An idea for a public ledger with a combination of symmetric and asymmetric cryptography, hidden one-time use public keys, and disposable public-private key pairs. Each transaction is authenticated with a new set of keys, that are kept secret until the transaction is made, and at that time relayed directly to the miners.

The set of keys for each transaction, one-time use only, are a public-private key pair, a secret d, and a symmetric key that is the same as the public key.

Authentication of transactions

A secret d is signed with a one-way function f, using a public-private key pair, resulting in the signed message s. The signature s is then encrypted with a symmetric key, the public key of the public-private key pair that was used to authenticate d, resulting in the ciphertext c.

The ciphertext c is included in the transaction, and becomes a proof of the next public key.

In this signature scheme, to sign a transaction, the plaintext d as well as the public key that corresponds to the signature of d is revealed and made public, verified by the miners, and a signature of the transaction itself is authenticated using that public key.

Address registry separate from signatures and authentication

The public-private key pairs are disposable, and only used to sign and authenticate transactions, while the address space uses a separate standard similar to the Ethereum Name Service (ENS).

Computational cost to brute-force

In this signature scheme, the resistance to brute force relies mainly on symmetric cryptography, while the authentication relies mainly on asymmetric cryptography. The best of two world.

To brute force, an attacker can run through all possible combinations to find the symmetric key that has encrypted s to c, and would still lack d that is needed to verify s to the public key (that is used as the symmetric key. )

A signature scheme for public ledgers

The secret d is signed with a one-way function f, using a public-private key pair, resulting in a signature ss is encrypted with the public key using symmetric cryptography, resulting in the proof c.

To authenticate a transaction, d and the public key are revealed to the miners, they verify the proof c, and the signature of the transaction.

A new set of keys have been chosen prior to each transaction, and a new proof c is included in the transaction, to be authenticated the next transaction. The keys are one-time use only.

To brute force, an attacker can run through all possible combinations to find the symmetric key that has encrypted s to c, and would still lack d that is needed to verify s to the public key (that is used as the symmetric key. )