’s downfall, whereas revisionist historians, like Esdaile, lay the blame predominantly on Russia. Both Napoleon’s invasion of Russia and the Peninsular war defeated Napoleon in different ways. The defeat in Russia was at the hands of Napoleon’s own stupidity and lost a large number of men, whereas the defeat in Spain was the first time the French army had been made to look weak and was more of a morale defeat. The failure of the Russian invasion was worse because it was a direct result of Napoleon’s actions, the army was experienced in battle and was a strong force, they just didn’t have the supplies needed in order to be successful. However, the defeat in Spain was a result of the Guerrilla warfare that was used by the Spanish, which the army was not experienced in fighting. Since the army was not less experienced in fighting Guerrillas, it was harder for a French victory. However, it was very possible for Napoleon’s invasion of Russia to be a success if he had decided to bring supplies instead of living off the land, making this a much worse defeat as there is not much excuse for his failure other than his own stupidity. Napoleon’s failure in Russia is the main reason for Napoleon’s downfall, not the ‘Spanish Ulcer’ because it is a direct cause of Napoleon’s abdication in 1814. Had Napoleon not invaded Russia, and maintained the strength of his army, it is very possible that he could have defeated the Sixth Coalition. Instead he had to try and defend France with a large but inexperienced army that had only just been put together. An impact this big had not been present from the Peninsular war, which is evident from the fact that Napoleon was still able to take as many as 650,000 men to Russia at the same time that he was fighting Spain. It is for this reason that the biggest reason for Napoleon’s downfall was the invasion of Russia in 1812 and not the ‘Spanish Ulcer’, although it cannot be denied that the ‘Spanish Ulcer’ played a large part in Napoleon’s downfall from 1807 onwards.

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6 months ago by fatboyjames (54)$0.19
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[-]wise-old-man (4) · 6 months ago
There is a sufficiency in the world for man's need but not for man's greed.

• Mahatma Gandhi

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[-]cuentadisponible (34) · 22 days ago
Es probable que Napoleon halla sido traicionado por asesores. Uno de ellos fue su Canciller. Lo que si. Es que su propia capacidad de hacer lo perjudico. Y termino matandolo junto a su orgullo

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